54
Sensemaking in Safety Critical and Complex Situations
organization studies and is strongly associated with the work of Karl Weick and his
change of focus from decision-making and organizational outcomes to how individuals and organizations make sense of or give meaning to events and experiences
( Weick, 1995). Sensemaking research has intensified over the last decades; however,
it has been scattered over several different domains with differing approaches. In
relation to the extensive literature on sensemaking, this chapter is a brief review of
the sensemaking literature to establish an understanding of the concept, especially
how it is understood in the context of s harp-end operators in h igh-risk organizations.
Mainly, work on the bridge of a maritime vessel is used as an example to illustrate
sensemaking in a high-risk environment.
This chapter is structured as follows: The next section presents the overall concept
of sensemaking, a definition of sensemaking and how it relates to decision-making
and situation awareness ( SA). Thereafter, the third section describes how sensemaking is understood as a cognitive process, followed by the fourth section describing
some of the debated core aspects of the sensemaking concept. A review of the main
factors influencing sensemaking is presented in fifth section. The sixth section discusses sensemaking in safety-critical situations before the last section concludes with
a summary and thoughts about future research opportunities.
THE CONCEPT OF SENSEMAKING
Sensemaking seems self-explanatory as it literally means “ the making of sense”;
however, as a cognitive concept, it reaches beyond merely being another word for
“ understanding” or “ interpreting” ( Weick, 1995). Interpretation implies there is
something in the environment to be discovered; however, sensemaking is not a passive diagnosis, it refers to the processes where people actively play a role in constructing the very situations they try to make sense of ( Weick, 1995). “ Sensemaking
is about sizing up a situation while you simultaneously act and partially determine
the nature of what you discover” ( Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015, p. 32).
Sensemaking both precedes and follows d ecision-making ( Maitlis, 2005).
Sensemaking is about “ the interplay of action and interpretation rather than the influence of evaluation on choice” ( Weick et al., 2005, p. 409). Snook ( 2000) effectively
describes how sensemaking differs from decision-making in his analysis of a friendly
fire incident over Iraq in 1994 where two US Air Force F -15 fighters accidentally shot
down two helicopters killing all 26 peacekeepers on board. Snook points out that the
F-15 pilots did not “ decide” to pull the trigger. They were trying to make sense of the
situation they were in. Ambiguous stimuli and strong expectations made the pilots
believe they saw an enemy helicopter, “ seeing through the mind’s eye” as Snook puts
it. Blaming the pilots for making the wrong decision would mean overlooking the
“ potent situation factors that influence action. Framing the i ndividual-level puzzle as
a question of meaning rather than deciding shifts the emphasis away from individual
decision makers toward a point somewhere ‘ out there’ where context and individual
action overlap” ( Snook, 2000, p . 207). Snook emphasizes that the individual sensemaking occurs as an interplay with the environment or embedded in context. To
view human actions as a struggle to make sense rather than d ecision-making makes
Sensemaking in Safety Critical and Complex Situations
organization studies and is strongly associated with the work of Karl Weick and his
change of focus from decision-making and organizational outcomes to how individuals and organizations make sense of or give meaning to events and experiences
( Weick, 1995). Sensemaking research has intensified over the last decades; however,
it has been scattered over several different domains with differing approaches. In
relation to the extensive literature on sensemaking, this chapter is a brief review of
the sensemaking literature to establish an understanding of the concept, especially
how it is understood in the context of s harp-end operators in h igh-risk organizations.
Mainly, work on the bridge of a maritime vessel is used as an example to illustrate
sensemaking in a high-risk environment.
This chapter is structured as follows: The next section presents the overall concept
of sensemaking, a definition of sensemaking and how it relates to decision-making
and situation awareness ( SA). Thereafter, the third section describes how sensemaking is understood as a cognitive process, followed by the fourth section describing
some of the debated core aspects of the sensemaking concept. A review of the main
factors influencing sensemaking is presented in fifth section. The sixth section discusses sensemaking in safety-critical situations before the last section concludes with
a summary and thoughts about future research opportunities.
THE CONCEPT OF SENSEMAKING
Sensemaking seems self-explanatory as it literally means “ the making of sense”;
however, as a cognitive concept, it reaches beyond merely being another word for
“ understanding” or “ interpreting” ( Weick, 1995). Interpretation implies there is
something in the environment to be discovered; however, sensemaking is not a passive diagnosis, it refers to the processes where people actively play a role in constructing the very situations they try to make sense of ( Weick, 1995). “ Sensemaking
is about sizing up a situation while you simultaneously act and partially determine
the nature of what you discover” ( Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015, p. 32).
Sensemaking both precedes and follows d ecision-making ( Maitlis, 2005).
Sensemaking is about “ the interplay of action and interpretation rather than the influence of evaluation on choice” ( Weick et al., 2005, p. 409). Snook ( 2000) effectively
describes how sensemaking differs from decision-making in his analysis of a friendly
fire incident over Iraq in 1994 where two US Air Force F -15 fighters accidentally shot
down two helicopters killing all 26 peacekeepers on board. Snook points out that the
F-15 pilots did not “ decide” to pull the trigger. They were trying to make sense of the
situation they were in. Ambiguous stimuli and strong expectations made the pilots
believe they saw an enemy helicopter, “ seeing through the mind’s eye” as Snook puts
it. Blaming the pilots for making the wrong decision would mean overlooking the
“ potent situation factors that influence action. Framing the i ndividual-level puzzle as
a question of meaning rather than deciding shifts the emphasis away from individual
decision makers toward a point somewhere ‘ out there’ where context and individual
action overlap” ( Snook, 2000, p . 207). Snook emphasizes that the individual sensemaking occurs as an interplay with the environment or embedded in context. To
view human actions as a struggle to make sense rather than d ecision-making makes