168 O. BAYULGEN
of the Turkish Republic. 52 First steps for realizing a nuclear power
plant were taken in 1956 when the Turkish Atomic Energy Commission
(TAEC) was established to oversee nuclear research. With the selection
of the Akkuyu as the first nuclear power site in 1974, the decades-long
negotiations with foreign investors began. Despite the financial, administrative, and social setbacks for the construction of the power plants, i.e.,
the difficulty of finding private investors to build and operate them with
no government treasury guarantees, lack of administrative and technical
capacity, and an active anti-nuclear movement, nuclear power has been a
crucial element of national development plans just like the hydroelectric
dams. 53 It has been pursued by many governments from the center-left
administration of the late 1970s to the center-right governments of the
1980s. The state’s desire to build nuclear power did not change when
AKP came to power; if anything it gained steam. AKP has been an ardent
proponent of a nuclear renaissance, framing it as central to the country’s economic growth and competitiveness by reducing dependence on
foreign energy sources, diversifying its national resources, and ensuring
energy independence. 54
Obsession with Economic Rents and Political Power
Beyond the pervasive mindset of developmentalism in the Turkish state,
politicians’ interest in accumulating political power and economic rents
can explain their energy choices and the type of energy policies they
pursue. Centralized, mega energy projects, and the state agencies that
regulate the energy industry offer government elites significant regulatory
power and economic benefits. During the 2000s, the AKP governments
gave up some of that power thanks to IMF and EU-induced structural reforms and in an effort to broaden the party’s support base. The
result was reduced government control and a relatively decentralized
sector to allow for more competition that was favorable to the development of alternative sources of energy. But by the end of 2000s, the
global and domestic context had changed. Emboldened by the impressive economic growth since the 2001 crisis and its increasing political
power over the decade, AKP started to act more independently from
the demands of external actors. Meanwhile, the increasing opposition to
Turkey’s membership in Germany and France as well as the stalemate
with the EU over the Cyprus issue soured the Turkish public’s interest
in EU membership. The EU’s own economic and political problems in
of the Turkish Republic. 52 First steps for realizing a nuclear power
plant were taken in 1956 when the Turkish Atomic Energy Commission
(TAEC) was established to oversee nuclear research. With the selection
of the Akkuyu as the first nuclear power site in 1974, the decades-long
negotiations with foreign investors began. Despite the financial, administrative, and social setbacks for the construction of the power plants, i.e.,
the difficulty of finding private investors to build and operate them with
no government treasury guarantees, lack of administrative and technical
capacity, and an active anti-nuclear movement, nuclear power has been a
crucial element of national development plans just like the hydroelectric
dams. 53 It has been pursued by many governments from the center-left
administration of the late 1970s to the center-right governments of the
1980s. The state’s desire to build nuclear power did not change when
AKP came to power; if anything it gained steam. AKP has been an ardent
proponent of a nuclear renaissance, framing it as central to the country’s economic growth and competitiveness by reducing dependence on
foreign energy sources, diversifying its national resources, and ensuring
energy independence. 54
Obsession with Economic Rents and Political Power
Beyond the pervasive mindset of developmentalism in the Turkish state,
politicians’ interest in accumulating political power and economic rents
can explain their energy choices and the type of energy policies they
pursue. Centralized, mega energy projects, and the state agencies that
regulate the energy industry offer government elites significant regulatory
power and economic benefits. During the 2000s, the AKP governments
gave up some of that power thanks to IMF and EU-induced structural reforms and in an effort to broaden the party’s support base. The
result was reduced government control and a relatively decentralized
sector to allow for more competition that was favorable to the development of alternative sources of energy. But by the end of 2000s, the
global and domestic context had changed. Emboldened by the impressive economic growth since the 2001 crisis and its increasing political
power over the decade, AKP started to act more independently from
the demands of external actors. Meanwhile, the increasing opposition to
Turkey’s membership in Germany and France as well as the stalemate
with the EU over the Cyprus issue soured the Turkish public’s interest
in EU membership. The EU’s own economic and political problems in