70
China
Direct investment in oil and gas supply pipelines is a priority in terms of China’s
current energy security policies, allowing for unbroken access to oil and gas that
does not depend on the perhaps less committed transit routes of the international
waterways (Shaffer 2009:51). In recent years, China has invested in the energy sector and various other projects in the Central Asia region, with the principal goal of
advancing Beijing’s influence to counteract Russia and America’s own growing
spheres. More immediate and practical objectives are not lacking either however—
and China also seeks to secure its Western frontier by bolstering the stability of, and
links with bordering nations while finally harnessing the energy resources of Central
Asia and the Caspian Sea, long seen, quite justifiably, as Russia’s “back yard”
(www.cfr.org 2017).
China’s economic relations and investment in the energy infrastructure of the
region has allowed Central Asian states to diversify their opportunities in terms of
energy transit routes and trade. China’s intentions here fall broadly in line with the
US’ own core objectives in that policymakers anticipate that by providing options,
choices, and alternative options to policymakers in the region, so Caspian and
Central Asia states’ sovereignty and independence will be strengthened. China has
been facilitating this by creating a mechanism which complements the American
emphasis on regional integration with economies to the region’s southern and eastern frontier (www.cfr.org 2017). In 2014, in the light of NATO’s withdrawal from
Afghanistan and the slump the Russian economy experienced due to EU sanctions
imposed in response to the Ukraine crisis, Central Asia republics found themselves
in the dark in terms of new investments and infrastructure projects, as Russia had
firmly remained the region’s principal investment and security partner. EU and
American sanctions, coupled with low oil prices thus forced Central Asian states to
seek out new partners for economic diversification and security. Chinese investment
in Central Asia, if only steady, has been warmly received: For instance, by 2016,
668 Chinese companies were present in Kazakhstan—an increase of 35% since
2013. This matches an investment of more than $10 billion by China in Kazakhstan
over a 5-year period (www.thediplomat.com 2017a, b).
At present, Chinese state-controlled oil companies are riding high, but their
future is not certain. Chinese energy companies’ overtures in the Caspian could well
create a counterresponse, as Caspian gas producers may welcome Chinese political
influence far less than Chinese cash investments and efficiency. The Caspian Sea
States, along with Uzbekistan, namely, show no interest in replacing one master for
another vis-a-vis Russia and China (www.foreignpolicy.com 2016a, b).
China held the expectation that Russia would function as a guarantor of stability
in Central Asia and the Caspian Basin until and beyond that point. The situation is
not free of complications since eight million Chinese Uighur residents are of the
same ethnic and religious heritage of various Central Asia populations. Islamic
radicalism is a source of fear for China. China also fears being separated from its
3 International Context of the New Era and the Caspian Sea Region
China
Direct investment in oil and gas supply pipelines is a priority in terms of China’s
current energy security policies, allowing for unbroken access to oil and gas that
does not depend on the perhaps less committed transit routes of the international
waterways (Shaffer 2009:51). In recent years, China has invested in the energy sector and various other projects in the Central Asia region, with the principal goal of
advancing Beijing’s influence to counteract Russia and America’s own growing
spheres. More immediate and practical objectives are not lacking either however—
and China also seeks to secure its Western frontier by bolstering the stability of, and
links with bordering nations while finally harnessing the energy resources of Central
Asia and the Caspian Sea, long seen, quite justifiably, as Russia’s “back yard”
(www.cfr.org 2017).
China’s economic relations and investment in the energy infrastructure of the
region has allowed Central Asian states to diversify their opportunities in terms of
energy transit routes and trade. China’s intentions here fall broadly in line with the
US’ own core objectives in that policymakers anticipate that by providing options,
choices, and alternative options to policymakers in the region, so Caspian and
Central Asia states’ sovereignty and independence will be strengthened. China has
been facilitating this by creating a mechanism which complements the American
emphasis on regional integration with economies to the region’s southern and eastern frontier (www.cfr.org 2017). In 2014, in the light of NATO’s withdrawal from
Afghanistan and the slump the Russian economy experienced due to EU sanctions
imposed in response to the Ukraine crisis, Central Asia republics found themselves
in the dark in terms of new investments and infrastructure projects, as Russia had
firmly remained the region’s principal investment and security partner. EU and
American sanctions, coupled with low oil prices thus forced Central Asian states to
seek out new partners for economic diversification and security. Chinese investment
in Central Asia, if only steady, has been warmly received: For instance, by 2016,
668 Chinese companies were present in Kazakhstan—an increase of 35% since
2013. This matches an investment of more than $10 billion by China in Kazakhstan
over a 5-year period (www.thediplomat.com 2017a, b).
At present, Chinese state-controlled oil companies are riding high, but their
future is not certain. Chinese energy companies’ overtures in the Caspian could well
create a counterresponse, as Caspian gas producers may welcome Chinese political
influence far less than Chinese cash investments and efficiency. The Caspian Sea
States, along with Uzbekistan, namely, show no interest in replacing one master for
another vis-a-vis Russia and China (www.foreignpolicy.com 2016a, b).
China held the expectation that Russia would function as a guarantor of stability
in Central Asia and the Caspian Basin until and beyond that point. The situation is
not free of complications since eight million Chinese Uighur residents are of the
same ethnic and religious heritage of various Central Asia populations. Islamic
radicalism is a source of fear for China. China also fears being separated from its
3 International Context of the New Era and the Caspian Sea Region