76
8 Societal Impact of a Radiological Attack
was part of a three-person team that travelled to Japan about one month after the
Fukushima accident; while there, members of the team met with people at shelters
and with evacuees. Many of those in the shelters were depressed and/or anxious,
while some of the evacuees mentioned that those living near them were voicing
complaints about noise, cooking odors, and so forth that appeared to be proxies for
an underlying fear of the radiation to which the evacuees had been exposed. A similar
social stigmatization (as well as a number of other psychosocial impacts) has also
been noted to affect survivors of radiation and nuclear reactor accidents around the
world [5–9].
To help address these, and related, issues New York City emergency planning
documents call for including mental health information and referrals among the
services they plan to offer to those affected by a nuclear or radiological attack [10].
8.1.4 Access Restrictions to Impacted Areas
As with any other emergency it will be necessary to quickly delineate the affected
area(s). One reason for this is for public health and safety, so that members of the
public are evacuated from, and denied entry to areas that might pose a risk due to
radiation, contamination, and other hazards (e.g. fire, unstable structures, downed or
ruptured utilities, etc.); it also serves to keep members of the public from interfering
with the emergency response efforts as well as preserving the area as a crime scene
for future investigations.
The immediate aftermath of a radiological attack will include delineating the Hot
Zone based first on default boundaries (e.g. 250 m in all directions and 2000 m
downwind, as suggested by New York City’s Radiological Response and Recovery
Plan [25]) and, when more information becomes available, adjusted according to
procedures developed by the US Department of Homeland Security [11]. However,
there are also non-radiological factors to consider that might call for adjusting boundaries further still. These factors can include the risk from secondary explosive devices,
secondary attacks in the area of an explosion, risks from falling glass, damage to
utility lines, the release of asbestos or other harmful materials into the environment,
the presence of smoke or contaminant plumes, and so forth.
The tension in setting boundaries is that they should be expansive enough to
encompass all potential sources of risk while remaining as compact as possible to
facilitate securing them and to minimize the inaccessible area(s). It also makes sense
to establish boundaries at “natural” locations (e.g. street corners versus the middle
of the block) when possible.
Once boundaries have been established responders should also establish entry/exit
points and, to the maximum extent possible, all traffic into and out of the controlled
area should pass through these to ensure that all who enter the area have proper
protective equipment and that all who exit are checked for contamination and decontaminated if necessary (except for the critically injured, who may be transported
directly to the hospital for life-saving medical care).
8 Societal Impact of a Radiological Attack
was part of a three-person team that travelled to Japan about one month after the
Fukushima accident; while there, members of the team met with people at shelters
and with evacuees. Many of those in the shelters were depressed and/or anxious,
while some of the evacuees mentioned that those living near them were voicing
complaints about noise, cooking odors, and so forth that appeared to be proxies for
an underlying fear of the radiation to which the evacuees had been exposed. A similar
social stigmatization (as well as a number of other psychosocial impacts) has also
been noted to affect survivors of radiation and nuclear reactor accidents around the
world [5–9].
To help address these, and related, issues New York City emergency planning
documents call for including mental health information and referrals among the
services they plan to offer to those affected by a nuclear or radiological attack [10].
8.1.4 Access Restrictions to Impacted Areas
As with any other emergency it will be necessary to quickly delineate the affected
area(s). One reason for this is for public health and safety, so that members of the
public are evacuated from, and denied entry to areas that might pose a risk due to
radiation, contamination, and other hazards (e.g. fire, unstable structures, downed or
ruptured utilities, etc.); it also serves to keep members of the public from interfering
with the emergency response efforts as well as preserving the area as a crime scene
for future investigations.
The immediate aftermath of a radiological attack will include delineating the Hot
Zone based first on default boundaries (e.g. 250 m in all directions and 2000 m
downwind, as suggested by New York City’s Radiological Response and Recovery
Plan [25]) and, when more information becomes available, adjusted according to
procedures developed by the US Department of Homeland Security [11]. However,
there are also non-radiological factors to consider that might call for adjusting boundaries further still. These factors can include the risk from secondary explosive devices,
secondary attacks in the area of an explosion, risks from falling glass, damage to
utility lines, the release of asbestos or other harmful materials into the environment,
the presence of smoke or contaminant plumes, and so forth.
The tension in setting boundaries is that they should be expansive enough to
encompass all potential sources of risk while remaining as compact as possible to
facilitate securing them and to minimize the inaccessible area(s). It also makes sense
to establish boundaries at “natural” locations (e.g. street corners versus the middle
of the block) when possible.
Once boundaries have been established responders should also establish entry/exit
points and, to the maximum extent possible, all traffic into and out of the controlled
area should pass through these to ensure that all who enter the area have proper
protective equipment and that all who exit are checked for contamination and decontaminated if necessary (except for the critically injured, who may be transported
directly to the hospital for life-saving medical care).