5 THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT RESTARTS …
109
foresaw nuclear power accounting for 20–22% of electricity generation, and renewable energy 22–24%. Within renewable energy, base-load
sources hydropower, biomass, and geothermal were expected to provide
8.8–9.2%, 3.7–4.6%, and 1–1.1% of total electricity generation, respectively. Variable solar PV was expected to contribute 7% to total electricity
generation, while wind power was expected to contribute 1.7% (METI
2015, pp. 7, 8). The 20–22% target for nuclear power in 2030 was not
much more than the 15% share for nuclear power estimated by METI
in 2012, 10 during the Noda administration (Shizen enerugi- kenky¯ ukai
2012, p. 90), suggesting a lack of drastic change in policy between the
Noda and Abe administrations.
Japan’s 2018 Strategic Energy Plan, its fifth, which updated the 2014
Plan and the 2015 Outlook, left the 2030 targets for renewable energy
and nuclear energy unchanged, but had three notable policy changes.
First, more focus was placed on upgrading grids, including for the first
time discussing the role of smart grids, to promote the further integration of renewable energy, and second, there was more focus on further
promoting the use of storage batteries. Finally, the 2018 Plan included
the abandonment of the Monju fast breeder reactor (METI 2018, pp. 65,
92, 124). Overall, however, the 2018 Strategic Energy Plan mostly represented continuity with the 2018 Plan (which some critics claimed did
not reflect rapid improvements in renewables technology), with continued
promotion of renewable energy plus support for restarting some nuclear
power plants (Asahi Shimbun 2018a).
Public Opinion on Nuclear Restarts
Moreover, the Abe administration followed the Kan-Noda road map
policy of non-interference with the new stringent safety regulations put
in place by the NRA, regulations that were expensive to implement, with
recent estimates suggest the industry is spending as much as US$123
billion (Kyodo News 2020a), and which involve a long multi-year and
uncertain path from application to restart. From the time Japan went
zero nuclear in September 2013, it took 23 months until the first reactor,
at the Sendai plant in Kyushu, was restarted in August 2015, ending
Japan’s zero nuclear state. A second reactor at the Sendai plant was
restarted in November 2015. A third reactor, at Takahama in Fukui, was
restarted in January 2016, but when the fourth reactor, also at Takahama
was restarted in February, it suffered a system failure during start up,
109
foresaw nuclear power accounting for 20–22% of electricity generation, and renewable energy 22–24%. Within renewable energy, base-load
sources hydropower, biomass, and geothermal were expected to provide
8.8–9.2%, 3.7–4.6%, and 1–1.1% of total electricity generation, respectively. Variable solar PV was expected to contribute 7% to total electricity
generation, while wind power was expected to contribute 1.7% (METI
2015, pp. 7, 8). The 20–22% target for nuclear power in 2030 was not
much more than the 15% share for nuclear power estimated by METI
in 2012, 10 during the Noda administration (Shizen enerugi- kenky¯ ukai
2012, p. 90), suggesting a lack of drastic change in policy between the
Noda and Abe administrations.
Japan’s 2018 Strategic Energy Plan, its fifth, which updated the 2014
Plan and the 2015 Outlook, left the 2030 targets for renewable energy
and nuclear energy unchanged, but had three notable policy changes.
First, more focus was placed on upgrading grids, including for the first
time discussing the role of smart grids, to promote the further integration of renewable energy, and second, there was more focus on further
promoting the use of storage batteries. Finally, the 2018 Plan included
the abandonment of the Monju fast breeder reactor (METI 2018, pp. 65,
92, 124). Overall, however, the 2018 Strategic Energy Plan mostly represented continuity with the 2018 Plan (which some critics claimed did
not reflect rapid improvements in renewables technology), with continued
promotion of renewable energy plus support for restarting some nuclear
power plants (Asahi Shimbun 2018a).
Public Opinion on Nuclear Restarts
Moreover, the Abe administration followed the Kan-Noda road map
policy of non-interference with the new stringent safety regulations put
in place by the NRA, regulations that were expensive to implement, with
recent estimates suggest the industry is spending as much as US$123
billion (Kyodo News 2020a), and which involve a long multi-year and
uncertain path from application to restart. From the time Japan went
zero nuclear in September 2013, it took 23 months until the first reactor,
at the Sendai plant in Kyushu, was restarted in August 2015, ending
Japan’s zero nuclear state. A second reactor at the Sendai plant was
restarted in November 2015. A third reactor, at Takahama in Fukui, was
restarted in January 2016, but when the fourth reactor, also at Takahama
was restarted in February, it suffered a system failure during start up,