28 K. HASEGAWA
18, 2012, replacing the Nuclear Safety Commission and the Nuclear
and Industrial Safety Agency, both of which had failed to prevent the
Fukushima accident, and thereby revealed their malfunctioning. The NRA
is expected to be independent of the national government.
After the accident, the focal point of the nuclear energy debate
shifted (Hasegawa 2018b). The main justification for nuclear power,
namely avoiding a short-term electricity shortage, lost persuasiveness. The
amount of electricity supplied by nuclear power has been replaced by
thermal reactors. The electricity rates increased by several percent, but
the majority of people supporting decreasing reliance on nuclear power,
as can be seen in Fig. 2.1.
Japan has three options for nuclear energy policy; (1) immediately
shut down all nuclear reactors. Former Prime Minister Koizumi changed
completely his mind after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, and now
supports immediately and permanently shutting down all of Japan’s
nuclear reactors. (2) Reopening the nuclear reactors that can meet the
new standards set by the NRA, strictly limiting each reactor to the legal
limit of 40 years the operation and rejecting construction of new reactors, thereby placing Japan on a trajectory for denuclearization by the
end of the 2030s. The former DPJ cabinet of Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko set this policy, but the current Abe cabinet subsequently abandoned
it. (3) Reopening nuclear reactors that can meet the NRA’s new standards and aim to construct new reactors and replace old reactors. The
Abe cabinet supports this policy and wants to keep the certain level of
electricity produced by nuclear, around 20–22% of the electricity supply
in 2030. Except for two reactors that were already under construction
before the Fukushima accident, the Abe administration has not proposed
the construction of any new reactors. Nonetheless, the real intention of
the Abe administration is to construct nuclear reactors and is waiting for
an opportune time to propose doing so.
In the Ministry of Economics, Trade, and Industry’s (METI) longterm outlook published in July 2015, which outlines how Japan plans
to achieve its 2030 Green House Gas (GHG) emission target for the
UNFCC (United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change,
COP21) Paris Conference, METI stated that total electricity generation
of 1065 billion kWh in the fiscal year 2030 will be composed of 22–24%
of renewable energy, 22–20% of nuclear, 27% of LNG-fired thermal, 26%
18, 2012, replacing the Nuclear Safety Commission and the Nuclear
and Industrial Safety Agency, both of which had failed to prevent the
Fukushima accident, and thereby revealed their malfunctioning. The NRA
is expected to be independent of the national government.
After the accident, the focal point of the nuclear energy debate
shifted (Hasegawa 2018b). The main justification for nuclear power,
namely avoiding a short-term electricity shortage, lost persuasiveness. The
amount of electricity supplied by nuclear power has been replaced by
thermal reactors. The electricity rates increased by several percent, but
the majority of people supporting decreasing reliance on nuclear power,
as can be seen in Fig. 2.1.
Japan has three options for nuclear energy policy; (1) immediately
shut down all nuclear reactors. Former Prime Minister Koizumi changed
completely his mind after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, and now
supports immediately and permanently shutting down all of Japan’s
nuclear reactors. (2) Reopening the nuclear reactors that can meet the
new standards set by the NRA, strictly limiting each reactor to the legal
limit of 40 years the operation and rejecting construction of new reactors, thereby placing Japan on a trajectory for denuclearization by the
end of the 2030s. The former DPJ cabinet of Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko set this policy, but the current Abe cabinet subsequently abandoned
it. (3) Reopening nuclear reactors that can meet the NRA’s new standards and aim to construct new reactors and replace old reactors. The
Abe cabinet supports this policy and wants to keep the certain level of
electricity produced by nuclear, around 20–22% of the electricity supply
in 2030. Except for two reactors that were already under construction
before the Fukushima accident, the Abe administration has not proposed
the construction of any new reactors. Nonetheless, the real intention of
the Abe administration is to construct nuclear reactors and is waiting for
an opportune time to propose doing so.
In the Ministry of Economics, Trade, and Industry’s (METI) longterm outlook published in July 2015, which outlines how Japan plans
to achieve its 2030 Green House Gas (GHG) emission target for the
UNFCC (United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change,
COP21) Paris Conference, METI stated that total electricity generation
of 1065 billion kWh in the fiscal year 2030 will be composed of 22–24%
of renewable energy, 22–20% of nuclear, 27% of LNG-fired thermal, 26%