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15 Initial Emergency Response Efforts
security and force protection, and investigating the attack. Not all of these will be the
responsibility of the Incident Commander; the investigation, for example, will likely
be overseen by the national government in the US and likely in many other nations
as well. These are discussed in the following sections.
Managing the scene includes establishing boundaries, securing these boundaries,
and establishing entry/egress points between the Hot Zone and the outside.
As noted in the previous section, the “First 100 min” document recommends
initially establishing boundaries 250 meters from the site of the explosion and
extending for 2 km downwind. As much as possible, these should follow “natural
boundaries,” so the outlines of the Hot Zone will almost certainly not be circular, but
might well be easier to secure.
In addition to setting boundaries it will be important to establish a Command Post,
an entry/exit corridor, and a decontamination point. The Command Post should be
close enough to the scene to permit relatively easy access for the Command Staff, but
it should also be in an area unaffected by the event with low levels of contamination
and radiation levels close to background. Placing the Command Post upwind from
the site of the explosion will help to ensure that it is not placed in a contaminated
area; however, winds are likely to shift from time to time and it is inevitable that, at
some points, the Command Post will be downwind of the site—for this reason it is
also important to place it sufficiently far from the site as to minimize the spread of
contamination via resuspension.
All persons entering and leaving the Hot Zone should do so via an established
entry/exit corridor once one has been established. Those entering the Hot Zone must
be properly garbed in appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) and those
leaving will be required to remove their PPE, to be surveyed for contamination, and
to proceed to the decontamination station if they are found to be contaminated. There
should also be a log sheet present that all personnel entering and leaving the area will
use to sign in and out so that all personnel are accounted for. In addition, members of
the public who are rescued should be noted as leaving the area as long as they are not
badly injured—life-threatening medical concerns take priority over decontamination
and all other matters.
The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP)
discusses the procedures for donning/doffing PPE, operating the entry/exit point,
and related matters in detail in Report #161 [7].
15.3 Health and Safety at the Scene
Any emergency response is an inherently dangerous undertaking; emergency responders knowingly put themselves at risk entering dangerous areas in order to save
members of the public and to try to limit the damage that is done. This might
involve entering burning buildings, working in areas with toxic gases or ruptured
utility lines, unstable structures, high radiation levels, working in the midst of heavy
machinery, and more. In the second volume of NCRP Report 161 (Management of
15 Initial Emergency Response Efforts
security and force protection, and investigating the attack. Not all of these will be the
responsibility of the Incident Commander; the investigation, for example, will likely
be overseen by the national government in the US and likely in many other nations
as well. These are discussed in the following sections.
Managing the scene includes establishing boundaries, securing these boundaries,
and establishing entry/egress points between the Hot Zone and the outside.
As noted in the previous section, the “First 100 min” document recommends
initially establishing boundaries 250 meters from the site of the explosion and
extending for 2 km downwind. As much as possible, these should follow “natural
boundaries,” so the outlines of the Hot Zone will almost certainly not be circular, but
might well be easier to secure.
In addition to setting boundaries it will be important to establish a Command Post,
an entry/exit corridor, and a decontamination point. The Command Post should be
close enough to the scene to permit relatively easy access for the Command Staff, but
it should also be in an area unaffected by the event with low levels of contamination
and radiation levels close to background. Placing the Command Post upwind from
the site of the explosion will help to ensure that it is not placed in a contaminated
area; however, winds are likely to shift from time to time and it is inevitable that, at
some points, the Command Post will be downwind of the site—for this reason it is
also important to place it sufficiently far from the site as to minimize the spread of
contamination via resuspension.
All persons entering and leaving the Hot Zone should do so via an established
entry/exit corridor once one has been established. Those entering the Hot Zone must
be properly garbed in appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) and those
leaving will be required to remove their PPE, to be surveyed for contamination, and
to proceed to the decontamination station if they are found to be contaminated. There
should also be a log sheet present that all personnel entering and leaving the area will
use to sign in and out so that all personnel are accounted for. In addition, members of
the public who are rescued should be noted as leaving the area as long as they are not
badly injured—life-threatening medical concerns take priority over decontamination
and all other matters.
The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP)
discusses the procedures for donning/doffing PPE, operating the entry/exit point,
and related matters in detail in Report #161 [7].
15.3 Health and Safety at the Scene
Any emergency response is an inherently dangerous undertaking; emergency responders knowingly put themselves at risk entering dangerous areas in order to save
members of the public and to try to limit the damage that is done. This might
involve entering burning buildings, working in areas with toxic gases or ruptured
utility lines, unstable structures, high radiation levels, working in the midst of heavy
machinery, and more. In the second volume of NCRP Report 161 (Management of