102 P. MIDFORD
and Lipscy 2018). This chapter asks whether this is an accurate assessment
of the Abe administration’s energy policy. It finds that the answer is no.
While the Abe administration supported restarts, it did not intervene
politically to speed up the process of restarts, expand the relatively small
number of nuclear reactors that are likely to qualify for restarts, nor did
it authorize the building of new nuclear power plants. Rather, its policy
legacy suggests that nuclear power will be largely phased out by the end of
the 2050s. At the same time, the Abe administration continued the policies of its DPJ predecessors, especially by pursuing a road map laid out
by Prime Minister Kan Naoto, and elaborated by Prime Minister Noda
Yoshihiko. Abe followed the Kan-Noda road map by promoting renewables, both directly, and by investing in enabling infrastructure, including
grid development, and developing the hydrogen economy, including as
a medium for storing variable renewable energy (see Uriu’s chapter in
this volume). Finally, the Abe administration implemented another DPJ
policy: electricity sector reform, arguably the leading example of structural economic reform in the third arrow of Abenomics. The weakening
of the nuclear village by 3-11, METI’s independence from these vested
interests, and the pressure being exerted by public opinion largely explain
these characteristics of the Abe administration’s energy policies and offer
insight into the energy policies that Abe’s successor, prime minister Suga
Yoshihide, is likely to pursue.
The rest of this chapter consists of eight sections. The next section
outlines the Kan-Noda road map that emerged in the wake of 3-11 and
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. The following section assesses
the degree to which the Abe administration adhered to the Kan-Noda
road map. The subsequent section analyzes public opinion regarding
nuclear restarts. The section after that examines the establishment of a
grid regulatory authority, and the temporary suspension of grid access
for solar PV in several regions of Japan over several months in 2014–
2015. The next section considers METI’s responses, especially its storage
subsidy system to aid renewable energy producers facing grid curtailment risks. The following section discusses the limited curtailment that
occurred in Kyushu in late 2018 as Japan’s first case. The section after
that analyzes Japan’s electricity retail market liberalization from April
2016 and the chance this provided to producers of renewable energy. The
concluding section demonstrates that renewable energy thrived under the
Abe administration and argues that the influence of public opinion and
the strong-state perspective offer the best explanations.
and Lipscy 2018). This chapter asks whether this is an accurate assessment
of the Abe administration’s energy policy. It finds that the answer is no.
While the Abe administration supported restarts, it did not intervene
politically to speed up the process of restarts, expand the relatively small
number of nuclear reactors that are likely to qualify for restarts, nor did
it authorize the building of new nuclear power plants. Rather, its policy
legacy suggests that nuclear power will be largely phased out by the end of
the 2050s. At the same time, the Abe administration continued the policies of its DPJ predecessors, especially by pursuing a road map laid out
by Prime Minister Kan Naoto, and elaborated by Prime Minister Noda
Yoshihiko. Abe followed the Kan-Noda road map by promoting renewables, both directly, and by investing in enabling infrastructure, including
grid development, and developing the hydrogen economy, including as
a medium for storing variable renewable energy (see Uriu’s chapter in
this volume). Finally, the Abe administration implemented another DPJ
policy: electricity sector reform, arguably the leading example of structural economic reform in the third arrow of Abenomics. The weakening
of the nuclear village by 3-11, METI’s independence from these vested
interests, and the pressure being exerted by public opinion largely explain
these characteristics of the Abe administration’s energy policies and offer
insight into the energy policies that Abe’s successor, prime minister Suga
Yoshihide, is likely to pursue.
The rest of this chapter consists of eight sections. The next section
outlines the Kan-Noda road map that emerged in the wake of 3-11 and
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. The following section assesses
the degree to which the Abe administration adhered to the Kan-Noda
road map. The subsequent section analyzes public opinion regarding
nuclear restarts. The section after that examines the establishment of a
grid regulatory authority, and the temporary suspension of grid access
for solar PV in several regions of Japan over several months in 2014–
2015. The next section considers METI’s responses, especially its storage
subsidy system to aid renewable energy producers facing grid curtailment risks. The following section discusses the limited curtailment that
occurred in Kyushu in late 2018 as Japan’s first case. The section after
that analyzes Japan’s electricity retail market liberalization from April
2016 and the chance this provided to producers of renewable energy. The
concluding section demonstrates that renewable energy thrived under the
Abe administration and argues that the influence of public opinion and
the strong-state perspective offer the best explanations.