problems: all the research in philosophy should be focused on the analysis of the
logics of language, while all other considerations are pure play of words. Bertrand
Russell (1872–1970) has transformed the “play of words” in the mathematical
logics. Russell and his Ph.D. supervisor Afred North Whitehead (1861–1947)
have finally established mathematical logics in their masterwork Principia Mathematica published for the first time in the year 1910.
The most prominent opponent to Vienna empiricism was Karl Popper, who has
argued that the scientific cognition can only be achieved by deduction, rather than
by induction [1]. The frameworks of a new proposed theory does not generally
emerge from the experience, but rather from quite different causes, for instance
from experiences from other scientific fields, personal experiences, social environment, intuition etc., and this theory must have such a form that it could be
falsified by deduction. Accordingly, the basic characteristic of a good theory is not
in its property to be confirmed, but rather in its property to be falsified! Bad
theories, pseudoscientific ideas and dullness are irrefutable! For Popper, falsifiability should be self-contained in the theory on the way that it enables corresponding verification test that should be satisfied. If the theory does not pass the
test, it should be rejected as a false. For instance, physical law that in vacuo all the
objects fall down by the same velocity is good law because it could be tested
experimentally. The advantage of this approach is that the verification of the theory
is much more exact because it is always possible to find an infinite number of
proofs, but only one experiment is enough to reject the theory.
To be historically correct, we have to mention that this idea is not originally
invented by Popper. It has been shaped fifty years earlier by Pierre Duhem (1861–
1916) who has argued that the scientific theory is an abstract construction that
should be verified by observation and by the experiment. Falsifiability method
proposed by Duhem is more appropriate in the scientific method since it is not so
radical as the method of Popper. In the following chapters, we will discuss the
examples where the Popperian radical falsificationistic approach could be counterproductive. Further extension of the Popperian method, which has been proposed
by Imre Lakatos (1922–1974) will also be discussed later in this book.
In the history of science there are plenty of examples in favour of the
Duhem-Popper falsificationistic method. For instance, Nicolaus Copernicus
(1473–1543) did not invent the heliocentric planetary system by induction (i.e. by
experience) from the observations of movements of heaven bodies, because the
astronomy at the time has not an accessible observation data in favour of the idea
about the rotation of Earth around the Sun, rather than Sun around Earth. The
reason that moved Copernicus to heliocentric system was in his philosophical
conviction rather than any kind of precise observation or measurement! Copernicus
was part of the philosophical circle of Neoplatonists, the doctrine which initiated
the philosophy of Renaissance. This version of Platonism appeared in the second
and third century by ideas of Ammonius Saccas (3rd century B.C.), and it has been
finally developed by the roman philosopher Plotinus (nearly 204–270 B.C.). In the
frame of the Neoplatonist point of view, all the Universe emerges, it emanates, from
one abstract, and infinitely distant point. In the Renaissance paintings, this point
1 Chemistry and Philosophy of Science
11
logics of language, while all other considerations are pure play of words. Bertrand
Russell (1872–1970) has transformed the “play of words” in the mathematical
logics. Russell and his Ph.D. supervisor Afred North Whitehead (1861–1947)
have finally established mathematical logics in their masterwork Principia Mathematica published for the first time in the year 1910.
The most prominent opponent to Vienna empiricism was Karl Popper, who has
argued that the scientific cognition can only be achieved by deduction, rather than
by induction [1]. The frameworks of a new proposed theory does not generally
emerge from the experience, but rather from quite different causes, for instance
from experiences from other scientific fields, personal experiences, social environment, intuition etc., and this theory must have such a form that it could be
falsified by deduction. Accordingly, the basic characteristic of a good theory is not
in its property to be confirmed, but rather in its property to be falsified! Bad
theories, pseudoscientific ideas and dullness are irrefutable! For Popper, falsifiability should be self-contained in the theory on the way that it enables corresponding verification test that should be satisfied. If the theory does not pass the
test, it should be rejected as a false. For instance, physical law that in vacuo all the
objects fall down by the same velocity is good law because it could be tested
experimentally. The advantage of this approach is that the verification of the theory
is much more exact because it is always possible to find an infinite number of
proofs, but only one experiment is enough to reject the theory.
To be historically correct, we have to mention that this idea is not originally
invented by Popper. It has been shaped fifty years earlier by Pierre Duhem (1861–
1916) who has argued that the scientific theory is an abstract construction that
should be verified by observation and by the experiment. Falsifiability method
proposed by Duhem is more appropriate in the scientific method since it is not so
radical as the method of Popper. In the following chapters, we will discuss the
examples where the Popperian radical falsificationistic approach could be counterproductive. Further extension of the Popperian method, which has been proposed
by Imre Lakatos (1922–1974) will also be discussed later in this book.
In the history of science there are plenty of examples in favour of the
Duhem-Popper falsificationistic method. For instance, Nicolaus Copernicus
(1473–1543) did not invent the heliocentric planetary system by induction (i.e. by
experience) from the observations of movements of heaven bodies, because the
astronomy at the time has not an accessible observation data in favour of the idea
about the rotation of Earth around the Sun, rather than Sun around Earth. The
reason that moved Copernicus to heliocentric system was in his philosophical
conviction rather than any kind of precise observation or measurement! Copernicus
was part of the philosophical circle of Neoplatonists, the doctrine which initiated
the philosophy of Renaissance. This version of Platonism appeared in the second
and third century by ideas of Ammonius Saccas (3rd century B.C.), and it has been
finally developed by the roman philosopher Plotinus (nearly 204–270 B.C.). In the
frame of the Neoplatonist point of view, all the Universe emerges, it emanates, from
one abstract, and infinitely distant point. In the Renaissance paintings, this point
1 Chemistry and Philosophy of Science
11