68
2 The Use of Paradigms and Theories in the PULSE 3 …
analyse problems (Cornut 2015). As already stated, not one single theory can explain
everything or even an event. We need alternative approaches and traditions in order to
construct a collective understanding (Hayes and James 2014). The late Elinor Ostrom
(2007: 15181) propagated the ‘…serious study of complex, multivariable, nonlinear,
cross-scale and changing systems,’ instead of relying on ‘…simple, predictive models
of social-ecological systems…’
In order to take up Ostrom’s (2007) call, we need a plurality of theories and
not just a few or, at best, one, like complexity thinking, to constitute a collective
understanding. Table 2.2 contains a list of the interpretivist, critical, postpositivist
and positivist theories that are applicable to the practicalities of the governance and
politics of society and the natural environment. This list is by no means exhaustive,
since it identifies only the theories that I have come across during my research career.
Ideally, one should be able to expand on it and refine it. What’s more, practitioners do
not adhere to one theory when executing practices or policies. In this light, theories
‘describe modes of thinking and not so much objective patterns of behaviour’ (Hayes
and James 2014: 408). We also need a plurality of theories, because practitioners
are likely to move from one approach to another and, in so doing, they rely on a
variety of perspectives. This will inevitably generate contradictions when issues are
investigated (Hayes and James 2014).
I would now like to discuss the pluralist philosophy that lies behind my list of
theories. My opinion, which is in agreement with that of Lebow (2011: 1225–1226,
cited in Rengger 2015), is that: ‘Pluralism must be valued not only as an end in its
own right, but also as an effective means of encouraging dialogue across different
approaches, something from which we have something to learn’. This means that
the pluralistic use of theories brings about a variety of explanatory forms of what is
happening in the world (Rengger 2015). This claim is also in line with the ethos of
analytic eclecticism (Meissner 2017). If we look closely at Lebow’s (2011) claim of
pluralism in scholarship and theory, what is this ‘something’ that we might learn? I am
of the view that this ‘something’ goes beyond the fact that there is a plurality of theories for explaining and understanding social phenomena. For me, this ‘something’
is the inherent value that is contained in each theory, which widens our knowledge
horizons and does not restrict us to mono-paradigmatic and mono-theoretical explanations. In other words, as far as I am concerned, we will gain more knowledge with
which we can explain and deepen our understanding of issues, and with which we
can open the dialogue between disciplines and fields of study, which is something
we can then utilise in the service of assisting practitioners and the public. For me,
this service of scientists is the ultimate ‘something’ that we will learn, because it
will take us further away from our mono-theoretical convictions and prevent us from
blindly following the so-called sages, or gurus, who put forward theories for others
to follow blindly, without questioning their basic assumptions (Meissner 2017).
The dialogue that Lebow (2011) refers to can take several forms, and it is not
just the ‘genuine and reasoned communication between equals’ (Rengger 2015:
3). Therefore, if the dialogue can take many forms, I would like to start my own
by continuing my support of paradigmatic and, particularly, theoretical pluralism,
as opposed to empiricism and the blind following of the sages, both of which are
2 The Use of Paradigms and Theories in the PULSE 3 …
analyse problems (Cornut 2015). As already stated, not one single theory can explain
everything or even an event. We need alternative approaches and traditions in order to
construct a collective understanding (Hayes and James 2014). The late Elinor Ostrom
(2007: 15181) propagated the ‘…serious study of complex, multivariable, nonlinear,
cross-scale and changing systems,’ instead of relying on ‘…simple, predictive models
of social-ecological systems…’
In order to take up Ostrom’s (2007) call, we need a plurality of theories and
not just a few or, at best, one, like complexity thinking, to constitute a collective
understanding. Table 2.2 contains a list of the interpretivist, critical, postpositivist
and positivist theories that are applicable to the practicalities of the governance and
politics of society and the natural environment. This list is by no means exhaustive,
since it identifies only the theories that I have come across during my research career.
Ideally, one should be able to expand on it and refine it. What’s more, practitioners do
not adhere to one theory when executing practices or policies. In this light, theories
‘describe modes of thinking and not so much objective patterns of behaviour’ (Hayes
and James 2014: 408). We also need a plurality of theories, because practitioners
are likely to move from one approach to another and, in so doing, they rely on a
variety of perspectives. This will inevitably generate contradictions when issues are
investigated (Hayes and James 2014).
I would now like to discuss the pluralist philosophy that lies behind my list of
theories. My opinion, which is in agreement with that of Lebow (2011: 1225–1226,
cited in Rengger 2015), is that: ‘Pluralism must be valued not only as an end in its
own right, but also as an effective means of encouraging dialogue across different
approaches, something from which we have something to learn’. This means that
the pluralistic use of theories brings about a variety of explanatory forms of what is
happening in the world (Rengger 2015). This claim is also in line with the ethos of
analytic eclecticism (Meissner 2017). If we look closely at Lebow’s (2011) claim of
pluralism in scholarship and theory, what is this ‘something’ that we might learn? I am
of the view that this ‘something’ goes beyond the fact that there is a plurality of theories for explaining and understanding social phenomena. For me, this ‘something’
is the inherent value that is contained in each theory, which widens our knowledge
horizons and does not restrict us to mono-paradigmatic and mono-theoretical explanations. In other words, as far as I am concerned, we will gain more knowledge with
which we can explain and deepen our understanding of issues, and with which we
can open the dialogue between disciplines and fields of study, which is something
we can then utilise in the service of assisting practitioners and the public. For me,
this service of scientists is the ultimate ‘something’ that we will learn, because it
will take us further away from our mono-theoretical convictions and prevent us from
blindly following the so-called sages, or gurus, who put forward theories for others
to follow blindly, without questioning their basic assumptions (Meissner 2017).
The dialogue that Lebow (2011) refers to can take several forms, and it is not
just the ‘genuine and reasoned communication between equals’ (Rengger 2015:
3). Therefore, if the dialogue can take many forms, I would like to start my own
by continuing my support of paradigmatic and, particularly, theoretical pluralism,
as opposed to empiricism and the blind following of the sages, both of which are