200
C. Nabukalu and R. Giere
when land productivity is failing (see also Ghilardi, Mwampamba, &
Dutt, 2013; Branch & Martiniello, 2018; Doggart & Meshack, 2017;
Ekpo & Mba, 2020). Participation by some traders is also voluntary and
highly random, based on their need for cash flow. However, charcoal
can be a primary source of income and, in such cases, informal companies recruit charcoal burners and truck drivers to produce consistently
and maintain inventory levels in final markets. Suppliers also seek out
entrepreneurial landowners who are willing to cut trees or allow production and, depending on negotiations, may retain sole ownership of the
goods for sale (Nabukalu & Gieré, 2019).
There is increasing support for formalizing the charcoal value chain
in sub-Saharan Africa, as reported for instance by Owen, van der Plas,
and Sepp (2012), Mugo and Ong (2006), and Schure, Ingram, SakhoJimbira, Levang and Wiersum (2013). Even though Schure, Ingram,
Sakho-Jimbira, Levang and Wiersum (2013) discussed that when formalities, such as production or transportation permits, are used to regulate
a widely informal charcoal sector, there are some disadvantages, such as
the disproportionate benefits of the trade to urban populations, corruption and loss of taxes. Nonetheless, Owen, van der Plas, and Sepp
(2012) showed that any African energy policy that completely perceives
biomass as a critical problem rather than a potential solution for energy
supply is futile, because electricity is not a substitute for biomass, further
suggesting that fuel switching is unrealistic, as Alfaro and Jones (2018)
also concluded in their study of Liberia.
Despite claims that the informal charcoal trade leads to revenue loss to
central governments, as reported for Tanzania by Sander, Gros, and Peter
(2013), our observations in Uganda revealed that it is not a zero-sum
trade, with absolute gains to traders and losses to governments, because
charcoal is sold in decentralized markets, where rents are collected for
the continuity of microeconomic development, mainly where traders
operate in a well-established, but not necessarily formal, infrastructure
(Fig. 6.3b–d) (Nabukalu & Gieré, 2019).
C. Nabukalu and R. Giere
when land productivity is failing (see also Ghilardi, Mwampamba, &
Dutt, 2013; Branch & Martiniello, 2018; Doggart & Meshack, 2017;
Ekpo & Mba, 2020). Participation by some traders is also voluntary and
highly random, based on their need for cash flow. However, charcoal
can be a primary source of income and, in such cases, informal companies recruit charcoal burners and truck drivers to produce consistently
and maintain inventory levels in final markets. Suppliers also seek out
entrepreneurial landowners who are willing to cut trees or allow production and, depending on negotiations, may retain sole ownership of the
goods for sale (Nabukalu & Gieré, 2019).
There is increasing support for formalizing the charcoal value chain
in sub-Saharan Africa, as reported for instance by Owen, van der Plas,
and Sepp (2012), Mugo and Ong (2006), and Schure, Ingram, SakhoJimbira, Levang and Wiersum (2013). Even though Schure, Ingram,
Sakho-Jimbira, Levang and Wiersum (2013) discussed that when formalities, such as production or transportation permits, are used to regulate
a widely informal charcoal sector, there are some disadvantages, such as
the disproportionate benefits of the trade to urban populations, corruption and loss of taxes. Nonetheless, Owen, van der Plas, and Sepp
(2012) showed that any African energy policy that completely perceives
biomass as a critical problem rather than a potential solution for energy
supply is futile, because electricity is not a substitute for biomass, further
suggesting that fuel switching is unrealistic, as Alfaro and Jones (2018)
also concluded in their study of Liberia.
Despite claims that the informal charcoal trade leads to revenue loss to
central governments, as reported for Tanzania by Sander, Gros, and Peter
(2013), our observations in Uganda revealed that it is not a zero-sum
trade, with absolute gains to traders and losses to governments, because
charcoal is sold in decentralized markets, where rents are collected for
the continuity of microeconomic development, mainly where traders
operate in a well-established, but not necessarily formal, infrastructure
(Fig. 6.3b–d) (Nabukalu & Gieré, 2019).