75
hydrocarbons and to reduce Russian influence in the region. The competition (and
various cooperation) between China, Russia, and the US in the region has been
highlighted in a number of studies—and commented upon greatly by many former
diplomats, including Evan Feigenbaum, former “US State Department Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia and Central Asia,” who has stated that
“The United States and China don’t need joint approaches to pursue strategic cooperation, just mutually beneficial ones’” adding that “in Central Asia, where Russia
has had a near-hammerlock on the region’s oil and gas, China’s new assertiveness
comes primarily at Russia’s expense” (www.foreignpolicy.com 2016a, b).
Between 2005 and 2010, China finally made its presence felt in the Caspian.
Examining how the country “triangularized” bilateral relations between each country in the region highlights the sensitivity the country has placed on its diplomatic
mission, and thus the importance it places on its active involvement. The RussiaChina- Turkmenistan triangle was based on competition between Russia and China
over energy reach in Turkmenistan and between Russia’s unrealized project for a
“Caspian Coastal Pipeline” (CCP), and on the other hand, the successfully constructed Turkmenistan-China natural gas pipeline project crossing Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan (Amineh and Guang 2012:48).
As Mehdi P. Amineh and Yang Guang rightly point out, it is impossible to understand the complicated system of Central Eurasian energy geo-economics that has
developed of late—and not least how it will evolve—without first examining how
Turkmenistan alone has developed and looks likely to develop thanks to its new
non-Russian export routes (Amineh and Guang 2012:48).
Clearly, in the absence of any territorial objectives, China is aiming to expand its
influence in the Caspian in order to increase its own economic and energy security.
Central Asia and the Caspian Sea States have signed and maintained mutual border
security agreements with one another, and separatists and radical Islamic groups
which provoke tension with China are of little threat. Energy will continue to provide the economic impetus for cooperation between the Caspian region and China
in spite of problems afflicting all countries involved, such as illegal migration
between nations and domestic migration block development projects. As for issues
stemming from shared cultural and national allegiances between peoples on both
sides of the modern borders, as in the case of Chinese’s Eastern Turkic peoples, this
can only exasperate cooperation efforts if little is done domestically to alleviate
issues of inequality and cultural assimilation (Ebel and Menon 2000:222).
In terms of Chinese policymakers’ thoughts on Russia, directly, since the end of
the Cold War, the country has taken care to develop a new “strategic partnership”
with its northern neighbor, aiming to avoid the impression that it represents an overt
rival in geopolitical affairs (Bluth 2014:57).
Russia, meanwhile, believes that the US presence in Central Asia and the Caspian
Sea ultimately weakens China’s ability to play a dominant role. This belief does not
necessarily contradict the US’ own appraisal of its place in the region, which posits
that China’s presence in the region, as well as its investment, might aid and stabilize
the region and decrease the potential of conflict—complementing its own stated
goals. Taken, the complex game between Russia, China, and the US in trying to
China
hydrocarbons and to reduce Russian influence in the region. The competition (and
various cooperation) between China, Russia, and the US in the region has been
highlighted in a number of studies—and commented upon greatly by many former
diplomats, including Evan Feigenbaum, former “US State Department Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia and Central Asia,” who has stated that
“The United States and China don’t need joint approaches to pursue strategic cooperation, just mutually beneficial ones’” adding that “in Central Asia, where Russia
has had a near-hammerlock on the region’s oil and gas, China’s new assertiveness
comes primarily at Russia’s expense” (www.foreignpolicy.com 2016a, b).
Between 2005 and 2010, China finally made its presence felt in the Caspian.
Examining how the country “triangularized” bilateral relations between each country in the region highlights the sensitivity the country has placed on its diplomatic
mission, and thus the importance it places on its active involvement. The RussiaChina- Turkmenistan triangle was based on competition between Russia and China
over energy reach in Turkmenistan and between Russia’s unrealized project for a
“Caspian Coastal Pipeline” (CCP), and on the other hand, the successfully constructed Turkmenistan-China natural gas pipeline project crossing Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan (Amineh and Guang 2012:48).
As Mehdi P. Amineh and Yang Guang rightly point out, it is impossible to understand the complicated system of Central Eurasian energy geo-economics that has
developed of late—and not least how it will evolve—without first examining how
Turkmenistan alone has developed and looks likely to develop thanks to its new
non-Russian export routes (Amineh and Guang 2012:48).
Clearly, in the absence of any territorial objectives, China is aiming to expand its
influence in the Caspian in order to increase its own economic and energy security.
Central Asia and the Caspian Sea States have signed and maintained mutual border
security agreements with one another, and separatists and radical Islamic groups
which provoke tension with China are of little threat. Energy will continue to provide the economic impetus for cooperation between the Caspian region and China
in spite of problems afflicting all countries involved, such as illegal migration
between nations and domestic migration block development projects. As for issues
stemming from shared cultural and national allegiances between peoples on both
sides of the modern borders, as in the case of Chinese’s Eastern Turkic peoples, this
can only exasperate cooperation efforts if little is done domestically to alleviate
issues of inequality and cultural assimilation (Ebel and Menon 2000:222).
In terms of Chinese policymakers’ thoughts on Russia, directly, since the end of
the Cold War, the country has taken care to develop a new “strategic partnership”
with its northern neighbor, aiming to avoid the impression that it represents an overt
rival in geopolitical affairs (Bluth 2014:57).
Russia, meanwhile, believes that the US presence in Central Asia and the Caspian
Sea ultimately weakens China’s ability to play a dominant role. This belief does not
necessarily contradict the US’ own appraisal of its place in the region, which posits
that China’s presence in the region, as well as its investment, might aid and stabilize
the region and decrease the potential of conflict—complementing its own stated
goals. Taken, the complex game between Russia, China, and the US in trying to
China