111
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
L. Mari et al., Measurement across the Sciences, Springer Series in
Measurement Science and Technology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65558-7_5
Chapter 5
What is measured?
5.1 Introduction
Measurement is a specific kind of evaluation of properties of objects. A measurement-oriented ontology and epistemology of properties is a complex subject, in
which the ontic dimension (what properties are) and the epistemic dimension (what
we can know about properties and how we can know it) are deeply intertwined.
Hence a discussion of properties is an important part of a discourse on measurement. Let us restart from our discussion of properties in Sect. 2.2.
An empirical property of an object is associated with a mode of empirical interaction of the object with its environment. This association happens under the conditions that
• an object empirically interacts with its environment in multiple modes, and each
mode of interaction is considered to correspond to a property of the object,
1
and
• some objects are comparable with respect to some of their properties, and sometimes distinct objects are discovered to have empirically indistinguishable
properties.
2
1 This does not preclude the possibility that in some cases distinct modes of interaction do not correspond to distinct properties, i.e., one property may correspond to multiple modes of interaction.
A well-known example in physics is mass, which is associated with both inertial and gravitational
phenomena, and therefore to distinct modes of interaction. This is consistent with Brian Ellis’
insight that “our quantity concepts are generally cluster concepts” (1968: p. 32). More generally,
the interaction of an object with each different instrument might be interpreted as a different mode
of interaction: from an operationalist perspective, the interaction with each instrument corresponds, by definition, to a different property (see Sect. 4.2.2).
2 The plausibility of these conditions is confirmed also in a philosophical context. For example, to
the question What is a property? Baron et al. (2013: p. 35) answer: “This is a thorny issue. For
present purposes we conceive of properties as the entities that ground causal powers and similarity
relations.”
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
L. Mari et al., Measurement across the Sciences, Springer Series in
Measurement Science and Technology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65558-7_5
Chapter 5
What is measured?
5.1 Introduction
Measurement is a specific kind of evaluation of properties of objects. A measurement-oriented ontology and epistemology of properties is a complex subject, in
which the ontic dimension (what properties are) and the epistemic dimension (what
we can know about properties and how we can know it) are deeply intertwined.
Hence a discussion of properties is an important part of a discourse on measurement. Let us restart from our discussion of properties in Sect. 2.2.
An empirical property of an object is associated with a mode of empirical interaction of the object with its environment. This association happens under the conditions that
• an object empirically interacts with its environment in multiple modes, and each
mode of interaction is considered to correspond to a property of the object,
1
and
• some objects are comparable with respect to some of their properties, and sometimes distinct objects are discovered to have empirically indistinguishable
properties.
2
1 This does not preclude the possibility that in some cases distinct modes of interaction do not correspond to distinct properties, i.e., one property may correspond to multiple modes of interaction.
A well-known example in physics is mass, which is associated with both inertial and gravitational
phenomena, and therefore to distinct modes of interaction. This is consistent with Brian Ellis’
insight that “our quantity concepts are generally cluster concepts” (1968: p. 32). More generally,
the interaction of an object with each different instrument might be interpreted as a different mode
of interaction: from an operationalist perspective, the interaction with each instrument corresponds, by definition, to a different property (see Sect. 4.2.2).
2 The plausibility of these conditions is confirmed also in a philosophical context. For example, to
the question What is a property? Baron et al. (2013: p. 35) answer: “This is a thorny issue. For
present purposes we conceive of properties as the entities that ground causal powers and similarity
relations.”