11 CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN THE ARAB REGION
327
10. OPEC, ‘World Proven Crude Oil Reserves’, Annual Statistical
Bulletin 2019, https://asb.opec.org/index.php/interactive-charts/oildata-upstream.
11. The National, ‘Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed’s Inspirational Vision for
a Post-Oil UAE’, 10 February 2015, https://www.thenational.ae/opi
nion/sheikh-mohammed-bin-zayed-s-inspirational-vision-for-a-post-oiluae-1.8710.
12. Samia Nakhoul, William Maclean and Marwa Rashed, ‘Saudi Prince
Unveils Sweeping Plans to End “Addiction” to Oil’, Reuters, 25 April
2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-economy/saudi-princeunveils-sweeping-plans-to-end-addiction-to-oil-idUSKCN0XM1CD.
13. Kinninmont observes this in the case of Saudi Arabia’s Vision, which
targets, among other things: increasing the size of the economy, private
sector contribution to the GDP and foreign direct investment overall;
raising the share of non-oil exports and non-oil GDP; increasing nonoil government revenue; increasing the Saudiization rate in the oil and
gas sector; and increasing the assets of the Public Investment Fund. Jane
Kinnimont, Vision 2030 and Saudi Arabia’s Social Contract Austerity and
Transformation, Research Paper, London: Chatham House, July 2017, 2
and 11.
14. See, e.g., G-77/China, Statement on Behalf of the Group of 77 and
China… at the Joint Opening Plenary of the 24th Session of the
COP to the UNFCCC (COP 24); the 14th Session of the CMP;
and the Third Part of the 1st Session of the CMA, 2 December
2018, https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/
201812022326---G77%20Katowice%20opening%20statement.pdf.
15. See, e.g., Arab Group, Arab Statement Opening of ADP, 29
April 2013, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/adp_2_arab_group_
29042013.pdf?download.
16. The LMDCs’ membership has been somewhat fluid, but it has included
a large number of Arab countries. It has generally supported a more
hard-line interpretation of the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ principle of the Convention, which has included an emphasis on
a binary set of differentiated rules and obligations for developed and
developing countries. On the LMDC’s members, see, e.g., Third World
Network, TWN Info Service on Climate Change (Oct 12/05), 24 October
2012, https://www.twn.my/title2/climate/info.service/2012/climate20
121005.htm; LMDCs, Submission on Elements of the 2015 Agreed
Outcome, 8 March 2014, http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submis
sions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_lmdc_ws1_20140309.pdf.
17. See, e.g., Mari Luomi, The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change: Abu
Dhabi and Qatar in an Era of Natural Unsustainability, London: Hurst,
2012.
327
10. OPEC, ‘World Proven Crude Oil Reserves’, Annual Statistical
Bulletin 2019, https://asb.opec.org/index.php/interactive-charts/oildata-upstream.
11. The National, ‘Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed’s Inspirational Vision for
a Post-Oil UAE’, 10 February 2015, https://www.thenational.ae/opi
nion/sheikh-mohammed-bin-zayed-s-inspirational-vision-for-a-post-oiluae-1.8710.
12. Samia Nakhoul, William Maclean and Marwa Rashed, ‘Saudi Prince
Unveils Sweeping Plans to End “Addiction” to Oil’, Reuters, 25 April
2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-economy/saudi-princeunveils-sweeping-plans-to-end-addiction-to-oil-idUSKCN0XM1CD.
13. Kinninmont observes this in the case of Saudi Arabia’s Vision, which
targets, among other things: increasing the size of the economy, private
sector contribution to the GDP and foreign direct investment overall;
raising the share of non-oil exports and non-oil GDP; increasing nonoil government revenue; increasing the Saudiization rate in the oil and
gas sector; and increasing the assets of the Public Investment Fund. Jane
Kinnimont, Vision 2030 and Saudi Arabia’s Social Contract Austerity and
Transformation, Research Paper, London: Chatham House, July 2017, 2
and 11.
14. See, e.g., G-77/China, Statement on Behalf of the Group of 77 and
China… at the Joint Opening Plenary of the 24th Session of the
COP to the UNFCCC (COP 24); the 14th Session of the CMP;
and the Third Part of the 1st Session of the CMA, 2 December
2018, https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/
201812022326---G77%20Katowice%20opening%20statement.pdf.
15. See, e.g., Arab Group, Arab Statement Opening of ADP, 29
April 2013, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/adp_2_arab_group_
29042013.pdf?download.
16. The LMDCs’ membership has been somewhat fluid, but it has included
a large number of Arab countries. It has generally supported a more
hard-line interpretation of the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ principle of the Convention, which has included an emphasis on
a binary set of differentiated rules and obligations for developed and
developing countries. On the LMDC’s members, see, e.g., Third World
Network, TWN Info Service on Climate Change (Oct 12/05), 24 October
2012, https://www.twn.my/title2/climate/info.service/2012/climate20
121005.htm; LMDCs, Submission on Elements of the 2015 Agreed
Outcome, 8 March 2014, http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submis
sions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_lmdc_ws1_20140309.pdf.
17. See, e.g., Mari Luomi, The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change: Abu
Dhabi and Qatar in an Era of Natural Unsustainability, London: Hurst,
2012.