112
yet—a complex challenge involving many different stakeholders—including seven
governments and 11 companies (www.bp.com 2017). The Southern Gas Corridor is
set to change the energy map of an entire region—connecting gas supplies in the
Caspian to markets in Europe for the very first time. First gas is targeted for late
2018, with supplies to Georgia and Turkey; gas deliveries to Europe are expected
just over a year after first gas is produced offshore Azerbaijan. The Southern Gas
Corridor pipeline system has been designed to be scalable to twice its initial capacity to accommodate potential additional gas supplies in the future (www.bp.
com 2017).
Both Russia and Iran are against the transit of Turkmen gas to European markets
from the Caspian Basin on legal grounds, claiming that the transit of oil and gas via
a pipeline built under water would damage the sea environment. In any case, if
Turkmenistan reaches an agreement with Iran and Russia to start the export of gas
to the EU from Azerbaijan or Iran, then both routes will go through Turkey—so a
win-win situation for Turkey in which the country may become an energy transit
hub for multiple, and even competing, projects. Since the Lausanne Agreement
between Iran and the 5+1, as well as the lifting of sanctions on Iran energy sector,
Iranian natural gas is almost ready to be sent to the European market will be one of
the potential markets for Iran natural gas. At this point, the EU openly stated that it
was ready to import gas from Iran after a final agreement between Iran and 5+1.
Turkey is the best route for Iran to export gas to the EU, with Turkey at present
importing around 10 bcm gas from Iran and requiring a pipeline for exporting gas
to the EU sufficiently. If the EU and Iran can agree on exporting to the EU, Turkey
has the chance to fulfill its desired role of being an energy transit hub (Schröder
et al. 2017:254).
US Interest in the Southern Gas Corridor
The US supports the free flow of oil and gas from Central Asia and the Persian Gulf
to the world energy market according to its own interests, and thus backs the success
of the Southern Gas Corridor in its Caspian energy diplomacy (www.foreign.senate.
gov 2012:5–6). The Southern Gas Corridor gives a chance to post-soviet nations
with internal strength to affirm their independence from Russia. The Southern Gas
Corridor idea, somewhat ironically, motivated the Russian energy sector to apply a
number of market-oriented policies with which to compete against such policies
(www.foreign.senate.gov 2012:5–6).
Containment of Iran has been ever-present in the reasons for supporting a Central
Asian corridor to the market. At present, Iran’s huge natural gas reserves are still
unable to join the Southern Gas Corridor, but it should be noted that this is more to
do with technical difficulties than politics given the gradual lifting of sanctions taking place. Iran is enthusiastic to join such projects for economical as well as political reasons, to boost cooperation and stability in the region (www.foreign.senate.
gov 2012:5–6).
3 International Context of the New Era and the Caspian Sea Region
yet—a complex challenge involving many different stakeholders—including seven
governments and 11 companies (www.bp.com 2017). The Southern Gas Corridor is
set to change the energy map of an entire region—connecting gas supplies in the
Caspian to markets in Europe for the very first time. First gas is targeted for late
2018, with supplies to Georgia and Turkey; gas deliveries to Europe are expected
just over a year after first gas is produced offshore Azerbaijan. The Southern Gas
Corridor pipeline system has been designed to be scalable to twice its initial capacity to accommodate potential additional gas supplies in the future (www.bp.
com 2017).
Both Russia and Iran are against the transit of Turkmen gas to European markets
from the Caspian Basin on legal grounds, claiming that the transit of oil and gas via
a pipeline built under water would damage the sea environment. In any case, if
Turkmenistan reaches an agreement with Iran and Russia to start the export of gas
to the EU from Azerbaijan or Iran, then both routes will go through Turkey—so a
win-win situation for Turkey in which the country may become an energy transit
hub for multiple, and even competing, projects. Since the Lausanne Agreement
between Iran and the 5+1, as well as the lifting of sanctions on Iran energy sector,
Iranian natural gas is almost ready to be sent to the European market will be one of
the potential markets for Iran natural gas. At this point, the EU openly stated that it
was ready to import gas from Iran after a final agreement between Iran and 5+1.
Turkey is the best route for Iran to export gas to the EU, with Turkey at present
importing around 10 bcm gas from Iran and requiring a pipeline for exporting gas
to the EU sufficiently. If the EU and Iran can agree on exporting to the EU, Turkey
has the chance to fulfill its desired role of being an energy transit hub (Schröder
et al. 2017:254).
US Interest in the Southern Gas Corridor
The US supports the free flow of oil and gas from Central Asia and the Persian Gulf
to the world energy market according to its own interests, and thus backs the success
of the Southern Gas Corridor in its Caspian energy diplomacy (www.foreign.senate.
gov 2012:5–6). The Southern Gas Corridor gives a chance to post-soviet nations
with internal strength to affirm their independence from Russia. The Southern Gas
Corridor idea, somewhat ironically, motivated the Russian energy sector to apply a
number of market-oriented policies with which to compete against such policies
(www.foreign.senate.gov 2012:5–6).
Containment of Iran has been ever-present in the reasons for supporting a Central
Asian corridor to the market. At present, Iran’s huge natural gas reserves are still
unable to join the Southern Gas Corridor, but it should be noted that this is more to
do with technical difficulties than politics given the gradual lifting of sanctions taking place. Iran is enthusiastic to join such projects for economical as well as political reasons, to boost cooperation and stability in the region (www.foreign.senate.
gov 2012:5–6).
3 International Context of the New Era and the Caspian Sea Region