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15 Initial Emergency Response Efforts
surveys and wearing PPE. If the government is perceived to be deceiving the people
in the first moments of the emergency response it will be difficult to recover the
public’s trust, making subsequent orders and recommendations less effective than
would otherwise be the case. And even if the government does not exactly lie to the
public (radioactivity is “hazardous material” after all), the distinction between lying
and being disingenuous is likely to be lost on the public during a period of high
stress.
The other part of the “inform” mission is to inform other levels of government and
appropriate governmental agencies of the event and the need for assistance. In the
United States, for example, the Federal government does not automatically provide
assistance—they must be asked to do so by the state that was attacked. Although this
particular task might seem like a rather odd formality, it remains important nevertheless. Consider, for example, the Health Commissioner hearing the news of a radiological attack in their city. The report might well be accurate; it might also simply
be the result of a reporter showing up at the scene of an explosion, hearing radiation
detectors registering background radiation and, not understanding that background
radiation exists, reporting that a radiological attack took place. The Health Commissioner cannot spring into action based on radio or internet news reports, neither can
the Federal government send assistance based on such anecdotal information; there
has to be a formal notification through a recognized communication channel before
the Health Commissioner (and Commissioners of other agencies) can order their
resources to respond. For similar reasons, there must be an official notification to
other levels of government to ask for their resources to be sent to the scene to assist.
As an aside, this means that the city must have a plan as to how these resources will
be incorporated into the city’s emergency response efforts; it can be useful for the
various agencies at the different levels of government to have such discussions before
an attack or other form of emergency occurs so that all parties understand their role,
where to report, and can work out the logistics associated with their response.
15.1.3 Measuring and Mapping Radiation Levels
One of the crucial initial tasks will involve measuring and mapping radiation levels
at the scene and throughout the city; in particular it will be necessary to quickly
determine the direction and “footprint” of the radioactive plume so that radiological boundaries can be established and so that members of the public (and emergency responders) will know which areas require taking appropriate radiation safety
precautions upon entry. Immediately upon recognizing a radiological attack the
Incident Commander might choose to establish default Hot Zone boundaries; one
recommendation [3, 6] is to establish default boundaries at a distance of 250 m
in all directions around the site of the explosion and extending them 2 km downwind. This should encompass the areas with high levels of radiation as well as the
majority of the contaminated areas. As time goes on, these initial boundaries can be
adjusted as necessary to reflect new measurements. As a general rule of thumb, there
15 Initial Emergency Response Efforts
surveys and wearing PPE. If the government is perceived to be deceiving the people
in the first moments of the emergency response it will be difficult to recover the
public’s trust, making subsequent orders and recommendations less effective than
would otherwise be the case. And even if the government does not exactly lie to the
public (radioactivity is “hazardous material” after all), the distinction between lying
and being disingenuous is likely to be lost on the public during a period of high
stress.
The other part of the “inform” mission is to inform other levels of government and
appropriate governmental agencies of the event and the need for assistance. In the
United States, for example, the Federal government does not automatically provide
assistance—they must be asked to do so by the state that was attacked. Although this
particular task might seem like a rather odd formality, it remains important nevertheless. Consider, for example, the Health Commissioner hearing the news of a radiological attack in their city. The report might well be accurate; it might also simply
be the result of a reporter showing up at the scene of an explosion, hearing radiation
detectors registering background radiation and, not understanding that background
radiation exists, reporting that a radiological attack took place. The Health Commissioner cannot spring into action based on radio or internet news reports, neither can
the Federal government send assistance based on such anecdotal information; there
has to be a formal notification through a recognized communication channel before
the Health Commissioner (and Commissioners of other agencies) can order their
resources to respond. For similar reasons, there must be an official notification to
other levels of government to ask for their resources to be sent to the scene to assist.
As an aside, this means that the city must have a plan as to how these resources will
be incorporated into the city’s emergency response efforts; it can be useful for the
various agencies at the different levels of government to have such discussions before
an attack or other form of emergency occurs so that all parties understand their role,
where to report, and can work out the logistics associated with their response.
15.1.3 Measuring and Mapping Radiation Levels
One of the crucial initial tasks will involve measuring and mapping radiation levels
at the scene and throughout the city; in particular it will be necessary to quickly
determine the direction and “footprint” of the radioactive plume so that radiological boundaries can be established and so that members of the public (and emergency responders) will know which areas require taking appropriate radiation safety
precautions upon entry. Immediately upon recognizing a radiological attack the
Incident Commander might choose to establish default Hot Zone boundaries; one
recommendation [3, 6] is to establish default boundaries at a distance of 250 m
in all directions around the site of the explosion and extending them 2 km downwind. This should encompass the areas with high levels of radiation as well as the
majority of the contaminated areas. As time goes on, these initial boundaries can be
adjusted as necessary to reflect new measurements. As a general rule of thumb, there