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US Energy Diplomacy Under the Obama Administration
With access to energy resources so fundamental to the US policymakers’ understanding of growth and stability in both the US and world economy, one administration usually (or rather, ideally) carries a certain sense of continuity from the last. For
instance, Bush may have represented a significant departure from the Clinton
Administration in terms of foreign policy, yet regarding hostility with Iran and support for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, a clear continuity can be observed. Further to
Clinton’s enthusiastic support for allowing the region to funnel energy to Western
markets, Bush took deliberate steps to ensure this. And so under Obama, the US’
general strategic interest in the stability of the Caspian region remained tied to the
country’s geopolitical concerns regarding major access routes to Central Asia, and
as part of a broader region prone to instability and unforeseen events which have
affected the US and the region at large (Author Interview with Ambassador John
Maresca 2016).
However, the Obama administration was accused of a serious lack of interest and
engagement in the Caspian region in a report prepared by Republican senators on
the Foreign Policy Committee of the US Senate, which cited a “perception that US
engagement [was] fading away.” In part, the report aimed to urge the US State of
Department to reinstate the position of “Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy,” left
vacant by Ambassador Richard Morningstar. According to the report, leaving the
position unfilled sent the message to players in the region that the US was not properly engaged in Eurasian energy security issues—and warned of dire consequences
to the security of the US’ European allies (The Economist Report 2013:37).
Speaking “at the Economist Investment Energy Summit in March 2012,” Morningstar
reflected the reduction of interest in campaigning on the EU’s behalf in this capacity
by essentially throwing the ball in Europe’s court:
…the most important thing that Europe can do—more so than any pipeline or any single gas
field—is what Europe does itself with respect to liberalizing its market, with respect to
creating interconnectors between countries, by looking at alternative sources of energy,
whether it be shale or renewables, by taking advantage of opportunities to improve energy
efficiency, by increasing LNG facilities, by increasing storage facilities; doing all things
that are necessary for Europe to have its own balance and diverse energy policy. (The
Economist Report 2013:37)
The Obama oil doctrine strongly followed on from that of former US presidents,
maintaining control over Middle Eastern state supplies, shoring up relations with
friendly oil-producing countries in the region, encouraging the free flow of oil on
the markets. However, the Caspian was never a region over which the US had
enjoyed either supremacy, as in the Middle East, or easy market access; Furthermore,
what changed under the Obama administration was the practical emphasis on reducing US dependence on imported oil in general, and thus a significant drive for
expansion in the region was considered a nonstarter (Taheri and Torabi 2010:22).
In Obama’s view, reducing the US’ dependency on foreign oil by exploiting
domestic reserves, increasing fuel efficiency, and increasing renewable energies
5 US Energy Diplomacy Under the Obama Administration
US Energy Diplomacy Under the Obama Administration
With access to energy resources so fundamental to the US policymakers’ understanding of growth and stability in both the US and world economy, one administration usually (or rather, ideally) carries a certain sense of continuity from the last. For
instance, Bush may have represented a significant departure from the Clinton
Administration in terms of foreign policy, yet regarding hostility with Iran and support for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, a clear continuity can be observed. Further to
Clinton’s enthusiastic support for allowing the region to funnel energy to Western
markets, Bush took deliberate steps to ensure this. And so under Obama, the US’
general strategic interest in the stability of the Caspian region remained tied to the
country’s geopolitical concerns regarding major access routes to Central Asia, and
as part of a broader region prone to instability and unforeseen events which have
affected the US and the region at large (Author Interview with Ambassador John
Maresca 2016).
However, the Obama administration was accused of a serious lack of interest and
engagement in the Caspian region in a report prepared by Republican senators on
the Foreign Policy Committee of the US Senate, which cited a “perception that US
engagement [was] fading away.” In part, the report aimed to urge the US State of
Department to reinstate the position of “Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy,” left
vacant by Ambassador Richard Morningstar. According to the report, leaving the
position unfilled sent the message to players in the region that the US was not properly engaged in Eurasian energy security issues—and warned of dire consequences
to the security of the US’ European allies (The Economist Report 2013:37).
Speaking “at the Economist Investment Energy Summit in March 2012,” Morningstar
reflected the reduction of interest in campaigning on the EU’s behalf in this capacity
by essentially throwing the ball in Europe’s court:
…the most important thing that Europe can do—more so than any pipeline or any single gas
field—is what Europe does itself with respect to liberalizing its market, with respect to
creating interconnectors between countries, by looking at alternative sources of energy,
whether it be shale or renewables, by taking advantage of opportunities to improve energy
efficiency, by increasing LNG facilities, by increasing storage facilities; doing all things
that are necessary for Europe to have its own balance and diverse energy policy. (The
Economist Report 2013:37)
The Obama oil doctrine strongly followed on from that of former US presidents,
maintaining control over Middle Eastern state supplies, shoring up relations with
friendly oil-producing countries in the region, encouraging the free flow of oil on
the markets. However, the Caspian was never a region over which the US had
enjoyed either supremacy, as in the Middle East, or easy market access; Furthermore,
what changed under the Obama administration was the practical emphasis on reducing US dependence on imported oil in general, and thus a significant drive for
expansion in the region was considered a nonstarter (Taheri and Torabi 2010:22).
In Obama’s view, reducing the US’ dependency on foreign oil by exploiting
domestic reserves, increasing fuel efficiency, and increasing renewable energies
5 US Energy Diplomacy Under the Obama Administration