138
of the region’s oil and gas sector coalesced with wider goals. Phase I of the forging
of post-Soviet US–Caspian relations, covering the years 1991–1993, saw US attention on the region center around containing the political influence of Iran. Phase II,
meanwhile, from 1994 onwards, was characterized by efforts on the part of US oil
companies to begin working on energy projects in the region and was spearheaded
by private sector involvement. However, this phase was followed by the development of far greater diplomatic efforts, and thus while there is no doubt that oil and
gas are of great importance in US foreign policy, begging the question as to whether
oil and gas really the main reason for the United States is to involve itself in regional
issues. In other words, have the possibilities of oil and gas resources been exaggerated by US foreign policymakers—as well as regional states, as a means of furthering their own interests? (www.isrjournals.com 2016).
Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his interview with Foreign Policy, states that the US and
EU have to act jointly to obtain greater energy diversification for the basic reason
that dependence creates political vulnerability on the part of US allies; giving this
as the reason the US and EU should support Nabucco project (www.foreignpolicy.
com 2015a, b). The 1990s marked a period in which liberal democracy was forwarded as the best, and according to some—ultimate—way of ensuring peace and
stability around the globe, an attitude supported in word and deed by the US at
many levels. The strategy of bolstering the fledgling former Soviet states was therefore inscribed in the security strategy of the Clinton Administration, and by 2006
had become almost an article of faith of the Bush Administration, as is clear from
the opening article of the “2006 National Security Strategy” text, which begins;
It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.
This tenant of the Bush Doctrine proscribed victory over terror as being tied to the
successful establishment of democracy thus institutionalizing the policy of encouraging democracy and, more contentiously, backing regime change. The US thus
gave staunch moral support to the wave of Color Revolutions which soon swept
over the former Soviet states of Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan aimed at the
overthrow, amid public outcry, of what were Kremlin-propped elites. However, that
such movements were often followed by a rush to shore up Western support for the
new governments through talk of NATO membership showed a more realist,
security- minded angle was not far from the minds of US policymakers in their prodemocracy endeavors (Somuncuoglu 2013:39).
The expansion in members and activities of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization across this time can be given as a sign of the wane in US power in the
region as much as the increase in Chinese soft power. Sure enough, the SCO took
measures to this effect in 2005, requesting the US to outline a timetable for removing its forces from bases in member states Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which was
followed by the latter requesting the removal of US troops from its territory. This
has led to a cooling in the US unilateral relations with many regional states in favor
of Kazakhstan, which US diplomats maintain as a model for the region (Somuncuoglu
2013:39).
4 George W. Bush Energy Diplomacy
of the region’s oil and gas sector coalesced with wider goals. Phase I of the forging
of post-Soviet US–Caspian relations, covering the years 1991–1993, saw US attention on the region center around containing the political influence of Iran. Phase II,
meanwhile, from 1994 onwards, was characterized by efforts on the part of US oil
companies to begin working on energy projects in the region and was spearheaded
by private sector involvement. However, this phase was followed by the development of far greater diplomatic efforts, and thus while there is no doubt that oil and
gas are of great importance in US foreign policy, begging the question as to whether
oil and gas really the main reason for the United States is to involve itself in regional
issues. In other words, have the possibilities of oil and gas resources been exaggerated by US foreign policymakers—as well as regional states, as a means of furthering their own interests? (www.isrjournals.com 2016).
Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his interview with Foreign Policy, states that the US and
EU have to act jointly to obtain greater energy diversification for the basic reason
that dependence creates political vulnerability on the part of US allies; giving this
as the reason the US and EU should support Nabucco project (www.foreignpolicy.
com 2015a, b). The 1990s marked a period in which liberal democracy was forwarded as the best, and according to some—ultimate—way of ensuring peace and
stability around the globe, an attitude supported in word and deed by the US at
many levels. The strategy of bolstering the fledgling former Soviet states was therefore inscribed in the security strategy of the Clinton Administration, and by 2006
had become almost an article of faith of the Bush Administration, as is clear from
the opening article of the “2006 National Security Strategy” text, which begins;
It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.
This tenant of the Bush Doctrine proscribed victory over terror as being tied to the
successful establishment of democracy thus institutionalizing the policy of encouraging democracy and, more contentiously, backing regime change. The US thus
gave staunch moral support to the wave of Color Revolutions which soon swept
over the former Soviet states of Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan aimed at the
overthrow, amid public outcry, of what were Kremlin-propped elites. However, that
such movements were often followed by a rush to shore up Western support for the
new governments through talk of NATO membership showed a more realist,
security- minded angle was not far from the minds of US policymakers in their prodemocracy endeavors (Somuncuoglu 2013:39).
The expansion in members and activities of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization across this time can be given as a sign of the wane in US power in the
region as much as the increase in Chinese soft power. Sure enough, the SCO took
measures to this effect in 2005, requesting the US to outline a timetable for removing its forces from bases in member states Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which was
followed by the latter requesting the removal of US troops from its territory. This
has led to a cooling in the US unilateral relations with many regional states in favor
of Kazakhstan, which US diplomats maintain as a model for the region (Somuncuoglu
2013:39).
4 George W. Bush Energy Diplomacy