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reduce or limit the influence of one another, often in partnership with the other, is
given an extra dimension according to each’s unique partnership with every individual country in the region. For China however its diplomatic activities are limited
to the sphere of energy’ and thus in terms of security, its role looks likely to remain
modest and restricted to SCO border control and anti-terrorism operations (Bluth
2014:61). As Christoph Bluth bluntly puts it, this makes China’s policy toward US
energy diplomacy in the Caspian Sea akin to a dog with no bark. The US’, in turn,
has tentatively supported the Sino-Russian strategic partnership in so much as it
focuses on regional stability, although it has had anxiety about the scale of China’s
military modernization based on Russian weapon technology finding special favor
among anti-American elements of the SCO (Bluth 2014:61).
European Union
Several recent developments in the foreign policy and domestic politics of Turkey,
Iran, and the EU make it not just possible, but practically inevitable that Turkey
becomes an important energy hub and transit route straddling the geopolitical terrain between the former and the latter powers. There are at least three major factors
which contribute to this: In Turkey, demand for resources has increased massively
due to a rapid burst of development which looks unlikely to moderate any time
soon; In the EU—the world’s largest energy consumer—great efforts have been
made to diversify energy sources and decrease independence on Russia in the wake
of the Ukrainian crisis; Meanwhile, as diplomatic relations between Iran and the
United States begin to thaw, there may be a chance for Iran to recover from the crippling sanctions it has suffered in a response to its nuclear ambitions.
This study will establish that the proposed Southern Gas Corridor and other proposals for lines running south of Russia through Turkey is likely to be realized as a
result of the convergence of these factors. For Turkey, this will represent the fulfillment of its ambition to assume a leading role in the region’s energy market, and with
the security situation to its southern border unstable, and tensions between Russia
and the EU fraying north across the Black Sea, this is the logical outcome for all
players. It will also allow the country to enjoy greater access to natural resources
and respond to increased demand. However, progress will not be instant. Even with
the signing of a nuclear deal, it will take years of planning, investment, and
construction for Iran to build the infrastructure required to mine, refine, and transport its much sought-after resources through any of these proposed channels.
Europe’s Energy Profile
The EU is the second-largest consumer of energy in the world, using around 17% of
the world’s total energy output. The EU’s total primary energy consumption (TPEC)
is comprised of natural gas (23.8%), nuclear (14.4%), oil (30%), renewables
3 International Context of the New Era and the Caspian Sea Region
reduce or limit the influence of one another, often in partnership with the other, is
given an extra dimension according to each’s unique partnership with every individual country in the region. For China however its diplomatic activities are limited
to the sphere of energy’ and thus in terms of security, its role looks likely to remain
modest and restricted to SCO border control and anti-terrorism operations (Bluth
2014:61). As Christoph Bluth bluntly puts it, this makes China’s policy toward US
energy diplomacy in the Caspian Sea akin to a dog with no bark. The US’, in turn,
has tentatively supported the Sino-Russian strategic partnership in so much as it
focuses on regional stability, although it has had anxiety about the scale of China’s
military modernization based on Russian weapon technology finding special favor
among anti-American elements of the SCO (Bluth 2014:61).
European Union
Several recent developments in the foreign policy and domestic politics of Turkey,
Iran, and the EU make it not just possible, but practically inevitable that Turkey
becomes an important energy hub and transit route straddling the geopolitical terrain between the former and the latter powers. There are at least three major factors
which contribute to this: In Turkey, demand for resources has increased massively
due to a rapid burst of development which looks unlikely to moderate any time
soon; In the EU—the world’s largest energy consumer—great efforts have been
made to diversify energy sources and decrease independence on Russia in the wake
of the Ukrainian crisis; Meanwhile, as diplomatic relations between Iran and the
United States begin to thaw, there may be a chance for Iran to recover from the crippling sanctions it has suffered in a response to its nuclear ambitions.
This study will establish that the proposed Southern Gas Corridor and other proposals for lines running south of Russia through Turkey is likely to be realized as a
result of the convergence of these factors. For Turkey, this will represent the fulfillment of its ambition to assume a leading role in the region’s energy market, and with
the security situation to its southern border unstable, and tensions between Russia
and the EU fraying north across the Black Sea, this is the logical outcome for all
players. It will also allow the country to enjoy greater access to natural resources
and respond to increased demand. However, progress will not be instant. Even with
the signing of a nuclear deal, it will take years of planning, investment, and
construction for Iran to build the infrastructure required to mine, refine, and transport its much sought-after resources through any of these proposed channels.
Europe’s Energy Profile
The EU is the second-largest consumer of energy in the world, using around 17% of
the world’s total energy output. The EU’s total primary energy consumption (TPEC)
is comprised of natural gas (23.8%), nuclear (14.4%), oil (30%), renewables
3 International Context of the New Era and the Caspian Sea Region