1 INTRODUCTION
5
such as Singapore, Vietnam, and China public opinion should matter
less. Vested interests can matter in both liberal democracies and authoritarian systems, although authoritarian regimes, such as South Korea from
the 1960s until the 1980s (Woo-Cumings 1999; Evans 1995), may be
expected to be somewhat less vulnerable to pressures from non-state
actors. Yet, liberal democracies can also be relatively autonomous and act
as strong states. Chalmers Johnson’s study of Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, now the Ministry of Economy, Trade,
and Industry, or METI) and its role as the “pilot” organization directing
Japan’s industrialization from the 1950s to the 1980s is a classic example
of a study that finds a highly autonomous state with great bureaucratic
capacity (Johnson 1982). 4 The “Capitalist Development State” model
Johnson posits has been applied (beyond Japan it is usually referred
to simply as the “developmental state”) to South Korea and several other
East Asian states (Woo-Cumings 1999). Evans finds strong states that
are not predatory, but stewards in promoting national economic development, must be autonomous but nevertheless have close links to society, a
condition he labels “embedded autonomy” (Evans 1995).
Beyond combating human-caused climate change strong states have
an incentive to promote renewable energy as an inexhaustible domestic
(autarkic) source of energy that reduces dependence on energy imports
or prepares for domestic fossil-fuel resource depletion in the case of
exporters like Norway. In relatively more authoritarian states the presence of a strong state not captured by vested interests can override
vested-interest groups, public opinion, NIMBY, and other forms of
public opposition to renewable energy and related technology (e.g., smart
meters) and infrastructure (e.g., grid expansion), and thus are well positioned to implement policies on grid development, storage infrastructure,
and even retail market liberalization, that lead to the rapid diffusion of
renewable energy. Of course, if a strong state does not see renewable
energy as in its interest, it can act to limit or shut down renewable energy
expansion. Russia might be a case of such a state (Chernysheva 2014).
The Focus of This Volume
This volume presents comparative cases that offer lessons on how to deal
with the second-stage new challenges and opportunities this book highlights, beginning with a deep look at the world’s third largest economy,
Japan, but then looking at a variety of other cases, including China,
5
such as Singapore, Vietnam, and China public opinion should matter
less. Vested interests can matter in both liberal democracies and authoritarian systems, although authoritarian regimes, such as South Korea from
the 1960s until the 1980s (Woo-Cumings 1999; Evans 1995), may be
expected to be somewhat less vulnerable to pressures from non-state
actors. Yet, liberal democracies can also be relatively autonomous and act
as strong states. Chalmers Johnson’s study of Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, now the Ministry of Economy, Trade,
and Industry, or METI) and its role as the “pilot” organization directing
Japan’s industrialization from the 1950s to the 1980s is a classic example
of a study that finds a highly autonomous state with great bureaucratic
capacity (Johnson 1982). 4 The “Capitalist Development State” model
Johnson posits has been applied (beyond Japan it is usually referred
to simply as the “developmental state”) to South Korea and several other
East Asian states (Woo-Cumings 1999). Evans finds strong states that
are not predatory, but stewards in promoting national economic development, must be autonomous but nevertheless have close links to society, a
condition he labels “embedded autonomy” (Evans 1995).
Beyond combating human-caused climate change strong states have
an incentive to promote renewable energy as an inexhaustible domestic
(autarkic) source of energy that reduces dependence on energy imports
or prepares for domestic fossil-fuel resource depletion in the case of
exporters like Norway. In relatively more authoritarian states the presence of a strong state not captured by vested interests can override
vested-interest groups, public opinion, NIMBY, and other forms of
public opposition to renewable energy and related technology (e.g., smart
meters) and infrastructure (e.g., grid expansion), and thus are well positioned to implement policies on grid development, storage infrastructure,
and even retail market liberalization, that lead to the rapid diffusion of
renewable energy. Of course, if a strong state does not see renewable
energy as in its interest, it can act to limit or shut down renewable energy
expansion. Russia might be a case of such a state (Chernysheva 2014).
The Focus of This Volume
This volume presents comparative cases that offer lessons on how to deal
with the second-stage new challenges and opportunities this book highlights, beginning with a deep look at the world’s third largest economy,
Japan, but then looking at a variety of other cases, including China,