5 THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT RESTARTS …
105
Abe Follows the Kan-Noda Road Map
Two months after mandating nuclear phaseout, Noda dissolved the Diet
and called new elections for the Lower House. The DPJ and Noda
were both unpopular. This unpopularity did not stem from distance
between the DPJ’s policy positions and public opinion, but rather from
public doubts about Noda and the DPJ’s ability to implement and even
formulate policies. 7 Contradictions in DPJ policies, including in energy
policy, most notably their refusal to cancel the stalled fast-breeder reactor
program even while simultaneously calling for gradual nuclear phaseout
by the end of the 2030, damaged the DPJ’s image, even in the eyes of
nuclear power opponents.
In the December 2012 Lower House election, the LDP and its coalition partner Komeito won a huge victory. The LDP won almost as many
seats as the DPJ had in 2009, in part because the LDP’s opponents
became divided as the DPJ found itself competing with new parties for the
non-LDP vote, even in first-past-the-post single-member districts. Among
the major political parties, the LDP was the only one not to promise
phasing out nuclear power, whereas Komeito was the only party among
those pledging to phase out nuclear power not specifying a date for doing
so.
Although the LDP was the most pronuclear party, it noticeably did not
criticize the Noda administration’s policy of phasing out nuclear power
by the end of the 2030s. Indeed, the LDP joined all other major political parties in its election manifesto by calling for “introducing renewable
energy as much as possible.” The LDP manifesto even contained a Kanlike statement when it advocated “creating economic and social structures
that can be strong even without relying on nuclear power” (Jimint¯ o 2012,
pp. 23–24). In other words, in its election manifesto the LDP, under pressure from public opinion, was influenced by Kan’s antinuclear declaration,
and by the Noda administration’s phaseout policy. Although the LDP did
not endorse nuclear phaseout, it failed to present an alternative vision to
the Kan-Noda road map.
Once in office Abe’s coalition government acted largely along the lines
laid out in the LDP’s election manifesto and the coalition agreement it
forged with Komeito. Even while the Abe administration interfered with
the independence of Japan’s ostensibly independent central bank (The
Bank of Japan), it was careful to respect the independence of the NRA,
even as the NRA devised stringent, time-consuming and costly new safety
105
Abe Follows the Kan-Noda Road Map
Two months after mandating nuclear phaseout, Noda dissolved the Diet
and called new elections for the Lower House. The DPJ and Noda
were both unpopular. This unpopularity did not stem from distance
between the DPJ’s policy positions and public opinion, but rather from
public doubts about Noda and the DPJ’s ability to implement and even
formulate policies. 7 Contradictions in DPJ policies, including in energy
policy, most notably their refusal to cancel the stalled fast-breeder reactor
program even while simultaneously calling for gradual nuclear phaseout
by the end of the 2030, damaged the DPJ’s image, even in the eyes of
nuclear power opponents.
In the December 2012 Lower House election, the LDP and its coalition partner Komeito won a huge victory. The LDP won almost as many
seats as the DPJ had in 2009, in part because the LDP’s opponents
became divided as the DPJ found itself competing with new parties for the
non-LDP vote, even in first-past-the-post single-member districts. Among
the major political parties, the LDP was the only one not to promise
phasing out nuclear power, whereas Komeito was the only party among
those pledging to phase out nuclear power not specifying a date for doing
so.
Although the LDP was the most pronuclear party, it noticeably did not
criticize the Noda administration’s policy of phasing out nuclear power
by the end of the 2030s. Indeed, the LDP joined all other major political parties in its election manifesto by calling for “introducing renewable
energy as much as possible.” The LDP manifesto even contained a Kanlike statement when it advocated “creating economic and social structures
that can be strong even without relying on nuclear power” (Jimint¯ o 2012,
pp. 23–24). In other words, in its election manifesto the LDP, under pressure from public opinion, was influenced by Kan’s antinuclear declaration,
and by the Noda administration’s phaseout policy. Although the LDP did
not endorse nuclear phaseout, it failed to present an alternative vision to
the Kan-Noda road map.
Once in office Abe’s coalition government acted largely along the lines
laid out in the LDP’s election manifesto and the coalition agreement it
forged with Komeito. Even while the Abe administration interfered with
the independence of Japan’s ostensibly independent central bank (The
Bank of Japan), it was careful to respect the independence of the NRA,
even as the NRA devised stringent, time-consuming and costly new safety