106 P. MIDFORD
guidelines for nuclear power plants. Abe did not attempt to push for the
speedy restart of nuclear power plants as the Noda administration had
done with two reactors at Oi in Fukui prefecture in July 2012. Indeed,
the Oi reactors remained the only reactors online from the time Abe
took office in late December 2012 until they went off-line in fall 2013,
and Japan again found itself in a state of zero nuclear power. This came
despite Abe’s enthusiasm at the beginning of 2013 for restarting all of
Japan’s nuclear reactors as soon as possible and desire to consider building
new ones (Cabinet Office 2013). The Abe administration’s caution about
interfering with the NRA stemmed from strong public skepticism about
nuclear power (see below) and the fear that this could lead to retrospective voting against Abe and the LDP so soon after they had clawed
back into power from several historic election defeats. 8 This meant that
Japan remained at zero nuclear power from September 2013 until August
2015. Even then, restarts were slow, with only nine reactors back on
line by 2019 (and several subsequently ordered shutdown again by the
NRA for failing to meet new counter-terrorism measures), and a large
percentage of Japan’s 48 operable reactors probably never to restart (see
Koppenborg’s chapter).
The Abe administration ended up following the Kan-Noda road
map to break up the regional Electrical Power Companies (henceforth
EPCOs), which were regional integrated electricity monopolies, with a
plan to financially unbundle transmission grids from generation businesses. The Abe administration essentially picked up where the Noda
administration had left off, finalizing a bill in spring 2013, inspired by
Nordic models of electricity sector reform, consisting of three stages.
The first stage involved creating an Independent System Operator
(ISO), established in 2015, to regulate electricity flows through all public
grids and regulate access to those grids. The second entailed deregulating
the consumer market by 2016, thereby allowing small-scale consumers
to choose their electricity provider. The third stage, scheduled for 2020,
called for unbundling power transmission from the current regional
electricity monopolies.
The Abe administration succeeded in having the Diet enact this KanNoda road map inspired legislation in fall 2013. In June 2015, the Abe
administration enacted two further bills specifying how liberalization of
the retail market would occur in April 2016, and how to unbundle
the EPCOs’ generation businesses from grid ownership (Japan Times
2015). Specifically, this enacted legislation mandated the separation of
guidelines for nuclear power plants. Abe did not attempt to push for the
speedy restart of nuclear power plants as the Noda administration had
done with two reactors at Oi in Fukui prefecture in July 2012. Indeed,
the Oi reactors remained the only reactors online from the time Abe
took office in late December 2012 until they went off-line in fall 2013,
and Japan again found itself in a state of zero nuclear power. This came
despite Abe’s enthusiasm at the beginning of 2013 for restarting all of
Japan’s nuclear reactors as soon as possible and desire to consider building
new ones (Cabinet Office 2013). The Abe administration’s caution about
interfering with the NRA stemmed from strong public skepticism about
nuclear power (see below) and the fear that this could lead to retrospective voting against Abe and the LDP so soon after they had clawed
back into power from several historic election defeats. 8 This meant that
Japan remained at zero nuclear power from September 2013 until August
2015. Even then, restarts were slow, with only nine reactors back on
line by 2019 (and several subsequently ordered shutdown again by the
NRA for failing to meet new counter-terrorism measures), and a large
percentage of Japan’s 48 operable reactors probably never to restart (see
Koppenborg’s chapter).
The Abe administration ended up following the Kan-Noda road
map to break up the regional Electrical Power Companies (henceforth
EPCOs), which were regional integrated electricity monopolies, with a
plan to financially unbundle transmission grids from generation businesses. The Abe administration essentially picked up where the Noda
administration had left off, finalizing a bill in spring 2013, inspired by
Nordic models of electricity sector reform, consisting of three stages.
The first stage involved creating an Independent System Operator
(ISO), established in 2015, to regulate electricity flows through all public
grids and regulate access to those grids. The second entailed deregulating
the consumer market by 2016, thereby allowing small-scale consumers
to choose their electricity provider. The third stage, scheduled for 2020,
called for unbundling power transmission from the current regional
electricity monopolies.
The Abe administration succeeded in having the Diet enact this KanNoda road map inspired legislation in fall 2013. In June 2015, the Abe
administration enacted two further bills specifying how liberalization of
the retail market would occur in April 2016, and how to unbundle
the EPCOs’ generation businesses from grid ownership (Japan Times
2015). Specifically, this enacted legislation mandated the separation of