396 E. MOE
commitments. Thus, there at least is a strong climate rationale for Japan
to support renewables, even if the favored strategy in the past has often
been energy efficiency.
Finally, what do new challenges for renewables mean with respect to
the debate about state vs. market? Beyond the usual disclaimer that it is
never either about the state or the market, but about some sensible mix
of the two, what I have argued before is that the first phase of the renewable expansion was much simpler in the sense that (very simplistically)
the state provided a support system, and market actors did the rest. In
the previous volume, we wrote a lot about whether the state opted for a
FIT regime, an RPS regime, auctions or tendering, whether renewables
had priority access to the grid, etc. By 2020 it is, however, becoming ever
more obvious that while FITs are a great tool if your renewable share of
electricity consumption is close to zero, it becomes expensive once that
share gets to somewhere between 10 and 20%. Thus, countries are now
phasing FITs down and out, depending on how much renewable energy
they have installed. The lesser present relevance of FITs is also because
both wind and solar are now cost-competitive in most countries.
The second phase of renewable expansion requires far more coordination between far more actors. Thus, there is more politics involved
and more vested interest battles. It is also characterized to a far greater
extent of renewables replacing rather than supplementing other sources
of energy, which also involves far more vested interest battles. While it is
still too early to see where our countries are going in this respect, it is fair
to assume that this cannot be left to the market alone. Being competitive
on price is obviously a good thing, which makes it reasonable to assume
that market actors will channel ever more funding into renewable energy.
Thus, in one way there is an increased role for the market in the sense
that the state does no longer need to be relied on as strongly for a financial support system. On the other hand, the state is also more important
than before in terms of coordinating developments, and in preventing
vested interest battles from derailing further expansion. We for instance
see strong vested interest actors in the Japanese utilities, Chinese grid and
utility companies, Chinese coal producers, the Norwegian power sector
and the Norwegian trade unions, just to mention a few.
What we also see is that despite this being an area that requires ever
greater cooperation between countries, in the sense of interconnectors
between countries, policymaking is still overwhelmingly national. The
level of analysis is the state. These are national politicians concerned with
commitments. Thus, there at least is a strong climate rationale for Japan
to support renewables, even if the favored strategy in the past has often
been energy efficiency.
Finally, what do new challenges for renewables mean with respect to
the debate about state vs. market? Beyond the usual disclaimer that it is
never either about the state or the market, but about some sensible mix
of the two, what I have argued before is that the first phase of the renewable expansion was much simpler in the sense that (very simplistically)
the state provided a support system, and market actors did the rest. In
the previous volume, we wrote a lot about whether the state opted for a
FIT regime, an RPS regime, auctions or tendering, whether renewables
had priority access to the grid, etc. By 2020 it is, however, becoming ever
more obvious that while FITs are a great tool if your renewable share of
electricity consumption is close to zero, it becomes expensive once that
share gets to somewhere between 10 and 20%. Thus, countries are now
phasing FITs down and out, depending on how much renewable energy
they have installed. The lesser present relevance of FITs is also because
both wind and solar are now cost-competitive in most countries.
The second phase of renewable expansion requires far more coordination between far more actors. Thus, there is more politics involved
and more vested interest battles. It is also characterized to a far greater
extent of renewables replacing rather than supplementing other sources
of energy, which also involves far more vested interest battles. While it is
still too early to see where our countries are going in this respect, it is fair
to assume that this cannot be left to the market alone. Being competitive
on price is obviously a good thing, which makes it reasonable to assume
that market actors will channel ever more funding into renewable energy.
Thus, in one way there is an increased role for the market in the sense
that the state does no longer need to be relied on as strongly for a financial support system. On the other hand, the state is also more important
than before in terms of coordinating developments, and in preventing
vested interest battles from derailing further expansion. We for instance
see strong vested interest actors in the Japanese utilities, Chinese grid and
utility companies, Chinese coal producers, the Norwegian power sector
and the Norwegian trade unions, just to mention a few.
What we also see is that despite this being an area that requires ever
greater cooperation between countries, in the sense of interconnectors
between countries, policymaking is still overwhelmingly national. The
level of analysis is the state. These are national politicians concerned with