48
Sensemaking in Safety Critical and Complex Situations
since this is what determines how it will be followed up as part of analysis or implementation as part of design processes or organizational efforts. Knowing which combinations of factors and levels made the operational barrier element high, medium
or low in criticality does not determine what actions are taken further in terms of
analysis and implementation efforts. One exception may arise in cases where operational barrier elements are rated as highly critical and where follow-up actions may
require substantial costs and/ or resources. If this occurs, documenting the rationale
behind why the operational barrier element was ranked as highly critical may serve a
purpose as basis for informed decision-making. A qualitative analysis would in any
case be the most useful.
Experiences from using the tool as part of processes for mapping and assessing operational barrier elements show that an expected distribution in criticality of
approximately:
• 10%–20% operational barrier elements with high criticality
• 40%–50% operational barrier elements with medium criticality
• 30%–40% operational barrier elements with low criticality
The distribution depends on what type of technology and operations are being considered, as well as the age of the installations. For example, operational barrier elements related to well control in drilling operations still involve many manual tasks as
compared to production facilities with automated fail-safe systems. Similarly, older
plants ( in general) were designed and constructed at a time when automation was
less advanced.
WHAT ABOUT LATENT FAILURES ( TYPE A ACTIONS)?
The presented process and roadmap have proved useful for screening operational
barrier elements in several large-scale projects, both as part of engineering and during the operational phase. It does however lack a feature which was particularly
emphasized in the guidance provided by Health and Safety Executive ( 1999), namely
identifying and screening Type A actions with the potential of introducing latent
TABLE 3.11
Scores Used for Calibrating the “ Roadmap”, Including Upper and Lower
Bounds for Per Criticality Level
Intervals (Ref. Table 10)
MAH Severity and
Unfamiliarity and
Upper
Lower
Levels
Consequence/Dependency
Complexity
Bound
Bound
High
3
1.5
9
8.5
Medium
2
1
8
5
Low
1
0.5
4
2
NA
NA
0
Sensemaking in Safety Critical and Complex Situations
since this is what determines how it will be followed up as part of analysis or implementation as part of design processes or organizational efforts. Knowing which combinations of factors and levels made the operational barrier element high, medium
or low in criticality does not determine what actions are taken further in terms of
analysis and implementation efforts. One exception may arise in cases where operational barrier elements are rated as highly critical and where follow-up actions may
require substantial costs and/ or resources. If this occurs, documenting the rationale
behind why the operational barrier element was ranked as highly critical may serve a
purpose as basis for informed decision-making. A qualitative analysis would in any
case be the most useful.
Experiences from using the tool as part of processes for mapping and assessing operational barrier elements show that an expected distribution in criticality of
approximately:
• 10%–20% operational barrier elements with high criticality
• 40%–50% operational barrier elements with medium criticality
• 30%–40% operational barrier elements with low criticality
The distribution depends on what type of technology and operations are being considered, as well as the age of the installations. For example, operational barrier elements related to well control in drilling operations still involve many manual tasks as
compared to production facilities with automated fail-safe systems. Similarly, older
plants ( in general) were designed and constructed at a time when automation was
less advanced.
WHAT ABOUT LATENT FAILURES ( TYPE A ACTIONS)?
The presented process and roadmap have proved useful for screening operational
barrier elements in several large-scale projects, both as part of engineering and during the operational phase. It does however lack a feature which was particularly
emphasized in the guidance provided by Health and Safety Executive ( 1999), namely
identifying and screening Type A actions with the potential of introducing latent
TABLE 3.11
Scores Used for Calibrating the “ Roadmap”, Including Upper and Lower
Bounds for Per Criticality Level
Intervals (Ref. Table 10)
MAH Severity and
Unfamiliarity and
Upper
Lower
Levels
Consequence/Dependency
Complexity
Bound
Bound
High
3
1.5
9
8.5
Medium
2
1
8
5
Low
1
0.5
4
2
NA
NA
0