13.3 Instrument Operators
135
responders, many of the more sophisticated instruments used by Tier 2 responders
are not; it is not unusual for a mobile system or a hand-held RIID to be designed for
scientists or for radiation safety professionals, to require extensive practice in order
to operate properly and maintain proficiency, and to display information in a manner
that is not intuitive. Emergency responders can learn to operate these instruments and
to use them well, but their supervisors and managers must understand that achieving
and maintaining these skills requires both initial training and continuing practice lest
these skills be forgotten.
13.4 Instrument Selection
Here’s a story for you. In the 2010 s a senior police officer in a major American
city had a brainstorm: “We should put radiation detectors on buildings!” He took
this idea to his management, explained his idea to them, and the police department
secured funding to implement the idea. They contacted a company with whom they
had done a great deal of business in the past and the company’s representative replied
“We have just the thing for you!” After spending time on the requisite negotiations
and contracts, the company began installing their radiation detectors on buildings
in the city. After several years over 30 units had been installed and their data lines
tied into the city’s central network (which included databases, video cameras, and a
number of other sensors) and the city was beginning to negotiate the purchase of an
additional 70 detectors.
At this point, a radiation instrumentation expert was hired by the city and, among
other tasks, was asked to evaluate the radiation sensor network. After several months
the radiation professional asked what purpose the sensors were to serve:
• Interdiction
• Health and safety monitoring during a radiological emergency
• Tracking fallout plumes
• Providing information for dose reconstruction and long-term public health
concerns.
He then pointed out that the detectors were of a type (gamma scintillators) that
were suitable for interdiction, but their location (at the tops of buildings) was not.
They overloaded at dose rates of a fraction of 1 mGy hr
−1 , making them far too
low-range to be useful for health and safety or for tracking fallout plumes. And they
were too inaccurate—especially when measuring any nuclides other than Cs-137—
to be useful in reconstructing radiation exposures from, for example, mixed fission
products or low-energy gamma-emitters. Thus, while each unit was an excellent
detector in and of itself, the network as a whole was virtually useless because the
customer had never discussed with the vendor what the network was to be used
for. Had they had this discussion, the detectors that were finally installed would
have been far different. In fact, subsequent conversations with the vendor led to the
testing of a different system that include two energy-compensated GM tubes that
135
responders, many of the more sophisticated instruments used by Tier 2 responders
are not; it is not unusual for a mobile system or a hand-held RIID to be designed for
scientists or for radiation safety professionals, to require extensive practice in order
to operate properly and maintain proficiency, and to display information in a manner
that is not intuitive. Emergency responders can learn to operate these instruments and
to use them well, but their supervisors and managers must understand that achieving
and maintaining these skills requires both initial training and continuing practice lest
these skills be forgotten.
13.4 Instrument Selection
Here’s a story for you. In the 2010 s a senior police officer in a major American
city had a brainstorm: “We should put radiation detectors on buildings!” He took
this idea to his management, explained his idea to them, and the police department
secured funding to implement the idea. They contacted a company with whom they
had done a great deal of business in the past and the company’s representative replied
“We have just the thing for you!” After spending time on the requisite negotiations
and contracts, the company began installing their radiation detectors on buildings
in the city. After several years over 30 units had been installed and their data lines
tied into the city’s central network (which included databases, video cameras, and a
number of other sensors) and the city was beginning to negotiate the purchase of an
additional 70 detectors.
At this point, a radiation instrumentation expert was hired by the city and, among
other tasks, was asked to evaluate the radiation sensor network. After several months
the radiation professional asked what purpose the sensors were to serve:
• Interdiction
• Health and safety monitoring during a radiological emergency
• Tracking fallout plumes
• Providing information for dose reconstruction and long-term public health
concerns.
He then pointed out that the detectors were of a type (gamma scintillators) that
were suitable for interdiction, but their location (at the tops of buildings) was not.
They overloaded at dose rates of a fraction of 1 mGy hr
−1 , making them far too
low-range to be useful for health and safety or for tracking fallout plumes. And they
were too inaccurate—especially when measuring any nuclides other than Cs-137—
to be useful in reconstructing radiation exposures from, for example, mixed fission
products or low-energy gamma-emitters. Thus, while each unit was an excellent
detector in and of itself, the network as a whole was virtually useless because the
customer had never discussed with the vendor what the network was to be used
for. Had they had this discussion, the detectors that were finally installed would
have been far different. In fact, subsequent conversations with the vendor led to the
testing of a different system that include two energy-compensated GM tubes that