52 H. OHTA
expected by many observers in the world, Japan, jointly with European
countries, took the lead during negotiations for the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), it hosted the
Kyoto Conference (COP3) in 1997 and contributed to the adoption
of the Kyoto Protocol. However, since that time, it has been reluctant
to grasp the initiative once more. Instead, while assigning itself the role
of a mediator between the United States and the European Union or
between developed countries and developing countries, it has recently
become a laggard in taking bold steps to mitigate climate change.
After the historic electoral victory of the Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ) over the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in September (2009),
Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio pledged that Japan would reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 25% by 2020 below 1990 levels at the
UN Summit on Climate Change and in December at the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) to the UNFCCC. However, there was a
condition attached to his pledge that all large emitters also commit to
ambitious reduction targets. Hatoyama’s successor Kan Naoto, who faced
the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011, and the Tokyo Electronic Power Company’s (TEPCO’s) Fukushima Daiichi (No. 1) nuclear
power plants’ triple disaster, did not have enough time to reshape Japan’s
climate policy. Nonetheless, he left the Japanese version of the feed-intariff system for the promotion of renewable energies in exchange for his
resignation. However, the Japanese government led by Prime Minister
Noda Yoshihiko refused to take any responsibility for the second commitment period under the framework of the Kyoto Protocol at COP17 in
2012.
The second Abe administration has not shown any enthusiasm for tackling this global problem either, although the first Abe administration in
May 2007 showed some interest by announcing with much fanfare a
new climate change initiative “Cool Earth 50” (to halve GHG emissions
from the current level by 2050). The government in June even proudly
declared that Japan would strive to “Becoming a Leading Environmental
Nation Strategy in the 21st Century” (MOE 2007). Why has Japan
been so reluctant to take a leadership role in climate change diplomacy
despite the technological lead it holds that could generate an economic
gain, vigorous public support, and the political incentive for non-military
diplomacy?
This chapter argues that the source of Japan’s inaction in international climate negotiations arises from its energy policy, which has been
expected by many observers in the world, Japan, jointly with European
countries, took the lead during negotiations for the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), it hosted the
Kyoto Conference (COP3) in 1997 and contributed to the adoption
of the Kyoto Protocol. However, since that time, it has been reluctant
to grasp the initiative once more. Instead, while assigning itself the role
of a mediator between the United States and the European Union or
between developed countries and developing countries, it has recently
become a laggard in taking bold steps to mitigate climate change.
After the historic electoral victory of the Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ) over the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in September (2009),
Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio pledged that Japan would reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 25% by 2020 below 1990 levels at the
UN Summit on Climate Change and in December at the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) to the UNFCCC. However, there was a
condition attached to his pledge that all large emitters also commit to
ambitious reduction targets. Hatoyama’s successor Kan Naoto, who faced
the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011, and the Tokyo Electronic Power Company’s (TEPCO’s) Fukushima Daiichi (No. 1) nuclear
power plants’ triple disaster, did not have enough time to reshape Japan’s
climate policy. Nonetheless, he left the Japanese version of the feed-intariff system for the promotion of renewable energies in exchange for his
resignation. However, the Japanese government led by Prime Minister
Noda Yoshihiko refused to take any responsibility for the second commitment period under the framework of the Kyoto Protocol at COP17 in
2012.
The second Abe administration has not shown any enthusiasm for tackling this global problem either, although the first Abe administration in
May 2007 showed some interest by announcing with much fanfare a
new climate change initiative “Cool Earth 50” (to halve GHG emissions
from the current level by 2050). The government in June even proudly
declared that Japan would strive to “Becoming a Leading Environmental
Nation Strategy in the 21st Century” (MOE 2007). Why has Japan
been so reluctant to take a leadership role in climate change diplomacy
despite the technological lead it holds that could generate an economic
gain, vigorous public support, and the political incentive for non-military
diplomacy?
This chapter argues that the source of Japan’s inaction in international climate negotiations arises from its energy policy, which has been