268 L.-C. SIM
of the author’s knowledge it has not been applied specifically to nuclear
energy in the Middle East.
Nuclear at the Landscape Level
The niche level is usually assumed to be the source of pressure on the
regime in favour of radical, innovative change that threatens the status
quo; this explains why the regime usually resists niche breakthroughs. The
rise of distributed renewable electricity in the US, for instance, is meeting
resistance from some utility companies because the former challenges the
influence, networks, and revenues derived from the pre-existing centrally
dispatched electricity model. 17 In the UAE, however, a nuclear advocacy
network was in its infancy as the country had no prior experience with the
technology, unlike Egypt and Iran that had experimental research reactors
and which had sent students abroad for training prior to breaking ground
on a civilian nuclear programme. In this regard, the interaction between
landscape and regime levels played a particularly significant role in the
UAE in explaining its nuclear energy policy.
The key landscape-level factor which informed the UAE’s nuclear
energy policy was the gradual interest in and acceptability of nuclear
energy at the regional and global levels by the dawn of the twentyfirst century. Partly to address Russia’s 2005 agreement with Tehran
to fuel the reactor at Bushehr, 18 one of the last remaining steps to a
fully operational unit that would enhance Iran’s regional clout, Saudi
Arabia commissioned a study for a nuclear power plant that would serve
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The latter was created
in 1981 as an anti-Iran, US-backed organization comprising six Arab
Gulf member states namely, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, and Qatar. The intention to develop a joint programme for
peaceful nuclear energy was announced at a GCC meeting in December
2006 during which Iran’s ambition of a weapons programme was also
denounced. Thereafter, the group embarked on consultations in 2007
with the IAEA.
The UAE’s leadership assessed, correctly, that the GCC plan to jointly
develop nuclear energy was unworkable. This was because of historical
sensitivities over sovereignty, as underlined by the failure of regional
initiatives like a GCC gas grid or common currency as well as the
lack of interoperability between the GCC’s military forces. 19 Taking a
cue from the legitimization of nuclear energy at the regional level, the
of the author’s knowledge it has not been applied specifically to nuclear
energy in the Middle East.
Nuclear at the Landscape Level
The niche level is usually assumed to be the source of pressure on the
regime in favour of radical, innovative change that threatens the status
quo; this explains why the regime usually resists niche breakthroughs. The
rise of distributed renewable electricity in the US, for instance, is meeting
resistance from some utility companies because the former challenges the
influence, networks, and revenues derived from the pre-existing centrally
dispatched electricity model. 17 In the UAE, however, a nuclear advocacy
network was in its infancy as the country had no prior experience with the
technology, unlike Egypt and Iran that had experimental research reactors
and which had sent students abroad for training prior to breaking ground
on a civilian nuclear programme. In this regard, the interaction between
landscape and regime levels played a particularly significant role in the
UAE in explaining its nuclear energy policy.
The key landscape-level factor which informed the UAE’s nuclear
energy policy was the gradual interest in and acceptability of nuclear
energy at the regional and global levels by the dawn of the twentyfirst century. Partly to address Russia’s 2005 agreement with Tehran
to fuel the reactor at Bushehr, 18 one of the last remaining steps to a
fully operational unit that would enhance Iran’s regional clout, Saudi
Arabia commissioned a study for a nuclear power plant that would serve
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The latter was created
in 1981 as an anti-Iran, US-backed organization comprising six Arab
Gulf member states namely, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, and Qatar. The intention to develop a joint programme for
peaceful nuclear energy was announced at a GCC meeting in December
2006 during which Iran’s ambition of a weapons programme was also
denounced. Thereafter, the group embarked on consultations in 2007
with the IAEA.
The UAE’s leadership assessed, correctly, that the GCC plan to jointly
develop nuclear energy was unworkable. This was because of historical
sensitivities over sovereignty, as underlined by the failure of regional
initiatives like a GCC gas grid or common currency as well as the
lack of interoperability between the GCC’s military forces. 19 Taking a
cue from the legitimization of nuclear energy at the regional level, the