58
its economy, allowing access for the exchange of goods and services via road, rail,
sea, and air—including energy transfer (Ahmadi Pour and Lashkari 2010:8).
In November 1991, Iran’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and many other Central Asian states, representing Iran’s
first official diplomatic mission to the region. The first order of business was establishing consulates in these countries. During this time, Iran found itself in competition with Turkey in terms of presenting a model for the region’s future governance.
However, Iran played a cautious game so as not to step on Russia’s toes, and delayed
recognition of each Central Asian state’s independence until December 1991.
However, none of these delicate encroachments gave the country the standing it sort
among nations in the region, who decided to embark on a firmly secular, statecentric system of governance (www.tabnak.ir 2017). It would not be until the
Ahmadinejad era, when the country implemented its “Look East” policy, that Iran
focused more on the region, expanding and developing links—albeit with limited
substantial rewards (www.tabnak.ir 2017).
Relations with Central Asia and the South Caucasus states have never been Iran’s
priority compared to the Persian Gulf and Turkey. According to Iranian officials, in
fact, Iran’s diplomatic vision in terms of the South Caucasus, Caspian Basin, and
Central Asia, falls into seven categories: The first of these is the development of
cultural, economic, and political relations with all regional states, in line with
expansion goals in Eurasia and the Persian Gulf. The second is to finalize a desirable resolution to territorial disputes over the Caspian Basin with the aim of protecting and exploiting Iranian energy and hydrocarbon resources. The third is active
participation in regional organizations such as the “Economic Cooperation
Organization (ECO)” and “Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)” in order to
undermine US sanctions neutralized American influence. The fourth is to prevent
any security threats from any state of the region. The fifth is to become an energy
hub across the region, exporting oil and gas to consumer markets. The sixth is to
expand and connect rail networks, roads, and tunnels to restore the old Silk Road,
connecting Iran to India, China, and Europe through the South Caucasus. And lastly,
to cooperate with neighboring states in the fight against terrorism and jihadism
(Milani 2014; www.csis.org 2017:6–7).
Energy policy forms an integral element of Iran’s foreign relations. And so for a
better understanding of Iran’s energy policy, we must understand its foreign policy
and the role hydrocarbon resources play within it. In 1997, Iran’s Foreign Minister
summed up the country’s international outlook accordingly:
Iran’s highest policy priority… is to strengthen trust, confidence and peace in our immediate neighborhood.
Although this picture has security at its heart, Iran’s energy requirements and
cultural and historical outlook have been harnessed as major tools in achieving
these goals. Iran’s 20-Year Plan, which began in 2005, concentrated on regionalism
and called for Iran to be the region’s top economic and technological power by 2025
(Khajehpour 2012; www.csis.org 2017:2).
3 International Context of the New Era and the Caspian Sea Region
its economy, allowing access for the exchange of goods and services via road, rail,
sea, and air—including energy transfer (Ahmadi Pour and Lashkari 2010:8).
In November 1991, Iran’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and many other Central Asian states, representing Iran’s
first official diplomatic mission to the region. The first order of business was establishing consulates in these countries. During this time, Iran found itself in competition with Turkey in terms of presenting a model for the region’s future governance.
However, Iran played a cautious game so as not to step on Russia’s toes, and delayed
recognition of each Central Asian state’s independence until December 1991.
However, none of these delicate encroachments gave the country the standing it sort
among nations in the region, who decided to embark on a firmly secular, statecentric system of governance (www.tabnak.ir 2017). It would not be until the
Ahmadinejad era, when the country implemented its “Look East” policy, that Iran
focused more on the region, expanding and developing links—albeit with limited
substantial rewards (www.tabnak.ir 2017).
Relations with Central Asia and the South Caucasus states have never been Iran’s
priority compared to the Persian Gulf and Turkey. According to Iranian officials, in
fact, Iran’s diplomatic vision in terms of the South Caucasus, Caspian Basin, and
Central Asia, falls into seven categories: The first of these is the development of
cultural, economic, and political relations with all regional states, in line with
expansion goals in Eurasia and the Persian Gulf. The second is to finalize a desirable resolution to territorial disputes over the Caspian Basin with the aim of protecting and exploiting Iranian energy and hydrocarbon resources. The third is active
participation in regional organizations such as the “Economic Cooperation
Organization (ECO)” and “Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)” in order to
undermine US sanctions neutralized American influence. The fourth is to prevent
any security threats from any state of the region. The fifth is to become an energy
hub across the region, exporting oil and gas to consumer markets. The sixth is to
expand and connect rail networks, roads, and tunnels to restore the old Silk Road,
connecting Iran to India, China, and Europe through the South Caucasus. And lastly,
to cooperate with neighboring states in the fight against terrorism and jihadism
(Milani 2014; www.csis.org 2017:6–7).
Energy policy forms an integral element of Iran’s foreign relations. And so for a
better understanding of Iran’s energy policy, we must understand its foreign policy
and the role hydrocarbon resources play within it. In 1997, Iran’s Foreign Minister
summed up the country’s international outlook accordingly:
Iran’s highest policy priority… is to strengthen trust, confidence and peace in our immediate neighborhood.
Although this picture has security at its heart, Iran’s energy requirements and
cultural and historical outlook have been harnessed as major tools in achieving
these goals. Iran’s 20-Year Plan, which began in 2005, concentrated on regionalism
and called for Iran to be the region’s top economic and technological power by 2025
(Khajehpour 2012; www.csis.org 2017:2).
3 International Context of the New Era and the Caspian Sea Region