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19 Additional Considerations When Responding to a Nuclear Attack
ment, and the final goal will likely devolve on the local government. The final goal
will be discussed in greater detail in the final three chapters of this book.
19.1 The Magnitude of a Nuclear Attack
The primary factor differentiating a nuclear attack from a non-nuclear explosion is
the sheer magnitude of the blast and the extent of its effects. For example, the 2020
Beirut explosion killed 190 people and the larger 1917 explosion in Halifax Nova
Scotia caused 2000 fatalities, while the 1945 Hiroshima blast killed more than 90,000
and injured tens of thousands. Not only that, but more than 25,000 people died over
the first four months following the Hiroshima attack; 25,000 patients who required
medical care and resources during the weeks between the attack and their deaths. On
top of that, as was mentioned in Chap. 11, there are not enough burn beds in most
nations to care for the number of expected burn victims from the thermal pulse and
the resulting fires. A nuclear attack will result in a few orders of magnitude more
fatalities and injuries than would even the largest conventional explosive attack we
have experienced.
There is likely no city in the world that has the personnel, medications, or equipment to care for so many for so long; at the same time, simply leaving so many to
die—especially when there are those who might survive with proper care—would
be unethical and unconscionable.
All of the other problems associated with a nuclear attack—the radius of destroyed
and damaged buildings, the number of destroyed and damaged buildings, the length
of the security perimeter, the size of the affected areas—all of the other factors
associated with an attack will be larger and more severe than a conventional bomb
by at least an order of magnitude if the bomb that goes off is a nuclear bomb.
It also bears mention that a nuclear attack would be the largest event and the most
serious emergency that anybody in the city—and likely the national—government
has experienced. It is likely that nobody will be able to exercise control over the entire
affected area, let alone the entire city, immediately. It is also likely that, when response
efforts commence, they will be small-scale and local in nature, gradually coalescing
into a more coordinated effort under the control of the Incident Commander and city
officials as communications and effective control are re-established.
19.2 Radioactive Fallout
As noted in Chap. 10, a nuclear explosion creates a huge amount of radioactivity
and, if detonated as a surface burst this radioactivity will come to ground as fallout
in a plume that can stretch 15 km or further downwind of the point of the explosion.
Radiation dose rates will be dangerously high in this plume for at least 12 h following
the detonation and possibly for as long as a few days. In a large and densely populated
19 Additional Considerations When Responding to a Nuclear Attack
ment, and the final goal will likely devolve on the local government. The final goal
will be discussed in greater detail in the final three chapters of this book.
19.1 The Magnitude of a Nuclear Attack
The primary factor differentiating a nuclear attack from a non-nuclear explosion is
the sheer magnitude of the blast and the extent of its effects. For example, the 2020
Beirut explosion killed 190 people and the larger 1917 explosion in Halifax Nova
Scotia caused 2000 fatalities, while the 1945 Hiroshima blast killed more than 90,000
and injured tens of thousands. Not only that, but more than 25,000 people died over
the first four months following the Hiroshima attack; 25,000 patients who required
medical care and resources during the weeks between the attack and their deaths. On
top of that, as was mentioned in Chap. 11, there are not enough burn beds in most
nations to care for the number of expected burn victims from the thermal pulse and
the resulting fires. A nuclear attack will result in a few orders of magnitude more
fatalities and injuries than would even the largest conventional explosive attack we
have experienced.
There is likely no city in the world that has the personnel, medications, or equipment to care for so many for so long; at the same time, simply leaving so many to
die—especially when there are those who might survive with proper care—would
be unethical and unconscionable.
All of the other problems associated with a nuclear attack—the radius of destroyed
and damaged buildings, the number of destroyed and damaged buildings, the length
of the security perimeter, the size of the affected areas—all of the other factors
associated with an attack will be larger and more severe than a conventional bomb
by at least an order of magnitude if the bomb that goes off is a nuclear bomb.
It also bears mention that a nuclear attack would be the largest event and the most
serious emergency that anybody in the city—and likely the national—government
has experienced. It is likely that nobody will be able to exercise control over the entire
affected area, let alone the entire city, immediately. It is also likely that, when response
efforts commence, they will be small-scale and local in nature, gradually coalescing
into a more coordinated effort under the control of the Incident Commander and city
officials as communications and effective control are re-established.
19.2 Radioactive Fallout
As noted in Chap. 10, a nuclear explosion creates a huge amount of radioactivity
and, if detonated as a surface burst this radioactivity will come to ground as fallout
in a plume that can stretch 15 km or further downwind of the point of the explosion.
Radiation dose rates will be dangerously high in this plume for at least 12 h following
the detonation and possibly for as long as a few days. In a large and densely populated