3 WHY JAPAN IS NO-LONGER A FRONT-RUNNER: DOMESTIC POLITICS …
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discouraging the extensive development of renewable energy. The root
cause of this energy policy is Japan’s energy security concerns that have
prevailed in Japanese energy policy since the two oil crises in the 1970s.
Since then, the Japanese government has promoted nuclear energy as
the primary energy alternative, not renewable energy sources, to reduce
overseas oil dependency while pursuing energy conservation through the
development of nuclear power plants led by the private sector (Samuels
1987). In February 1974, the government established the Advisory
Committee for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE) under the auspices
of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) (since 2001,
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry: METI) to adopt a long-term
energy supply and demand policy every five years (Kikkawa 2011; Yoshioka 2011). Since then, the government has prioritized the development
of nuclear energy over renewable energy, which led to constructing 54
nuclear power plants, becoming the third largest nuclear-energy power
in the world, just after the United States and France. As the construction of new nuclear power plants almost came to a halt in the late 1990s
to the early 2000s, 2 the government began to advocate nuclear energy
as one of the main policy measures to mitigate climate change, claiming
that it does not emit any greenhouse gases (Yoshioka 2011). Thus, the
government could continuously justify upholding the policy of prioritizing nuclear energy over renewable energy. However, the long-term
energy policy of discouraging the full-fledged development of renewable energy while steadfastly maintaining the system of local monopolies
over electricity generation and distribution by relying on nuclear power
plants revealed themselves as major systemic flaws in both energy policy
and climate change policy when the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident
occurred. Japan had to restart old coal and gas power plants and even
build new thermal plants, to import more fossil fuels such as natural gas
and coal, and then to continue to emit a large volume of greenhouse
gases, which render Japan’s position in international climate negotiations
laggard or passive, at best.
In sum, the reason why Japan has been reluctant since COP3 in Kyoto
to take leadership in international negotiations is mainly that the policy
coalition consisted of the MITI/METI and Japan Business Federation
(Keidanren) under the strong influence of energy-intensive industries
(Moe 2012, 2015; Tsunekawa 2010) that are very reluctant to support
any substantial CO 2 emission reductions. This pressure was reflected even
in Prime Minister Hatoyama’s initiative of setting a mid-term target for
53
discouraging the extensive development of renewable energy. The root
cause of this energy policy is Japan’s energy security concerns that have
prevailed in Japanese energy policy since the two oil crises in the 1970s.
Since then, the Japanese government has promoted nuclear energy as
the primary energy alternative, not renewable energy sources, to reduce
overseas oil dependency while pursuing energy conservation through the
development of nuclear power plants led by the private sector (Samuels
1987). In February 1974, the government established the Advisory
Committee for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE) under the auspices
of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) (since 2001,
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry: METI) to adopt a long-term
energy supply and demand policy every five years (Kikkawa 2011; Yoshioka 2011). Since then, the government has prioritized the development
of nuclear energy over renewable energy, which led to constructing 54
nuclear power plants, becoming the third largest nuclear-energy power
in the world, just after the United States and France. As the construction of new nuclear power plants almost came to a halt in the late 1990s
to the early 2000s, 2 the government began to advocate nuclear energy
as one of the main policy measures to mitigate climate change, claiming
that it does not emit any greenhouse gases (Yoshioka 2011). Thus, the
government could continuously justify upholding the policy of prioritizing nuclear energy over renewable energy. However, the long-term
energy policy of discouraging the full-fledged development of renewable energy while steadfastly maintaining the system of local monopolies
over electricity generation and distribution by relying on nuclear power
plants revealed themselves as major systemic flaws in both energy policy
and climate change policy when the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident
occurred. Japan had to restart old coal and gas power plants and even
build new thermal plants, to import more fossil fuels such as natural gas
and coal, and then to continue to emit a large volume of greenhouse
gases, which render Japan’s position in international climate negotiations
laggard or passive, at best.
In sum, the reason why Japan has been reluctant since COP3 in Kyoto
to take leadership in international negotiations is mainly that the policy
coalition consisted of the MITI/METI and Japan Business Federation
(Keidanren) under the strong influence of energy-intensive industries
(Moe 2012, 2015; Tsunekawa 2010) that are very reluctant to support
any substantial CO 2 emission reductions. This pressure was reflected even
in Prime Minister Hatoyama’s initiative of setting a mid-term target for