112 P. MIDFORD
EPCOs, Hokkaido, Tohoku, Shikoku, Kyushu, and Okinawa, suspended
their acceptance of new grid connection applications from mega solar
projects. The feed-in tariff that Kan had pushed through the Diet in
summer 2011 came into effect in July 2012, and lead to spectacular
growth in installed capacity of PV solar, both residential and mega solar,
with an especially large amount of new capacity coming online in mid2014. As of September 2014, projects totaling 72 GW of solar electricity
generating capacity had been approved by METI, a capacity far exceeding
that of Japan’s surviving 48 nuclear reactors. As of June 2014, 11 GW of
this total had already begun generating electricity, or about 15% of the
approved total (Watanabe 2014). Despite the suspensions of new grid
connections by these five EPCOs, PV solar continued to grow rapidly: by
the end of 2014 installed PV capacity surpassed 20 GW, and approved
projects exceeded 82 GW (Yabe et al. 2015, slides 3–4). 12
By the time of these suspensions Japan’s EPCOs had yet to implement
any curtailment, compensated or uncompensated. Indeed, a comparison
with China finds that with comparable rates of renewable energy penetration, Japan by 2014 had zero curtailment, while China in 2012 and
2013 had curtailment ratios ranging between 11 and 17% (Yasuda et al.
2015, p. 3). 13 An analysis of the EPCOs carrying capacity suggested
that none of them had reached, or were even very close to reaching,
their carrying capacity for intermittent PV solar power. However, three
of the five that had suspended new grid hookups, Hokkaido, Shikoku,
and Kyushu, exceeded 50% of their carrying capacity for connected PV
solar plants. Nevertheless, in terms of approved, but not yet built or
connected projects, these six EPCOs faced the prospect of more PV
capacity than they could handle: just over 100% in Hokkaido, nearly
250% in Tohoku, just over 100% in Hokuriku, nearly 150% in Shikoku,
over 200% in Kyushu, and over 125% in Okinawa (Kanky¯ o Bijinesu
2016, p. 32, Figure 1). Likewise, a 2013 study by the New Energy and
Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO) found that
approved PV solar capacity in Hokkaido, Tohoku, and Kyushu exceeded
off-peak electricity demand, with approved capacity almost double offpeak demand in Kyushu (Yabe et al. 2015). Although Japan’s EPCOs
had a looming capacity problem, the suspension of grid hookups by
five EPCOs was arguably premature and was seen by industry critics as
designed by the EPCOs to limit the spread of solar PV by rival generating companies, and perhaps even to protect their investments in nuclear
power (Japan Times 2014).
EPCOs, Hokkaido, Tohoku, Shikoku, Kyushu, and Okinawa, suspended
their acceptance of new grid connection applications from mega solar
projects. The feed-in tariff that Kan had pushed through the Diet in
summer 2011 came into effect in July 2012, and lead to spectacular
growth in installed capacity of PV solar, both residential and mega solar,
with an especially large amount of new capacity coming online in mid2014. As of September 2014, projects totaling 72 GW of solar electricity
generating capacity had been approved by METI, a capacity far exceeding
that of Japan’s surviving 48 nuclear reactors. As of June 2014, 11 GW of
this total had already begun generating electricity, or about 15% of the
approved total (Watanabe 2014). Despite the suspensions of new grid
connections by these five EPCOs, PV solar continued to grow rapidly: by
the end of 2014 installed PV capacity surpassed 20 GW, and approved
projects exceeded 82 GW (Yabe et al. 2015, slides 3–4). 12
By the time of these suspensions Japan’s EPCOs had yet to implement
any curtailment, compensated or uncompensated. Indeed, a comparison
with China finds that with comparable rates of renewable energy penetration, Japan by 2014 had zero curtailment, while China in 2012 and
2013 had curtailment ratios ranging between 11 and 17% (Yasuda et al.
2015, p. 3). 13 An analysis of the EPCOs carrying capacity suggested
that none of them had reached, or were even very close to reaching,
their carrying capacity for intermittent PV solar power. However, three
of the five that had suspended new grid hookups, Hokkaido, Shikoku,
and Kyushu, exceeded 50% of their carrying capacity for connected PV
solar plants. Nevertheless, in terms of approved, but not yet built or
connected projects, these six EPCOs faced the prospect of more PV
capacity than they could handle: just over 100% in Hokkaido, nearly
250% in Tohoku, just over 100% in Hokuriku, nearly 150% in Shikoku,
over 200% in Kyushu, and over 125% in Okinawa (Kanky¯ o Bijinesu
2016, p. 32, Figure 1). Likewise, a 2013 study by the New Energy and
Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO) found that
approved PV solar capacity in Hokkaido, Tohoku, and Kyushu exceeded
off-peak electricity demand, with approved capacity almost double offpeak demand in Kyushu (Yabe et al. 2015). Although Japan’s EPCOs
had a looming capacity problem, the suspension of grid hookups by
five EPCOs was arguably premature and was seen by industry critics as
designed by the EPCOs to limit the spread of solar PV by rival generating companies, and perhaps even to protect their investments in nuclear
power (Japan Times 2014).