15
States operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their own self-interest
and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states, or to the interests of the
so-called ‘international community’. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self-help
world. This is true in the short term as well as in the long term, because if a state loses in
the short run, it might not be around for the long haul.
Waltz throws caution to the notion that the result of this is a division of winners
and losers inhabiting the global system by emphasizing that:
if states are to be secure in an anarchic world, they need to pay heed to the structural constraints under which they operate. Simplistically stated, powerful states can and indeed
should or must “do more” than less powerful states. Interests expand as relative power
increases. Still, even the most powerful states shouldn’t get too excited about the powerprojection opportunities that arise simply from having great capabilities. (www.popularsocialscience.com 2017)
States which aim to deepen their means of survival often acquire offensive military capabilities. They thus increase their relative power in international system,
while also provoking the mistrust of other states, leading to a strengthening of the
military capabilities of the latter in response. This problem is described as the security dilemma (Bluth 2014:5).
The regional equilibrium theory has a special place in the neorealist approach.
This is due to the emphasis neorealists have placed on the issue of power and security. Academics such as Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, and John Mearsheimer have
various responses to this interplay. According to Waltz’s theory, the issue of the
balance of power is important because it can moderate conflicts and crises in each
region. Though humanitarian concerns may play a part, the central element to stabilization lies in the balance struck by actors in the region and around the globe (Waltz
1979:87). Unlike neorealist such as Waltz and Mearsheimer, who are pessimistic
when it comes to cooperation between states in a post-Cold War world, other neorealist have a brighter outlook. According to Charles Glaser, “contrary to settled
understanding, the general tendency to act is not a logical end to the basic assumptions of structural realization” (Baylis 2008:76,77).
US Foreign Policy in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Region
US foreign policy toward energy as manifested in the Caucasus mainly began with
the BTC negotiation and outcome, which subsequently set a lot of frameworks for
how US diplomats understood energy and their own goals. Specifically, the framework encouraged the sovereignty and independence of countries in their energy
diplomacy, which created the roots for lessening dependence on Russia. BakuTbilisi- Ceyhan became a symbol encapsulating the understanding of the professed
winning formula of having private companies working with US energy diplomats to
negotiate a deal that by-passed countries into a different energy network. The problem with that is that it also created this expectation that this is the paradigm of
energy diplomacy going forward (Author’s interview with Alexander Cooley 2017).
US Foreign Policy in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Region
States operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their own self-interest
and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states, or to the interests of the
so-called ‘international community’. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self-help
world. This is true in the short term as well as in the long term, because if a state loses in
the short run, it might not be around for the long haul.
Waltz throws caution to the notion that the result of this is a division of winners
and losers inhabiting the global system by emphasizing that:
if states are to be secure in an anarchic world, they need to pay heed to the structural constraints under which they operate. Simplistically stated, powerful states can and indeed
should or must “do more” than less powerful states. Interests expand as relative power
increases. Still, even the most powerful states shouldn’t get too excited about the powerprojection opportunities that arise simply from having great capabilities. (www.popularsocialscience.com 2017)
States which aim to deepen their means of survival often acquire offensive military capabilities. They thus increase their relative power in international system,
while also provoking the mistrust of other states, leading to a strengthening of the
military capabilities of the latter in response. This problem is described as the security dilemma (Bluth 2014:5).
The regional equilibrium theory has a special place in the neorealist approach.
This is due to the emphasis neorealists have placed on the issue of power and security. Academics such as Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, and John Mearsheimer have
various responses to this interplay. According to Waltz’s theory, the issue of the
balance of power is important because it can moderate conflicts and crises in each
region. Though humanitarian concerns may play a part, the central element to stabilization lies in the balance struck by actors in the region and around the globe (Waltz
1979:87). Unlike neorealist such as Waltz and Mearsheimer, who are pessimistic
when it comes to cooperation between states in a post-Cold War world, other neorealist have a brighter outlook. According to Charles Glaser, “contrary to settled
understanding, the general tendency to act is not a logical end to the basic assumptions of structural realization” (Baylis 2008:76,77).
US Foreign Policy in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Region
US foreign policy toward energy as manifested in the Caucasus mainly began with
the BTC negotiation and outcome, which subsequently set a lot of frameworks for
how US diplomats understood energy and their own goals. Specifically, the framework encouraged the sovereignty and independence of countries in their energy
diplomacy, which created the roots for lessening dependence on Russia. BakuTbilisi- Ceyhan became a symbol encapsulating the understanding of the professed
winning formula of having private companies working with US energy diplomats to
negotiate a deal that by-passed countries into a different energy network. The problem with that is that it also created this expectation that this is the paradigm of
energy diplomacy going forward (Author’s interview with Alexander Cooley 2017).
US Foreign Policy in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Region