2 THE POLITICS OF LOW-CARBON ENERGY IN IRAN AND IRAQ
37
MOE and other ministries, making it hard to place competent individuals
in the right roles and empower them.
Climate policy has not been a major part of Iraq’s plans. Its NDC
under the Paris Agreement mentions solar equipment and appliances, but
the only quantitative target for renewables is to raise hydroelectric plant
capacity by 3.3%, a very unambitious goal. 88
Renewable and Nuclear Energy
Iraq has a good variety of renewable resources, including exploitable
hydropower, abundant sunshine on unused land and, in some areas, good
wind speeds. Given endemic power and gas shortages, and frequent insurgent and criminal sabotage of transmission lines, distributed renewables
should be an economic and practical part of the generation mix.
Iraq has had significant hydropower capacity since the 1950s. Its dams
are all intended for flood control and irrigation water provision, and
all the large ones except Duhok have hydropower generation attached,
totalling 2.1 GW. The Dokan (1959) and Darbandikhan (1961) Dams,
in what is now the KRI, the Hamrin (1981) and Adhaim (2000) Dams
are on tributaries of the Tigris, and the Samarra Dam is on the Tigris
itself. The Haditha Dam is on the Euphrates and was finished in 1987.
The Mosul Dam on the Tigris accounts for the largest share of generation capacity with 1062 MW nominal capacity. It was built between 1981
and 1984, but has significant safety concerns because of dissolution of the
gypsum bedrock, requiring continuous application of grouting to prevent
collapse. The Badush Dam downstream was intended to absorb any flood
from Mosul, and began construction in 1989 but work stopped in 1991
because of the UN sanctions. The US suspected in 1991 that the unfinished dam could have been supplying power to a supposed secret uranium
enrichment plant nearby. 89 Completion of the dam would cost $300
million, but expansion to hold any flood from Mosul has been costed at
$10 billion. 90 Work did, however, resume in the summer of 2019, with
the possibility of including 170 MW of generation capacity.
The Darbandikhan Dam also suffers from poor construction and was
bombed both in the Iran-Iraq and First Gulf wars. Following the USled invasion of 2003, these dams were partly rehabilitated. However, in
August 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or Da’esh in its
Arabic nickname, seized control of the Mosul Dam, before being driven
37
MOE and other ministries, making it hard to place competent individuals
in the right roles and empower them.
Climate policy has not been a major part of Iraq’s plans. Its NDC
under the Paris Agreement mentions solar equipment and appliances, but
the only quantitative target for renewables is to raise hydroelectric plant
capacity by 3.3%, a very unambitious goal. 88
Renewable and Nuclear Energy
Iraq has a good variety of renewable resources, including exploitable
hydropower, abundant sunshine on unused land and, in some areas, good
wind speeds. Given endemic power and gas shortages, and frequent insurgent and criminal sabotage of transmission lines, distributed renewables
should be an economic and practical part of the generation mix.
Iraq has had significant hydropower capacity since the 1950s. Its dams
are all intended for flood control and irrigation water provision, and
all the large ones except Duhok have hydropower generation attached,
totalling 2.1 GW. The Dokan (1959) and Darbandikhan (1961) Dams,
in what is now the KRI, the Hamrin (1981) and Adhaim (2000) Dams
are on tributaries of the Tigris, and the Samarra Dam is on the Tigris
itself. The Haditha Dam is on the Euphrates and was finished in 1987.
The Mosul Dam on the Tigris accounts for the largest share of generation capacity with 1062 MW nominal capacity. It was built between 1981
and 1984, but has significant safety concerns because of dissolution of the
gypsum bedrock, requiring continuous application of grouting to prevent
collapse. The Badush Dam downstream was intended to absorb any flood
from Mosul, and began construction in 1989 but work stopped in 1991
because of the UN sanctions. The US suspected in 1991 that the unfinished dam could have been supplying power to a supposed secret uranium
enrichment plant nearby. 89 Completion of the dam would cost $300
million, but expansion to hold any flood from Mosul has been costed at
$10 billion. 90 Work did, however, resume in the summer of 2019, with
the possibility of including 170 MW of generation capacity.
The Darbandikhan Dam also suffers from poor construction and was
bombed both in the Iran-Iraq and First Gulf wars. Following the USled invasion of 2003, these dams were partly rehabilitated. However, in
August 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or Da’esh in its
Arabic nickname, seized control of the Mosul Dam, before being driven