164 O. BAYULGEN
and their professional organizations/associations. The numerous wind,
solar, geothermal, biogas, hydroelectric national associations in Turkey,
in addition to providing professional network opportunities for their
members, have organized and/or participated in renewable energy
conferences and workshops where they regularly met with politicians,
government bureaucrats, and foreign investors and presented their views
on government policy and challenges of the sector. These increased and
increasingly publicized interactions in the 2000s between business associations and the government have contributed to some of the improvements
in the renewable legislation. 37
Despite increased levels of environmental mobilization and resistance
against dirtier and unsustainable forms of energy since the 2000s, the
extent and impact of grassroots as well as institutionalized civil society
pressures on government policy have nevertheless stayed very limited in
Turkey. The episodic rises in participation and organizational strength, for
the most part, have not translated into coherent and enduring national
movements but instead produced short-lived victories or solutions that
have done little to change the overall policy structures. 38 Over time
due to ideological divisions within the movements, the lack of adequate
funding for and membership to these organizations, and the state’s heavyhanded efforts to selectively choose and manage the input from them,
societal stakeholders had little success in changing the overall direction of
government’s energy policies. 39
It also did not help that investors in the renewable sector were, at
least initially, inexperienced and opportunistic. Especially in the small
hydro and wind energy sectors, many entrepreneurs with no prior experience and knowledge rushed to apply for licenses to trade them at higher
profits later as opposed to designing well-planned and thoroughly assessed
projects and seeing them through. 40 The field of entrepreneurs was often
very diverse with construction companies, appliance producers, real-estate
developers, textile companies, and even soccer clubs. These companies
often relied on energy brokers, also known as briefcase dealers (cantaci),
who had access to government resources and received huge commission
fees to trade licenses for project sites. As such, many projects changed
hands at their early stages and failed to turn into long-term, sustainable
developments. 41 In numerous cases, haphazard planning with inadequate
feasibility studies generated public outcry and protests, ending in lawsuits,
which slowed down or hampered the timely development of resources.
Even the more established, traditional energy companies that entered the
and their professional organizations/associations. The numerous wind,
solar, geothermal, biogas, hydroelectric national associations in Turkey,
in addition to providing professional network opportunities for their
members, have organized and/or participated in renewable energy
conferences and workshops where they regularly met with politicians,
government bureaucrats, and foreign investors and presented their views
on government policy and challenges of the sector. These increased and
increasingly publicized interactions in the 2000s between business associations and the government have contributed to some of the improvements
in the renewable legislation. 37
Despite increased levels of environmental mobilization and resistance
against dirtier and unsustainable forms of energy since the 2000s, the
extent and impact of grassroots as well as institutionalized civil society
pressures on government policy have nevertheless stayed very limited in
Turkey. The episodic rises in participation and organizational strength, for
the most part, have not translated into coherent and enduring national
movements but instead produced short-lived victories or solutions that
have done little to change the overall policy structures. 38 Over time
due to ideological divisions within the movements, the lack of adequate
funding for and membership to these organizations, and the state’s heavyhanded efforts to selectively choose and manage the input from them,
societal stakeholders had little success in changing the overall direction of
government’s energy policies. 39
It also did not help that investors in the renewable sector were, at
least initially, inexperienced and opportunistic. Especially in the small
hydro and wind energy sectors, many entrepreneurs with no prior experience and knowledge rushed to apply for licenses to trade them at higher
profits later as opposed to designing well-planned and thoroughly assessed
projects and seeing them through. 40 The field of entrepreneurs was often
very diverse with construction companies, appliance producers, real-estate
developers, textile companies, and even soccer clubs. These companies
often relied on energy brokers, also known as briefcase dealers (cantaci),
who had access to government resources and received huge commission
fees to trade licenses for project sites. As such, many projects changed
hands at their early stages and failed to turn into long-term, sustainable
developments. 41 In numerous cases, haphazard planning with inadequate
feasibility studies generated public outcry and protests, ending in lawsuits,
which slowed down or hampered the timely development of resources.
Even the more established, traditional energy companies that entered the