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George W. Bush Energy Policy
Bush administration focused a lot more on natural gas than the Clinton administration—you did not ask about that—but Clinton focused more on oil: but both Obama
and Bush focused on a lot more was the diversification of gas supplies. So, there is
no difference in goals, but there was a difference in implementation (Author interview with Ambassador Matthew Bryza 2017).
Outlining the Challenges Facing US Energy Demands
In May 2001, “the US Council on Foreign Relations and The James Baker III Institute
for Public Policy of Rice University” copublished the finds of a joint task force
charged with identifying the challenges the United States would have to overcome to
develop an independent energy industry. The group was required to compile its suggestions in an explicit report which, it was hoped, would pave the way for steps to be
taken to reduce the nation’s strategic vulnerability (Jaffe and Morse 2001:1).
“Energy Task Force”
Entitled “Strategic Energy Policy: Challenges for the 21st Century,” the task force
report would become the founding document upon which the Bush administration
based its perspective on energy and the role of the United States in the Persian Gulf.
The findings and recommendations of the working group would soon become manifest in the National Energy Policy and the Security Strategy forwarded by the
administration, which were accelerated in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks
months later.
One of the over-riding messages of the Task Force Report was that, essentially,
Americans were still insisting on cheap and abundant energy supplies without willing to sacrifice any clout in the quest for adequate sources to maintain such an
advantageous position. Spurred on by harsh oil market conditions, gas shortages,
and difficulties managing excess winter demands, Bush thus urged a robust, intervention and belligerent strategy in dealing with the Gulf States. Although confrontational, the prevailing view of the time held that such zeal for foreign supplies was
the only solution given that procuring existent and emergent supplies could not be
described as economically or technically feasible (Jaffe and Morse 2001:4–5).
The joint study further underlined that the United States’ ability to procure a
constant supply of energy was predicated on maintaining free access to the Persian
Gulf, and thus declared it paramount that maintenance of uninterrupted access to the
region’s supplies be ensured. At the heart of this policy lay the maintenance of special relationships between the United States and many key exporters in the region,
4 George W. Bush Energy Diplomacy
George W. Bush Energy Policy
Bush administration focused a lot more on natural gas than the Clinton administration—you did not ask about that—but Clinton focused more on oil: but both Obama
and Bush focused on a lot more was the diversification of gas supplies. So, there is
no difference in goals, but there was a difference in implementation (Author interview with Ambassador Matthew Bryza 2017).
Outlining the Challenges Facing US Energy Demands
In May 2001, “the US Council on Foreign Relations and The James Baker III Institute
for Public Policy of Rice University” copublished the finds of a joint task force
charged with identifying the challenges the United States would have to overcome to
develop an independent energy industry. The group was required to compile its suggestions in an explicit report which, it was hoped, would pave the way for steps to be
taken to reduce the nation’s strategic vulnerability (Jaffe and Morse 2001:1).
“Energy Task Force”
Entitled “Strategic Energy Policy: Challenges for the 21st Century,” the task force
report would become the founding document upon which the Bush administration
based its perspective on energy and the role of the United States in the Persian Gulf.
The findings and recommendations of the working group would soon become manifest in the National Energy Policy and the Security Strategy forwarded by the
administration, which were accelerated in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks
months later.
One of the over-riding messages of the Task Force Report was that, essentially,
Americans were still insisting on cheap and abundant energy supplies without willing to sacrifice any clout in the quest for adequate sources to maintain such an
advantageous position. Spurred on by harsh oil market conditions, gas shortages,
and difficulties managing excess winter demands, Bush thus urged a robust, intervention and belligerent strategy in dealing with the Gulf States. Although confrontational, the prevailing view of the time held that such zeal for foreign supplies was
the only solution given that procuring existent and emergent supplies could not be
described as economically or technically feasible (Jaffe and Morse 2001:4–5).
The joint study further underlined that the United States’ ability to procure a
constant supply of energy was predicated on maintaining free access to the Persian
Gulf, and thus declared it paramount that maintenance of uninterrupted access to the
region’s supplies be ensured. At the heart of this policy lay the maintenance of special relationships between the United States and many key exporters in the region,
4 George W. Bush Energy Diplomacy