10 POWERING THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA …
269
UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain drew up plans accordingly. Inspired by the
UAE’s progress on nuclear energy (discussed below), Kuwait’s leaders
declared that ‘if nuclear was going to happen in the UAE, then we
should do it too’. 20 The advisor to Kuwait’s Nuclear Energy Commission, Adnan Shihab-Eldin, noted that ‘we considered the Emirates as an
example, although we were four or five decades ahead of them in terms of
nuclear experience. We had also worked with the same consultants used
to develop the program in the Emirates’. 21 As for Bahrain, it announced
that it would cooperate with the US to operate nuclear plants in the Gulf
state by 2017.
The regional legitimacy of nuclear energy was an echo of the global
nuclear renaissance at that time, prompted by sustained increases in crude
oil prices since the early 2000s on the back of insatiable demand from
Asia. 22 During this period, the administration of George W. Bush in the
US was offering multi-billion dollar subsidies to encourage the building
of new nuclear plants in the country by 2010, Prime Minister Gordon
Brown of the UK proposed in 2008 the building of eight new nuclear
plants that would feed electricity into the national grid by 2017, and
construction began on additional nuclear reactors in Finland and France
based a new European pressurized reactor design.
The link between oil prices, energy import bills (since gas is often
indexed to oil prices), and interest in nuclear energy informed decisions
in energy importing states. In Jordan, where 96% of energy needs are
imported, nuclear energy was seen as a way to reduce the financial burden
in the long run; energy imports rose from 9% of GDP in 2003 to 16% in
2013, and even after the oil price crash were 10% in 2016. 23 This link also
motivated oil exporters to maximize export revenue. For Kuwait, where
64% of electricity generation capacity is from oil, 24 it made financial sense
to free up oil for export. A senior Kuwaiti policy participant explained it
as follows: ‘each time there was an increase in the price of oil, there was a
debate in Kuwait about why we were burning oil for electricity. This was
an opportunity cost and we should have been exporting oil to earn its
high value, as well as consider producing electricity from cheaper energy
sources, such as nuclear energy. The price of oil increased on three occasions, and on each occasion, Kuwait attempted to have a nuclear power
program (1976–1980; 1985–1986; 2007–2011)’. 25
This gradual acceptability of nuclear energy at the regional and global
levels in turn provided the impetus at the regime level to consider how
nuclear energy could meet what the UAE leadership considered to be one
269
UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain drew up plans accordingly. Inspired by the
UAE’s progress on nuclear energy (discussed below), Kuwait’s leaders
declared that ‘if nuclear was going to happen in the UAE, then we
should do it too’. 20 The advisor to Kuwait’s Nuclear Energy Commission, Adnan Shihab-Eldin, noted that ‘we considered the Emirates as an
example, although we were four or five decades ahead of them in terms of
nuclear experience. We had also worked with the same consultants used
to develop the program in the Emirates’. 21 As for Bahrain, it announced
that it would cooperate with the US to operate nuclear plants in the Gulf
state by 2017.
The regional legitimacy of nuclear energy was an echo of the global
nuclear renaissance at that time, prompted by sustained increases in crude
oil prices since the early 2000s on the back of insatiable demand from
Asia. 22 During this period, the administration of George W. Bush in the
US was offering multi-billion dollar subsidies to encourage the building
of new nuclear plants in the country by 2010, Prime Minister Gordon
Brown of the UK proposed in 2008 the building of eight new nuclear
plants that would feed electricity into the national grid by 2017, and
construction began on additional nuclear reactors in Finland and France
based a new European pressurized reactor design.
The link between oil prices, energy import bills (since gas is often
indexed to oil prices), and interest in nuclear energy informed decisions
in energy importing states. In Jordan, where 96% of energy needs are
imported, nuclear energy was seen as a way to reduce the financial burden
in the long run; energy imports rose from 9% of GDP in 2003 to 16% in
2013, and even after the oil price crash were 10% in 2016. 23 This link also
motivated oil exporters to maximize export revenue. For Kuwait, where
64% of electricity generation capacity is from oil, 24 it made financial sense
to free up oil for export. A senior Kuwaiti policy participant explained it
as follows: ‘each time there was an increase in the price of oil, there was a
debate in Kuwait about why we were burning oil for electricity. This was
an opportunity cost and we should have been exporting oil to earn its
high value, as well as consider producing electricity from cheaper energy
sources, such as nuclear energy. The price of oil increased on three occasions, and on each occasion, Kuwait attempted to have a nuclear power
program (1976–1980; 1985–1986; 2007–2011)’. 25
This gradual acceptability of nuclear energy at the regional and global
levels in turn provided the impetus at the regime level to consider how
nuclear energy could meet what the UAE leadership considered to be one