112
By considering properties of objects as associated with modes of empirical interaction of objects with their environment, we avoid taking a position on:
• The nature of properties of objects, other than that we consider them to be entities able to produce at least in principle observable effects and to support the
comparison of objects
3
• The difference between inherent (or essential) and contingent (or accidental)
properties, where the identity of the bearer, i.e., the object, is supposed to be
affected by a change of one of its inherent properties (a vase might be considered
a different object than the amorphous amount of clay from which it was shaped),
but not by a change of one of its contingent properties (a vase may still be considered the same object, even if it is chipped)
• The issue of the possible distinction between object-specific (“primary”, e.g.,
mass) and observer-related (“secondary”, e.g., perceived color) properties
4
This is consistent with a pragmatic stance which, we believe, is appropriate to
ground a discussion on measurement:
• We consider a property of an object to exist insofar as the object somehow interacts with its environment, though we accept that everything we consider as
known about a property is always revisable, and could turn out to be wrong.
• We acknowledge that empirical interactions may be physical, but also psychological, sociological, etc., thus admitting the existence of nonphysical
properties.
• We consider a property of an object to be associated with a mode of interaction
of the object, but we acknowledge that the existence of a property may be hypothesized also independently of a mode of interaction, and we do not say anything
further about what a property is per se.
5
3 That “the familiar objects of the everyday world agree in their characteristics, features, or attributes” is considered “a prephilosophical truism” (Loux & Crisp, 2017: p. 18).
4 For an analysis on this distinction, see for example Heil (2003: ch. 8), who also presents the idea
that properties manifest themselves through empirical interactions of objects: “all there really is to
a concrete entity is its power to affect and be affected by other entities. Assuming that an entity’s
powers depend on its properties, this suggests that there is no more to a property than powers or
dispositionalities it confers on its possessors. […] The business of science is to tease out fundamental properties of objects. Properties are what figure in laws of nature, and laws govern the
behaviour of objects. Properties, then, are features of the world that make a difference in how
objects behave or would behave” (p. 75).
5 The subject of what properties are is complex, and out of the scope of this book, in which a (black
box) characterization of how properties manifest themselves is sufficient. For a philosophically
oriented introduction to this subject, see for example the articles by Orilia and Swoyer (2020),
Weatherson and Marshall (2018), and Wilson (2017) in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Concepts such as, , , and are so fundamental in
human knowledge that it is not clear how they could be defined without circularity. For example,
René Dybkaer (2004: p. 51) defines as an “inherent state- or process-descriptive feature of a system including any pertinent components”, while leaving as a primitive (i.e.,
undefined) concept. Were he requested to define, he plausibly might have included the
term “property” in the definition, thus showing that the concept is ultimately defined in terms of
5 What is measured?
By considering properties of objects as associated with modes of empirical interaction of objects with their environment, we avoid taking a position on:
• The nature of properties of objects, other than that we consider them to be entities able to produce at least in principle observable effects and to support the
comparison of objects
3
• The difference between inherent (or essential) and contingent (or accidental)
properties, where the identity of the bearer, i.e., the object, is supposed to be
affected by a change of one of its inherent properties (a vase might be considered
a different object than the amorphous amount of clay from which it was shaped),
but not by a change of one of its contingent properties (a vase may still be considered the same object, even if it is chipped)
• The issue of the possible distinction between object-specific (“primary”, e.g.,
mass) and observer-related (“secondary”, e.g., perceived color) properties
4
This is consistent with a pragmatic stance which, we believe, is appropriate to
ground a discussion on measurement:
• We consider a property of an object to exist insofar as the object somehow interacts with its environment, though we accept that everything we consider as
known about a property is always revisable, and could turn out to be wrong.
• We acknowledge that empirical interactions may be physical, but also psychological, sociological, etc., thus admitting the existence of nonphysical
properties.
• We consider a property of an object to be associated with a mode of interaction
of the object, but we acknowledge that the existence of a property may be hypothesized also independently of a mode of interaction, and we do not say anything
further about what a property is per se.
5
3 That “the familiar objects of the everyday world agree in their characteristics, features, or attributes” is considered “a prephilosophical truism” (Loux & Crisp, 2017: p. 18).
4 For an analysis on this distinction, see for example Heil (2003: ch. 8), who also presents the idea
that properties manifest themselves through empirical interactions of objects: “all there really is to
a concrete entity is its power to affect and be affected by other entities. Assuming that an entity’s
powers depend on its properties, this suggests that there is no more to a property than powers or
dispositionalities it confers on its possessors. […] The business of science is to tease out fundamental properties of objects. Properties are what figure in laws of nature, and laws govern the
behaviour of objects. Properties, then, are features of the world that make a difference in how
objects behave or would behave” (p. 75).
5 The subject of what properties are is complex, and out of the scope of this book, in which a (black
box) characterization of how properties manifest themselves is sufficient. For a philosophically
oriented introduction to this subject, see for example the articles by Orilia and Swoyer (2020),
Weatherson and Marshall (2018), and Wilson (2017) in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Concepts such as
human knowledge that it is not clear how they could be defined without circularity. For example,
René Dybkaer (2004: p. 51) defines
undefined) concept. Were he requested to define
term “property” in the definition, thus showing that the concept is ultimately defined in terms of
5 What is measured?