38
According to Stephan Blank, when Obama came to power in 2009, the US faced
three major crises in Central Asia—namely, the situation in Afghanistan, an economic crisis which lowered the appetite of the US and its allies for fighting in the
region, and Russia’s determination to dislodge the US militarily from Central Asia,
thereby resuming its domination of the region (Blank 2009:1–5). To solve these
issues, Blank proposed the Obama Administration came up with a new diplomatic
policy for Central Asia and Caspian. This would involve expanding the Bush administration’s promotion of regional integration with East and South Asia in terms of
electricity, energy, and other commodities; building upon that policy and using US
military forces as a tool for encouraging regional economic development and integration; combining this strategy with other US policies; reforming the interagency
process; cooperating with NATO to form an expanded menu of “ala carte” programs
for developing security, border defenses, and logistical programs; and employing an
integrated and comprehensive approach to security in both Central Asia and
Afghanistan to combat the narcotics trade (Blank 2009:1–5).
As Vicken Cheterian stated that From Russia’s perspective, as it was losing
power subsequent to its withdrawal from Afghanistan and East Europe and the 14
former Soviet republics’ gaining their independence, she needed to sustain her existence and her presence on the “Near Environment” by forming a certain strategy. If
Russia were to be respected as the “Great Power,” she would have to regain her
influence in former Soviet republics, Caucasia, and Ukraine in the Middle East. To
this end, Hazar oil and gas was of vital importance. It was important not because
Russia needed it—she already had sufficient amounts of it—but to establish a new
canal with new pipeline routes for the purpose of reinforcing the Russian power
(Cheterian 2017:406).
Alternatively, Ekaterina Svyatets (2016:193–194), in her book about Energy
Security and Cooperation in Eurasia, provides empirical insight into the energy
security literature and proposes some advice for policymaking. She believes that the
geopolitical rivalries are important in all energy and non-energy spheres and are
major impediment to otherwise mutually lucrative energy deals. It is very important
to consider the issue-linkage between energy negotiations and none-related security
concerns such as war, human rights, nuclear weapons, and nationalism. Her second
argument is that countries and international oil companies should rather relish competition on energy projects (such as two different pipeline projects) and should not
view every decision as a zero-sum game; but rather, as a batch of opportunities
favorable for all the involved parties. Furthermore, she is proposing deferring the
decision-making process in the energy domain to international organizations such
as World Bank’s energy division, the International Energy Agency, which could
provide more objective insight about future energy transit routes.
According to Robert E. Bedeski and Niklas Swanstrom, Russia is concerned
about China’s economic dynamism in Central Asia. This dynamism, it is feared,
may enable China to present itself as the dominant power in the Caspian Basin and
Central Asia. In turn, China has no desire to accept Russian military hegemony and
high-handedness against China in Central Asia (Bedeski and Swanström 2012:66,
79). Somewhat easing this fact however Huasheng Zhao argues that China and
2 Literature Review
According to Stephan Blank, when Obama came to power in 2009, the US faced
three major crises in Central Asia—namely, the situation in Afghanistan, an economic crisis which lowered the appetite of the US and its allies for fighting in the
region, and Russia’s determination to dislodge the US militarily from Central Asia,
thereby resuming its domination of the region (Blank 2009:1–5). To solve these
issues, Blank proposed the Obama Administration came up with a new diplomatic
policy for Central Asia and Caspian. This would involve expanding the Bush administration’s promotion of regional integration with East and South Asia in terms of
electricity, energy, and other commodities; building upon that policy and using US
military forces as a tool for encouraging regional economic development and integration; combining this strategy with other US policies; reforming the interagency
process; cooperating with NATO to form an expanded menu of “ala carte” programs
for developing security, border defenses, and logistical programs; and employing an
integrated and comprehensive approach to security in both Central Asia and
Afghanistan to combat the narcotics trade (Blank 2009:1–5).
As Vicken Cheterian stated that From Russia’s perspective, as it was losing
power subsequent to its withdrawal from Afghanistan and East Europe and the 14
former Soviet republics’ gaining their independence, she needed to sustain her existence and her presence on the “Near Environment” by forming a certain strategy. If
Russia were to be respected as the “Great Power,” she would have to regain her
influence in former Soviet republics, Caucasia, and Ukraine in the Middle East. To
this end, Hazar oil and gas was of vital importance. It was important not because
Russia needed it—she already had sufficient amounts of it—but to establish a new
canal with new pipeline routes for the purpose of reinforcing the Russian power
(Cheterian 2017:406).
Alternatively, Ekaterina Svyatets (2016:193–194), in her book about Energy
Security and Cooperation in Eurasia, provides empirical insight into the energy
security literature and proposes some advice for policymaking. She believes that the
geopolitical rivalries are important in all energy and non-energy spheres and are
major impediment to otherwise mutually lucrative energy deals. It is very important
to consider the issue-linkage between energy negotiations and none-related security
concerns such as war, human rights, nuclear weapons, and nationalism. Her second
argument is that countries and international oil companies should rather relish competition on energy projects (such as two different pipeline projects) and should not
view every decision as a zero-sum game; but rather, as a batch of opportunities
favorable for all the involved parties. Furthermore, she is proposing deferring the
decision-making process in the energy domain to international organizations such
as World Bank’s energy division, the International Energy Agency, which could
provide more objective insight about future energy transit routes.
According to Robert E. Bedeski and Niklas Swanstrom, Russia is concerned
about China’s economic dynamism in Central Asia. This dynamism, it is feared,
may enable China to present itself as the dominant power in the Caspian Basin and
Central Asia. In turn, China has no desire to accept Russian military hegemony and
high-handedness against China in Central Asia (Bedeski and Swanström 2012:66,
79). Somewhat easing this fact however Huasheng Zhao argues that China and
2 Literature Review