5 THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT RESTARTS …
103
The Kan-Noda Road Map
Before the Great East Japan earthquake, tsunami, and Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear accident of March 11, 2011 (hereafter 3-11), Japan, under its
2010 Energy Strategy enacted by the DPJ, pursued a policy of expanding
nuclear power generation from just under 30% of generation to 50%
by 2030. This entailed building five new nuclear power reactors by
2020, and another nine by 2030 (METI 2010). The LDP and the DPJ
both embraced this goal. Nonetheless, implementation of this policy was
already largely deadlocked as rising public concerns about nuclear safety,
concerns that had slowed the rapid expansion of nuclear power already
from the late 1980s, 2 and brought expansion to a halt by the end of the
1990s, in the wake of the Tokaimura nuclear accident. 3
Six weeks after 3-11 and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdowns,
Prime Minister Kan Naoto scrapped the Strategic Energy Plan’s goal
of increasing nuclear power to over 50% of generation by 2030. Then,
on July 13, just over four months after 3-11, Kan, at a press conference, issued a call for Japan to free itself from reliance on nuclear power.
According to the prime minister, Japan “should…aim at a society where
people can live without nuclear power plants.” To achieve this nonnuclear future Kan called for reducing dependence on nuclear power “in
a planned and gradual manner” while working “to actively secure new
renewable energy sources” (Kantei 2011). 4
A few weeks after this speech Kan succeeded in pushing through
the Diet an ambitious feed-in tariff (FIT) to promote renewable power
sources, including solar, wind, small-scale hydro, and geothermal generation of electricity. Shortly thereafter, in September, Kan resigned and
turned over the prime minister’s chair to fellow DPJ leader Noda Yoshihiko, leaving it to his successor to come up with the plan to denuclearize
Japan. Noda largely supported his predecessor’s position on nuclear
power. He enacted Kan’s proposal to strip METI of its authority over
nuclear power plant safety regulation, placing this in the hands of a new
Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA), and mandating that the NRA come
up with new and more stringent safety standards for nuclear plants.
In October 2011, Noda instructed his cabinet’s Energy and Environment Council to consider three options for Japan’s energy mix by 2030,
and to seek citizen input. In the first option, nuclear power would provide
20–25% of Japan’s electricity, renewables would provide 20–30%, and
fossil fuels the remainder. This option would require building additional
103
The Kan-Noda Road Map
Before the Great East Japan earthquake, tsunami, and Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear accident of March 11, 2011 (hereafter 3-11), Japan, under its
2010 Energy Strategy enacted by the DPJ, pursued a policy of expanding
nuclear power generation from just under 30% of generation to 50%
by 2030. This entailed building five new nuclear power reactors by
2020, and another nine by 2030 (METI 2010). The LDP and the DPJ
both embraced this goal. Nonetheless, implementation of this policy was
already largely deadlocked as rising public concerns about nuclear safety,
concerns that had slowed the rapid expansion of nuclear power already
from the late 1980s, 2 and brought expansion to a halt by the end of the
1990s, in the wake of the Tokaimura nuclear accident. 3
Six weeks after 3-11 and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdowns,
Prime Minister Kan Naoto scrapped the Strategic Energy Plan’s goal
of increasing nuclear power to over 50% of generation by 2030. Then,
on July 13, just over four months after 3-11, Kan, at a press conference, issued a call for Japan to free itself from reliance on nuclear power.
According to the prime minister, Japan “should…aim at a society where
people can live without nuclear power plants.” To achieve this nonnuclear future Kan called for reducing dependence on nuclear power “in
a planned and gradual manner” while working “to actively secure new
renewable energy sources” (Kantei 2011). 4
A few weeks after this speech Kan succeeded in pushing through
the Diet an ambitious feed-in tariff (FIT) to promote renewable power
sources, including solar, wind, small-scale hydro, and geothermal generation of electricity. Shortly thereafter, in September, Kan resigned and
turned over the prime minister’s chair to fellow DPJ leader Noda Yoshihiko, leaving it to his successor to come up with the plan to denuclearize
Japan. Noda largely supported his predecessor’s position on nuclear
power. He enacted Kan’s proposal to strip METI of its authority over
nuclear power plant safety regulation, placing this in the hands of a new
Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA), and mandating that the NRA come
up with new and more stringent safety standards for nuclear plants.
In October 2011, Noda instructed his cabinet’s Energy and Environment Council to consider three options for Japan’s energy mix by 2030,
and to seek citizen input. In the first option, nuclear power would provide
20–25% of Japan’s electricity, renewables would provide 20–30%, and
fossil fuels the remainder. This option would require building additional