9 CHINA’S PROMOTION OF WIND AND SOLAR POWER …
217
Government departments and grid dispatchers in favor of vested coal
interests have been accused of exerting administrative power to disrupt
wind production. Like many other countries, China’s response to energy
challenges is intertwined with its energy policy process, in which even
the powerful NDRC lacks the authority, resources and tools to prevail
over other state energy oligarchies. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) that
dominate China’s fossil fuel supply as well as thermal power generation
and transmission sectors are major forces blocking local renewable energy
production. In the coal production industry, large-sized SOEs, most of
which are supervised by provincial governments, account for about half
of China’s domestic coal output. The remaining half of country’s coal
output comes from small-scale SOEs supervised by local governments
and numerous privately- or collectively-owned coal mines in villages and
townships. China’s coal production industry has been partially liberalized
to allow the participation of privately operated mines, thus creating many
multi-millionaires, whose interests are often threatened by the booming
local renewable energy projects.
When designing renewable energy policies, the Chinese policy makers
expected local governments to play a very cooperative role in enforcing
those policies, laws and regulations. In practice, however, this high degree
of administrative cohesion does not exist in places where local government interests diverge sharply from those of the central planners and
create substantial obstacles to strict enforcement of both national and
local energy policies. As stakeholders of local fossil fuel companies, local
authorities in many cases tend to help these companies bypass strict energy
directives and curb competition from local renewable players. China’s
weakness in enforcing national energy policies is subject to the level of
coordination within three kinds of relationships, namely the relationship
among central government agencies, the relationship between central and
local governments and the relationship between SOEs and government
agencies.
First, responsibilities are not clearly defined among central government
agencies and long bargaining process emerges when conflict of interests occurs. Second, the multilayer local regimes have great scope for
distortion or non-implementation of national energy policy (AndrewsSpeed 2003, p. 53). Third, the interest groups like gigantic energy SOEs
in China’s energy sectors have gained more influence in policy implementation. In China’s state-centric society, the forces of environmental
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are still very weak and media’s
217
Government departments and grid dispatchers in favor of vested coal
interests have been accused of exerting administrative power to disrupt
wind production. Like many other countries, China’s response to energy
challenges is intertwined with its energy policy process, in which even
the powerful NDRC lacks the authority, resources and tools to prevail
over other state energy oligarchies. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) that
dominate China’s fossil fuel supply as well as thermal power generation
and transmission sectors are major forces blocking local renewable energy
production. In the coal production industry, large-sized SOEs, most of
which are supervised by provincial governments, account for about half
of China’s domestic coal output. The remaining half of country’s coal
output comes from small-scale SOEs supervised by local governments
and numerous privately- or collectively-owned coal mines in villages and
townships. China’s coal production industry has been partially liberalized
to allow the participation of privately operated mines, thus creating many
multi-millionaires, whose interests are often threatened by the booming
local renewable energy projects.
When designing renewable energy policies, the Chinese policy makers
expected local governments to play a very cooperative role in enforcing
those policies, laws and regulations. In practice, however, this high degree
of administrative cohesion does not exist in places where local government interests diverge sharply from those of the central planners and
create substantial obstacles to strict enforcement of both national and
local energy policies. As stakeholders of local fossil fuel companies, local
authorities in many cases tend to help these companies bypass strict energy
directives and curb competition from local renewable players. China’s
weakness in enforcing national energy policies is subject to the level of
coordination within three kinds of relationships, namely the relationship
among central government agencies, the relationship between central and
local governments and the relationship between SOEs and government
agencies.
First, responsibilities are not clearly defined among central government
agencies and long bargaining process emerges when conflict of interests occurs. Second, the multilayer local regimes have great scope for
distortion or non-implementation of national energy policy (AndrewsSpeed 2003, p. 53). Third, the interest groups like gigantic energy SOEs
in China’s energy sectors have gained more influence in policy implementation. In China’s state-centric society, the forces of environmental
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are still very weak and media’s