6 BYZANTINE ENERGY POLITICS: THE COMPLEX TALE …
167
of this energy source for Turkish economic growth agenda. Having designated 2012 as ‘the year of coal,’ the AKP government in all its official
strategic and development plans highlighted coal as an indispensable,
and strategic source of national energy supply, which, in turn, has been
regarded as the sine qua non of economic growth and development. 48
Similar to coal, large hydropower has also had a central role in Turkey’s
modernization project. The Southeastern Anatolian Dam Project (aka
GAP) which began in the 1960s with the construction of multiple dams
on the Euphrates river was not only envisioned as producing electricity
but also as a strategic tool in alleviating regional socioeconomic disparities through improved irrigation systems and agricultural production in
9 provinces, 80 districts, 195 municipalities, and 4,297 villages as well
as a foreign policy tool used as leverage against the neighboring countries of Iraq and Syria. In addition to their perceived practical benefits,
dams have always been treated as a symbol of improvement and grandeur.
Indeed, “just as Nehru claimed that dams were the temples of modern
India, Turkish policymakers have aspired to construct impressive visual
signs of the catching up of modern Turkey.” 49 Ground-breaking and
ribbon-cutting ceremonies of dam construction have been common political tools to project the patriotic and modernist image of politicians.
The fact that the two of the Turkish presidents were once the heads of
the State Hydraulic Works Agency (DSI in Turkish) and one of them,
Suleyman Demirel, had the nickname of the ‘king of dams’ demonstrates
the centrality of dam construction in the developmentalist ideology of the
Turkish state. 50
When AKP came to power, the emphasis on hydropower as an engine
of economic development continued as before. Similar to previous ones,
consecutive AKP governments saw environmental degradation and societal dislocations caused by dams as an inevitable and unavoidable result of
economic development. They also treated environmentalists who oppose
such developmental projects as siding with foreign powers and posing a
threat to the Turkish state and nation. This mindset is best reflected in
the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s statement that opponents
of the controversial Ilisu Dam in southeastern Turkey should be treated
as members of the PKK, a militant Kurdish separatist group that is listed
as a terrorist organization by the USA and Turkey. 51
Finally, interest in nuclear power has been a constant in Turkish politics and fits well into the growth-oriented, state-centric developmentalist
paradigm that has dominated the public discourse since the founding
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of this energy source for Turkish economic growth agenda. Having designated 2012 as ‘the year of coal,’ the AKP government in all its official
strategic and development plans highlighted coal as an indispensable,
and strategic source of national energy supply, which, in turn, has been
regarded as the sine qua non of economic growth and development. 48
Similar to coal, large hydropower has also had a central role in Turkey’s
modernization project. The Southeastern Anatolian Dam Project (aka
GAP) which began in the 1960s with the construction of multiple dams
on the Euphrates river was not only envisioned as producing electricity
but also as a strategic tool in alleviating regional socioeconomic disparities through improved irrigation systems and agricultural production in
9 provinces, 80 districts, 195 municipalities, and 4,297 villages as well
as a foreign policy tool used as leverage against the neighboring countries of Iraq and Syria. In addition to their perceived practical benefits,
dams have always been treated as a symbol of improvement and grandeur.
Indeed, “just as Nehru claimed that dams were the temples of modern
India, Turkish policymakers have aspired to construct impressive visual
signs of the catching up of modern Turkey.” 49 Ground-breaking and
ribbon-cutting ceremonies of dam construction have been common political tools to project the patriotic and modernist image of politicians.
The fact that the two of the Turkish presidents were once the heads of
the State Hydraulic Works Agency (DSI in Turkish) and one of them,
Suleyman Demirel, had the nickname of the ‘king of dams’ demonstrates
the centrality of dam construction in the developmentalist ideology of the
Turkish state. 50
When AKP came to power, the emphasis on hydropower as an engine
of economic development continued as before. Similar to previous ones,
consecutive AKP governments saw environmental degradation and societal dislocations caused by dams as an inevitable and unavoidable result of
economic development. They also treated environmentalists who oppose
such developmental projects as siding with foreign powers and posing a
threat to the Turkish state and nation. This mindset is best reflected in
the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s statement that opponents
of the controversial Ilisu Dam in southeastern Turkey should be treated
as members of the PKK, a militant Kurdish separatist group that is listed
as a terrorist organization by the USA and Turkey. 51
Finally, interest in nuclear power has been a constant in Turkish politics and fits well into the growth-oriented, state-centric developmentalist
paradigm that has dominated the public discourse since the founding