190 S. Y. KIM AND I. SUN
renewable energy development, the definition of renewable energy was
quite problematic. Initially, the law set out to promote alternative energy
where “alternative” was meant to be energy sources other than oil,
coal, nuclear, and natural gas. When the law was substantially revised in
2004, the types of energy to be promoted by the government for the
cleaner environment were expanded to include “new” energy—namely,
hydrogen, fuel cell, and residual oil gasification which are all converted
from fossil fuels. Although renewable energy was defined to cover eight
areas—solar thermal, solar PV, wind, bioenergy, hydropower, geothermal,
ocean, and waste to energy—in MOTIE’s Fourth Basic Plan for New and
Renewable Energy, the terminology essentially lumping new energy and
renewable energy generated much confusion in renewable energy statistics. It is also responsible for the illusion of the country’s renewable
energy production rate appearing higher than the actual level of penetration. Furthermore, it is criticized to lead to unclear and inconsistent
policymaking as well as improperly defined roles for relevant government
agencies (Yoon and Sim 2015). 4
At a deeper level, the slow adoption of renewable energy is closely
related to the very process of South Korea’s industrialization in the 1970s
and 1980s. For fast-track industrialization, it relied heavily on nuclear
energy as a source of cheap electricity. Even the latest national energy
blueprint, the Second National Plan for Energy, aims to increase the share
of nuclear power in total energy generation to 29% by 2035 despite the
general tone of renewable energy promotion. In comparison, the target
for renewable in total energy penetration is only 6% by 2020 and 11%
by 2035. In fact, nuclear energy promotion in South Korea was much
more than a choice of necessity for cheap energy. One of the widely
read studies in the science and technology literature on the dominance
of nuclear power in South Korea explains it as driven by the sociotechnical imaginary of “atoms for development” in which the state not only
imported nuclear technology from abroad, but also incorporated it into its
scientific, technological, and political practices (Jasanoff and Kim 2009).
The study by Yoon and Sim (2015) traces the slow adoption of renewable energy in South Korea to the policy shift from a feed-in-tariff (FIT)
to renewable portfolio standard (RPS). The FIT was introduced in 2002
and ran about ten years. The FIT was discontinued due to concerns
with the cost. Total government expenditure amounting to KRW 1.59
trillion between 2002 and 2012, but the FIT budget supported out
of the Electricity Industry Fund totaled only KRW 395 billion. Out of
renewable energy development, the definition of renewable energy was
quite problematic. Initially, the law set out to promote alternative energy
where “alternative” was meant to be energy sources other than oil,
coal, nuclear, and natural gas. When the law was substantially revised in
2004, the types of energy to be promoted by the government for the
cleaner environment were expanded to include “new” energy—namely,
hydrogen, fuel cell, and residual oil gasification which are all converted
from fossil fuels. Although renewable energy was defined to cover eight
areas—solar thermal, solar PV, wind, bioenergy, hydropower, geothermal,
ocean, and waste to energy—in MOTIE’s Fourth Basic Plan for New and
Renewable Energy, the terminology essentially lumping new energy and
renewable energy generated much confusion in renewable energy statistics. It is also responsible for the illusion of the country’s renewable
energy production rate appearing higher than the actual level of penetration. Furthermore, it is criticized to lead to unclear and inconsistent
policymaking as well as improperly defined roles for relevant government
agencies (Yoon and Sim 2015). 4
At a deeper level, the slow adoption of renewable energy is closely
related to the very process of South Korea’s industrialization in the 1970s
and 1980s. For fast-track industrialization, it relied heavily on nuclear
energy as a source of cheap electricity. Even the latest national energy
blueprint, the Second National Plan for Energy, aims to increase the share
of nuclear power in total energy generation to 29% by 2035 despite the
general tone of renewable energy promotion. In comparison, the target
for renewable in total energy penetration is only 6% by 2020 and 11%
by 2035. In fact, nuclear energy promotion in South Korea was much
more than a choice of necessity for cheap energy. One of the widely
read studies in the science and technology literature on the dominance
of nuclear power in South Korea explains it as driven by the sociotechnical imaginary of “atoms for development” in which the state not only
imported nuclear technology from abroad, but also incorporated it into its
scientific, technological, and political practices (Jasanoff and Kim 2009).
The study by Yoon and Sim (2015) traces the slow adoption of renewable energy in South Korea to the policy shift from a feed-in-tariff (FIT)
to renewable portfolio standard (RPS). The FIT was introduced in 2002
and ran about ten years. The FIT was discontinued due to concerns
with the cost. Total government expenditure amounting to KRW 1.59
trillion between 2002 and 2012, but the FIT budget supported out
of the Electricity Industry Fund totaled only KRW 395 billion. Out of