38 R. MILLS
out. During their occupation of large parts of northern Iraq, they inflicted
severe damage on the electricity generation and transmission networks.
The Bekhme Dam, on the Greater Zab river in what is now the
KRI, was begun in 1986, but halted in 1991 by the First Gulf War. It
would have 1500 MW of generation capacity. In 2005, Baghdad promised
to fund the required $5 billion. However, no work has commenced,
reportedly because it would flood the Barzan area, historic home to the
Barzani family which heads the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the region’s
leading party. 91 Additional dams have been planned in the KRI, including
Mandawa (764 MW), Taq Taq (270 MW), Bakrman (52.5 MW) and
Deralok (37.6 MW). 92 These have not progressed, although a number
of small dams have been built for water storage. 93 The KRG has repeatedly suffered from budgetary crises, particularly following its loss of the
Kirkuk area to federal government control in 2017, and during the coronavirus pandemic and sharp drop in oil prices in 2020, and these constrain
its ability to fund such large projects. The central government is unlikely
to come up with the finance either, since most lucrative subcontracting
opportunities would go to politically-connected KRI companies.
Iraq’s dams have also suffered from falling water availability, because of
regional drought and upstream dam construction by Turkey and Iran, 94
although this improved somewhat with higher rainfall in 2019. Iraqi MPs
and the minister of water resources have complained over water shortages
because of the filling of Turkish dams, 95 and Turkey did agree to slow
down the filling. This was a contrast to the situation in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, when Iraqi and Syrian tensions with Turkey over dams
escalated almost to the point of military action, 96 but neither country is in
any position to coerce Turkey today. The KRI and the federal government
in Baghdad have several outstanding disputes, including over territory,
the national budget and the KRI’s management of oil resources on its
territory. 97 The construction of further dams controlling water flows into
the Tigris could give the KRI more leverage in these disputes, another
reason for Baghdad to drag its feet on funding them.
Repair and rehabilitation of the dams has been slow, both post-2003
and post-ISIS. By early 2019, the maximum operational capacity of the
federal Iraq dams appeared to be about 867 MW from a nominal total
of 1904 MW. 98 After the initial post-invasion repairs, the hydroelectric sector has received little attention either from the Iraqi government
or the international community, except with respect to water. The IEA
report on Iraq of April 2019, 99 for instance, only mentions dams in
out. During their occupation of large parts of northern Iraq, they inflicted
severe damage on the electricity generation and transmission networks.
The Bekhme Dam, on the Greater Zab river in what is now the
KRI, was begun in 1986, but halted in 1991 by the First Gulf War. It
would have 1500 MW of generation capacity. In 2005, Baghdad promised
to fund the required $5 billion. However, no work has commenced,
reportedly because it would flood the Barzan area, historic home to the
Barzani family which heads the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the region’s
leading party. 91 Additional dams have been planned in the KRI, including
Mandawa (764 MW), Taq Taq (270 MW), Bakrman (52.5 MW) and
Deralok (37.6 MW). 92 These have not progressed, although a number
of small dams have been built for water storage. 93 The KRG has repeatedly suffered from budgetary crises, particularly following its loss of the
Kirkuk area to federal government control in 2017, and during the coronavirus pandemic and sharp drop in oil prices in 2020, and these constrain
its ability to fund such large projects. The central government is unlikely
to come up with the finance either, since most lucrative subcontracting
opportunities would go to politically-connected KRI companies.
Iraq’s dams have also suffered from falling water availability, because of
regional drought and upstream dam construction by Turkey and Iran, 94
although this improved somewhat with higher rainfall in 2019. Iraqi MPs
and the minister of water resources have complained over water shortages
because of the filling of Turkish dams, 95 and Turkey did agree to slow
down the filling. This was a contrast to the situation in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, when Iraqi and Syrian tensions with Turkey over dams
escalated almost to the point of military action, 96 but neither country is in
any position to coerce Turkey today. The KRI and the federal government
in Baghdad have several outstanding disputes, including over territory,
the national budget and the KRI’s management of oil resources on its
territory. 97 The construction of further dams controlling water flows into
the Tigris could give the KRI more leverage in these disputes, another
reason for Baghdad to drag its feet on funding them.
Repair and rehabilitation of the dams has been slow, both post-2003
and post-ISIS. By early 2019, the maximum operational capacity of the
federal Iraq dams appeared to be about 867 MW from a nominal total
of 1904 MW. 98 After the initial post-invasion repairs, the hydroelectric sector has received little attention either from the Iraqi government
or the international community, except with respect to water. The IEA
report on Iraq of April 2019, 99 for instance, only mentions dams in