66
2 The Use of Paradigms and Theories in the PULSE 3 …
contexts. In this regard, Rueschemeyer (2009), just like Falleti and Lynch (2009),
highlighted two other characteristics of causal mechanisms, namely, condition and
relation.
When reflecting on these definitions, we see that causal mechanisms institute both
the processes of causation and the ‘things’ that constitute change, and because of this,
causal mechanisms show not only why something is happening (Guzzini 2011), but
also that something is happening and how it is taking place (Koslowski et al. 1989;
Meissner et al. 2018). In a critique of the concept of causal mechanism, Gerring
(2010: 1500–1501) asserted that:
In prior work, I demonstrate that “causal mechanism” may refer to (a) the pathway or
process by which an effect is produced, (b) a micro-level (microfoundational) explanation
for a causal phenomenon, (c) a difficult-to-observe causal factor, (d) an easy-to-observe
causal factor, (e) a context dependent (tightly bounded or middle-range) explanation, (f) a
universal (i.e. highly general explanation), (g) an explanation that presumes probabilistic,
and perhaps highly contingent, causal relations, (h) an explanation built on phenomena that
exhibit law-like regularities, (i) a technique of analysis based on qualitative or case study
evidence, and/or (j) a theory couched in formal mathematical models.
Indeed, Goertz and Mahoney (2010) stated that the literature around causal mechanisms contains heterogeneous definitions, which, in some way, affirm Gerring’s
(2010) conclusion. Considering what Gerring (2010) had to say about the various
meanings or typology of ‘causal mechanism’, my argument in this regard is that
causal mechanisms are all of these elements, and more, depending on the paradigmatic plain from which a researcher views the world. As was rightfully pointed out
by Gerring (2010), the reason for this is that several of these definitions are contradictory, because causal mechanisms cannot simultaneously be difficult to see and
easy to observe (Guzzini 2011). Taking contradiction into consideration, Schaffer
(2000) contended that one can ‘wire’ causal mechanisms in many ways. The various
‘wirings’ depend on the researcher’s training, which constitutes his or her paradigmatic stance, with respect to research objects and the context in which causal mechanisms are enacted. For a person wearing a positivist lens, it is easy to see the direct
connection between a clogged sewer line and sewerage pollution spilling into a river
or stream. Nevertheless, to uncover some of the hidden causal mechanisms, one
might want to look into the other ‘causes’, which may constitute a blocked sewer.
What is the source of the blockage; household litter or disused diapers? How did the
source of the blockage end up in the sewer line in the first place? Is it because the
consumer of the diaper did not know that disposing of it through the sewer system
might cause a blockage? These are questions that not only highlight the ‘difficultto-observe causal factors’ but that also need to be asked to ascertain how causal
mechanisms arise (Imai et al. 2011). To answer these questions, there needs to be an
interplay between ontology, epistemology and methodology, from various paradigmatic perspectives. On the meta-theoretical functions of causal mechanisms, Turner
(2013: 536) went on to say that:
2 The Use of Paradigms and Theories in the PULSE 3 …
contexts. In this regard, Rueschemeyer (2009), just like Falleti and Lynch (2009),
highlighted two other characteristics of causal mechanisms, namely, condition and
relation.
When reflecting on these definitions, we see that causal mechanisms institute both
the processes of causation and the ‘things’ that constitute change, and because of this,
causal mechanisms show not only why something is happening (Guzzini 2011), but
also that something is happening and how it is taking place (Koslowski et al. 1989;
Meissner et al. 2018). In a critique of the concept of causal mechanism, Gerring
(2010: 1500–1501) asserted that:
In prior work, I demonstrate that “causal mechanism” may refer to (a) the pathway or
process by which an effect is produced, (b) a micro-level (microfoundational) explanation
for a causal phenomenon, (c) a difficult-to-observe causal factor, (d) an easy-to-observe
causal factor, (e) a context dependent (tightly bounded or middle-range) explanation, (f) a
universal (i.e. highly general explanation), (g) an explanation that presumes probabilistic,
and perhaps highly contingent, causal relations, (h) an explanation built on phenomena that
exhibit law-like regularities, (i) a technique of analysis based on qualitative or case study
evidence, and/or (j) a theory couched in formal mathematical models.
Indeed, Goertz and Mahoney (2010) stated that the literature around causal mechanisms contains heterogeneous definitions, which, in some way, affirm Gerring’s
(2010) conclusion. Considering what Gerring (2010) had to say about the various
meanings or typology of ‘causal mechanism’, my argument in this regard is that
causal mechanisms are all of these elements, and more, depending on the paradigmatic plain from which a researcher views the world. As was rightfully pointed out
by Gerring (2010), the reason for this is that several of these definitions are contradictory, because causal mechanisms cannot simultaneously be difficult to see and
easy to observe (Guzzini 2011). Taking contradiction into consideration, Schaffer
(2000) contended that one can ‘wire’ causal mechanisms in many ways. The various
‘wirings’ depend on the researcher’s training, which constitutes his or her paradigmatic stance, with respect to research objects and the context in which causal mechanisms are enacted. For a person wearing a positivist lens, it is easy to see the direct
connection between a clogged sewer line and sewerage pollution spilling into a river
or stream. Nevertheless, to uncover some of the hidden causal mechanisms, one
might want to look into the other ‘causes’, which may constitute a blocked sewer.
What is the source of the blockage; household litter or disused diapers? How did the
source of the blockage end up in the sewer line in the first place? Is it because the
consumer of the diaper did not know that disposing of it through the sewer system
might cause a blockage? These are questions that not only highlight the ‘difficultto-observe causal factors’ but that also need to be asked to ascertain how causal
mechanisms arise (Imai et al. 2011). To answer these questions, there needs to be an
interplay between ontology, epistemology and methodology, from various paradigmatic perspectives. On the meta-theoretical functions of causal mechanisms, Turner
(2013: 536) went on to say that: