14
Balance of Power
The theory of balance of power proclaims that governments either fall into weakness or attain power according to their freely made choices. However, more powerful states will push their policies onto weaker ones as a systematic inevitability of
this system. This situation arises from amid anarchy.
Mearsheimer defines anarchy as the nonexistence of a centralized authority and
the nonexistence of a night watchman or an arbiter that has a superior status above
the government with the function of protecting it (www.theatlantic.com 2016a, b).
Mearsheimer broadens the theory to modern political realities by putting forward
that the unexpected power of the US has demonstrated its domestic politics as a
force of global purchase, which has dynamics that cannot be easily explained by
means of structural realism (www.theory- talks.org 2017). Political scientists are of
the belief that until the end of the Cold War, it was possible to explain the international relations of the US by means of realist terms. However, since the end of the
Cold War, realist terms have begun to be insufficient in explaining their international relations. Mearsheimer states that the US usually acted in a realist manner
and its idealist rhetoric was supportive of its behavior. Mearsheimer continued to
say that they acted as realists and talked as idealists, but since the Cold War, the US
has started to act in a non-realist manner and began following illogical policies. In
times of trouble, it does not experience the consequences all that much due to its
great power relative to that of the other states in the system (www.theory- talks.
org 2017).
The military power of the US and the USSR were in a general equilibrium and
their military doctrines accorded throughout the majority of the Cold War. However,
it was from the 1960s, according to Waltz (2000:5–41) that military policy critics at
home began to encourage the United States to “reestablish war capabilities.” Before
becoming Defense Minister, M. R. Laird stated that the US strategic endeavor
should have the target of “fighting, winning, and renewing” and that this strategy
should be based on the willingness to make “nuclear war and coup d’etats first.”
This current of thought reached its zenith in 1980 when President Ronald Reagan
became president. Despite moderating the Republicans’ new commitment to taking
the offensive, Reagan pledged to actively establish a “security barrier” for the
United States. The result achieved was expected; the parity of military forces and
doctrines to heightened levels (Waltz 2000:5–41). This episode can be explained in
neorealist terms thusly: The primary goal of any government is to preserve its existence amid anarchic conditions. A more widely used term for “survival” is “security.” According to neorealists, security is the fundamental goal of governments.
Waltz believes that the business of governments is essential to maximize security
(www.popularsocialscience.com 2017). Waltz argues that the anarchic nature of the
international system thus places great pressure on the powerful countries to pursue
their interests with further rigor. John Mearsheimer (2014:18) clarifies this logic
with the claim that:
1 Theoretical Framework
Balance of Power
The theory of balance of power proclaims that governments either fall into weakness or attain power according to their freely made choices. However, more powerful states will push their policies onto weaker ones as a systematic inevitability of
this system. This situation arises from amid anarchy.
Mearsheimer defines anarchy as the nonexistence of a centralized authority and
the nonexistence of a night watchman or an arbiter that has a superior status above
the government with the function of protecting it (www.theatlantic.com 2016a, b).
Mearsheimer broadens the theory to modern political realities by putting forward
that the unexpected power of the US has demonstrated its domestic politics as a
force of global purchase, which has dynamics that cannot be easily explained by
means of structural realism (www.theory- talks.org 2017). Political scientists are of
the belief that until the end of the Cold War, it was possible to explain the international relations of the US by means of realist terms. However, since the end of the
Cold War, realist terms have begun to be insufficient in explaining their international relations. Mearsheimer states that the US usually acted in a realist manner
and its idealist rhetoric was supportive of its behavior. Mearsheimer continued to
say that they acted as realists and talked as idealists, but since the Cold War, the US
has started to act in a non-realist manner and began following illogical policies. In
times of trouble, it does not experience the consequences all that much due to its
great power relative to that of the other states in the system (www.theory- talks.
org 2017).
The military power of the US and the USSR were in a general equilibrium and
their military doctrines accorded throughout the majority of the Cold War. However,
it was from the 1960s, according to Waltz (2000:5–41) that military policy critics at
home began to encourage the United States to “reestablish war capabilities.” Before
becoming Defense Minister, M. R. Laird stated that the US strategic endeavor
should have the target of “fighting, winning, and renewing” and that this strategy
should be based on the willingness to make “nuclear war and coup d’etats first.”
This current of thought reached its zenith in 1980 when President Ronald Reagan
became president. Despite moderating the Republicans’ new commitment to taking
the offensive, Reagan pledged to actively establish a “security barrier” for the
United States. The result achieved was expected; the parity of military forces and
doctrines to heightened levels (Waltz 2000:5–41). This episode can be explained in
neorealist terms thusly: The primary goal of any government is to preserve its existence amid anarchic conditions. A more widely used term for “survival” is “security.” According to neorealists, security is the fundamental goal of governments.
Waltz believes that the business of governments is essential to maximize security
(www.popularsocialscience.com 2017). Waltz argues that the anarchic nature of the
international system thus places great pressure on the powerful countries to pursue
their interests with further rigor. John Mearsheimer (2014:18) clarifies this logic
with the claim that:
1 Theoretical Framework
