139
Although during the war in Afghanistan the US government was obliged to
ensure close cooperation from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, it never retained enough
of a foothold in the region to offset the influence of the regional giants of Russia or
China. Despite this reality, in 2006, Western nations decided to take steps to diversify their gas and oil suppliers in order to avoid reliance on Russia, which was
beginning to show signs of using not just its own resources but seeking those of the
Caspian region to push its foreign policy objectives. This undoubtedly expanded
the spotlight on the region, and particularly Kazakhstan, whose growing petroleum
and gas sectors were attracting the attention of foreign investors (Somuncuoglu
2013:39).
Since the 1990s, energy had been a basis upon which to develop relations in the
region, with its most crucial endeavors of the time aiming to break Russia’s monopoly over resources. In line with this, the Clinton Administration decided to back the
development of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in 1994–1995. In an attempt to
link its energy and foreign policy goals, the US aimed to participate in finding solutions to a number of regional issues such as those experienced in the divided
Fergana Valley, which has at times witnessed tension reflecting friction between the
US, Russian, and Chinese influence. The US also offered assistance in cases of
ethnic tension, terrorism, drug trafficking, and security (www.akademikarastirma.
org 2016).
Despite James Baker’s 1995 announcement regarding the specifically geopolitical nature of the US’ relations to the Caspian, this would not manifest into official
policy until 1998, with the establishment of the Caspian Energy Directorate within
the US State Department. The fact that the directorate was not based within the
government’s Energy Department can be taken as a sign that Washington was at
least as much in pursuit of strategic and geopolitical goals as economic ones (Taheri
and Farahmand 2014:155). On the one hand, the Bush administration’s Energy Bill
reflected America’s strong dependence on imported oil. Yet it also emphasized the
unilateral drive of the Bush Doctrine. Unilateralism was the preferred tool of the
administration, pursuing the goal of “spreading democracy and the free market”
with little consideration for the objections of international organizations (Bush’s
New National Security Strategy 2002:7–31).
Consequently, American leaders sought to shake up the international environment in the name of spreading the sacred values of democracy and the free market
capitalism. According to the designers of the Strategic Energy Policy report the
United States had the means and wherewithal in terms of military force to dispense
with international organizations and act unilaterally against authoritarian governments in pursuit of liberal-democratic norms. As a result, both liberal interventionists, as well as supporters of realpolitik, rallied behind the Bush Doctrine as a sort
of “Wilsonianizm in Boots” that sought to spread democracy and liberal values
around the world, albeit with the inconvenient use of military force (Bush’s New
National Security Strategy 2002:7–31).
In other words, Bush and his policymakers were on a path to boost the spread of
globalization and American ideas through force, and to this end, would soon sideline all supranational measures—including the mandates of the United Nations, and
George W. Bush Energy Policy
Although during the war in Afghanistan the US government was obliged to
ensure close cooperation from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, it never retained enough
of a foothold in the region to offset the influence of the regional giants of Russia or
China. Despite this reality, in 2006, Western nations decided to take steps to diversify their gas and oil suppliers in order to avoid reliance on Russia, which was
beginning to show signs of using not just its own resources but seeking those of the
Caspian region to push its foreign policy objectives. This undoubtedly expanded
the spotlight on the region, and particularly Kazakhstan, whose growing petroleum
and gas sectors were attracting the attention of foreign investors (Somuncuoglu
2013:39).
Since the 1990s, energy had been a basis upon which to develop relations in the
region, with its most crucial endeavors of the time aiming to break Russia’s monopoly over resources. In line with this, the Clinton Administration decided to back the
development of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in 1994–1995. In an attempt to
link its energy and foreign policy goals, the US aimed to participate in finding solutions to a number of regional issues such as those experienced in the divided
Fergana Valley, which has at times witnessed tension reflecting friction between the
US, Russian, and Chinese influence. The US also offered assistance in cases of
ethnic tension, terrorism, drug trafficking, and security (www.akademikarastirma.
org 2016).
Despite James Baker’s 1995 announcement regarding the specifically geopolitical nature of the US’ relations to the Caspian, this would not manifest into official
policy until 1998, with the establishment of the Caspian Energy Directorate within
the US State Department. The fact that the directorate was not based within the
government’s Energy Department can be taken as a sign that Washington was at
least as much in pursuit of strategic and geopolitical goals as economic ones (Taheri
and Farahmand 2014:155). On the one hand, the Bush administration’s Energy Bill
reflected America’s strong dependence on imported oil. Yet it also emphasized the
unilateral drive of the Bush Doctrine. Unilateralism was the preferred tool of the
administration, pursuing the goal of “spreading democracy and the free market”
with little consideration for the objections of international organizations (Bush’s
New National Security Strategy 2002:7–31).
Consequently, American leaders sought to shake up the international environment in the name of spreading the sacred values of democracy and the free market
capitalism. According to the designers of the Strategic Energy Policy report the
United States had the means and wherewithal in terms of military force to dispense
with international organizations and act unilaterally against authoritarian governments in pursuit of liberal-democratic norms. As a result, both liberal interventionists, as well as supporters of realpolitik, rallied behind the Bush Doctrine as a sort
of “Wilsonianizm in Boots” that sought to spread democracy and liberal values
around the world, albeit with the inconvenient use of military force (Bush’s New
National Security Strategy 2002:7–31).
In other words, Bush and his policymakers were on a path to boost the spread of
globalization and American ideas through force, and to this end, would soon sideline all supranational measures—including the mandates of the United Nations, and
George W. Bush Energy Policy