59
We can assume that Iran has the following strategic benefits in the region:
1. The development of a positive relationship with Russia which can function as a
counterbalance to conflicts with western countries;
2. The development of positive relationships in areas of trade and investments with
close neighboring countries, particularly in countries with larger markets, such
as Russia, Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan;
3. The utilization of energy interdependent through cooperation in the fields of oil,
gas, and electric power to put Iran’s massive resource base to strategic and economic use;
4. The utilization of regional relations with neighbours to weaken the impacts of
western pressure, particularly in bypassing sanctions (traditionally the UAE was
used to this end, yet recently, Iran has been in closer cooperation with Turkey
and Central Asian states. (Khajehpour 2012; www.csis.org 2017:2)
Energy interdependency has become a crucial feature in Iran’s regional interaction, especially with Caspian state nations, and can be summed up accordingly
(Khajehpour 2012; www.csis.org 2017:2)
• Importing natural gas from Turkmenistan and exporting to Turkey
• Exporting gas to Armenia in return for electricity
• Gas swap deals with Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan
• Oil swap deals with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan
• Electricity network integration with neighbors (Iran is exporting electricity to
Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Armenia, Nakhchivan, and Afghanistan, and importing
electricity from Armenia, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan).
Energy connectivity has been a significant parameter in Iran’s regional politics,
and due to the importance placed upon such networking, Iran has never hesitated to
invest in its infrastructure (Khajehpour 2012; www.csis.org 2017:7). For example,
Iran very recently began to construct a gas pipeline for exporting natural gas to
Pakistan according to the IP gas agreement (www.iranpetroleum.ir 2016:9). Iran is
trying to facilitate localization of the technology as required for the construction of
this pipeline (Khajehpour 2012; www.csis.org 2017:7).
Iran planned to produce 5 mbpd by the end of 2022, but studies showed that there
are no assumptions about achieving the planned production. It is also expected that
Iran’s oil production capacity will fall to 3.1 mbdp by 2016, with revenue-earning
exports suffering consequently (Khajehpour 2012; www.csis.org 2017:7).
Iran Energy Strategy
As with other countries, Iran pursues energy diplomacy based on structure, agenda,
and process. Iran’s weaknesses in structural terms lie in that it shares a number of
fields with neighbors such as Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Its diplomatic
efforts in terms of dealing with these fields are undocumented, but the significance
Iran
We can assume that Iran has the following strategic benefits in the region:
1. The development of a positive relationship with Russia which can function as a
counterbalance to conflicts with western countries;
2. The development of positive relationships in areas of trade and investments with
close neighboring countries, particularly in countries with larger markets, such
as Russia, Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan;
3. The utilization of energy interdependent through cooperation in the fields of oil,
gas, and electric power to put Iran’s massive resource base to strategic and economic use;
4. The utilization of regional relations with neighbours to weaken the impacts of
western pressure, particularly in bypassing sanctions (traditionally the UAE was
used to this end, yet recently, Iran has been in closer cooperation with Turkey
and Central Asian states. (Khajehpour 2012; www.csis.org 2017:2)
Energy interdependency has become a crucial feature in Iran’s regional interaction, especially with Caspian state nations, and can be summed up accordingly
(Khajehpour 2012; www.csis.org 2017:2)
• Importing natural gas from Turkmenistan and exporting to Turkey
• Exporting gas to Armenia in return for electricity
• Gas swap deals with Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan
• Oil swap deals with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan
• Electricity network integration with neighbors (Iran is exporting electricity to
Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Armenia, Nakhchivan, and Afghanistan, and importing
electricity from Armenia, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan).
Energy connectivity has been a significant parameter in Iran’s regional politics,
and due to the importance placed upon such networking, Iran has never hesitated to
invest in its infrastructure (Khajehpour 2012; www.csis.org 2017:7). For example,
Iran very recently began to construct a gas pipeline for exporting natural gas to
Pakistan according to the IP gas agreement (www.iranpetroleum.ir 2016:9). Iran is
trying to facilitate localization of the technology as required for the construction of
this pipeline (Khajehpour 2012; www.csis.org 2017:7).
Iran planned to produce 5 mbpd by the end of 2022, but studies showed that there
are no assumptions about achieving the planned production. It is also expected that
Iran’s oil production capacity will fall to 3.1 mbdp by 2016, with revenue-earning
exports suffering consequently (Khajehpour 2012; www.csis.org 2017:7).
Iran Energy Strategy
As with other countries, Iran pursues energy diplomacy based on structure, agenda,
and process. Iran’s weaknesses in structural terms lie in that it shares a number of
fields with neighbors such as Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Its diplomatic
efforts in terms of dealing with these fields are undocumented, but the significance
Iran