15.3 Health and Safety at the Scene
173
Persons Contaminated with Radioactivity) [8] all of these risks, radiological and nonradiological, are summarized to help readers understand that, not only is radiation
not the only risk present, but it is often not the most pressing risk facing emergency
responders. Responders, the Health and Safety Officer, and the Incident Commander
must all avoid the temptation to focus on radiological concerns to the exclusion
of other factors that might pose a greater risk to their health and safety. The nonradiological hazards are fairly well-understood and are discussed in detail in many
other documents (e.g. [4, 5, 14]); here we will concentrate on the radiological risks
to emergency responders and to the public.
Among the highest priorities will be initiating lifesaving and rescue operations.
It is essential to locate and evacuate those members of the public who are seriously
or critically injured so that they can receive the medical care they need in order
to survive. This means that, unlike emergency responders exiting the Hot Zone,
members of the public who are badly injured can (and should) be evacuated to the
hospital without delay, even if that precludes decontamination.
15.3.1 Internal Radioactivity, Inhalation and Ingestion
Inhalation and ingestion risks to emergency responders can be relatively easily
managed by the use of respiratory protection and contamination controls. Respiratory protection will prevent inhalation of airborne radioactivity and will keep it
from entering the mouth to be swallowed, while contamination controls will minimize the risk of accidental ingestion via the secondary contamination of food or
drink.
However, inhalation can be a concern for members of the public who are in the
area near where an explosive RDD was detonated and in areas downwind where the
plume settles to the ground. Members of the public who are closest to the location
of a bomb’s detonation will be most at risk of inhaling radioactivity and will also be
at the greatest risk of suffering from embedded radioactive particles and fragments
from a source shattered by the explosion. In addition, those sufficiently close to
the explosion will have injuries (e.g. cuts and scrapes) that provide a pathway for
radioactivity to enter the bloodstream, as well as embedded fragments of radioactive
materials.
From a public health perspective, one should assume that emergency responders, if
properly equipped with protective equipment, are unlikely to have a significant intake
of radioactivity. Thus, public health officials can devote the majority of their attention
towards the goal of attempting to determine the intake of radioactive materials by
members of the general public. This dose assessment process will help to determine
the number of people requiring decorporation therapy to remove radioactivity from
their bodies [9].
Assessing and quantifying this internal radioactivity and the resultant dose will
be discussed in greater detail in Chap. 19.
173
Persons Contaminated with Radioactivity) [8] all of these risks, radiological and nonradiological, are summarized to help readers understand that, not only is radiation
not the only risk present, but it is often not the most pressing risk facing emergency
responders. Responders, the Health and Safety Officer, and the Incident Commander
must all avoid the temptation to focus on radiological concerns to the exclusion
of other factors that might pose a greater risk to their health and safety. The nonradiological hazards are fairly well-understood and are discussed in detail in many
other documents (e.g. [4, 5, 14]); here we will concentrate on the radiological risks
to emergency responders and to the public.
Among the highest priorities will be initiating lifesaving and rescue operations.
It is essential to locate and evacuate those members of the public who are seriously
or critically injured so that they can receive the medical care they need in order
to survive. This means that, unlike emergency responders exiting the Hot Zone,
members of the public who are badly injured can (and should) be evacuated to the
hospital without delay, even if that precludes decontamination.
15.3.1 Internal Radioactivity, Inhalation and Ingestion
Inhalation and ingestion risks to emergency responders can be relatively easily
managed by the use of respiratory protection and contamination controls. Respiratory protection will prevent inhalation of airborne radioactivity and will keep it
from entering the mouth to be swallowed, while contamination controls will minimize the risk of accidental ingestion via the secondary contamination of food or
drink.
However, inhalation can be a concern for members of the public who are in the
area near where an explosive RDD was detonated and in areas downwind where the
plume settles to the ground. Members of the public who are closest to the location
of a bomb’s detonation will be most at risk of inhaling radioactivity and will also be
at the greatest risk of suffering from embedded radioactive particles and fragments
from a source shattered by the explosion. In addition, those sufficiently close to
the explosion will have injuries (e.g. cuts and scrapes) that provide a pathway for
radioactivity to enter the bloodstream, as well as embedded fragments of radioactive
materials.
From a public health perspective, one should assume that emergency responders, if
properly equipped with protective equipment, are unlikely to have a significant intake
of radioactivity. Thus, public health officials can devote the majority of their attention
towards the goal of attempting to determine the intake of radioactive materials by
members of the general public. This dose assessment process will help to determine
the number of people requiring decorporation therapy to remove radioactivity from
their bodies [9].
Assessing and quantifying this internal radioactivity and the resultant dose will
be discussed in greater detail in Chap. 19.