236
European Union. But public mention of ENO in the same breath as ESO at
European level only increased the unease and resentment of ESO.
From that point onwards, ESO began systematically and shamelessly to
anathematize the IAC Observatories, as I now explain, basing my account on
fully archived documentation on the matter. In the view of those representing
the European Southern Observatory, the hour had come to remove from their
midst the threat that ENO posed to their prestige and hegemonic designs.
The effect was felt immediately in numerous ways. There were soon bitter and
angry exchanges at CCI meetings, whose membership included persons serving on the governing organs of ESO. It did not take long for them to ensure
that ENO should end up dissolving through inanition. In the absence of
divine intervention in this battle between David and Goliath, it was David
who stood to lose everything.
But there was more to come. A technical working group was set up with
European funding to examine which of the two technical proposals, EURO-50
or OWL, would be the more suitable for the European extremely large telescope. Needless to say, ESO managed to stifle the EURO-50 in favour of its
OWL, however much the Spanish and Swedish members of the group demonstrated in tough technical meetings the clear advantages offered by the
EURO-50. What happened next? First, ESO, in the face of the multiple construction problems with OWL that rendered it unviable with a 100-m mirror,
were forced to reduce its diameter to 60 metres. But the project still remained
impracticable, so they made a further reduction to forty-odd metres. That was
still not doable, with the result that today the diameter has shrunken to a
‘mere’ 39 metres. This version is now the E-ELT, whose construction has
begun in Chile.
After the EURO-50 had been wiped from the slate, we focused all our
efforts on getting the E-ELT sent to the ORM, knowing all the while that
ESO wanted it in Chile. As is usual in the IAC, when we face a major challenge we set up a think tank. We have always believed in brainstorming. The
group consisted of our best researchers and was set the task of analysing the
subject in depth, devising a workable strategy, monitoring the evolution of
events, and proposing practicable solutions to be tried at all times. We knew
we were up against a giant, so we had to have courage and determination. We
were encouraged by knowing that this would not be the first time we had
achieved impossible goals. We were also sure in our knowledge that we wanted
the best for the Canaries, for Spain, and for Europe—and for astrophysics
too. All or nothing! You cannot enter the arena with the spirit of a loser.
We were quite aware that the final emplacement of the E-ELT was going to
be decided on political and economic grounds, and also on personal
F. Sánchez
European Union. But public mention of ENO in the same breath as ESO at
European level only increased the unease and resentment of ESO.
From that point onwards, ESO began systematically and shamelessly to
anathematize the IAC Observatories, as I now explain, basing my account on
fully archived documentation on the matter. In the view of those representing
the European Southern Observatory, the hour had come to remove from their
midst the threat that ENO posed to their prestige and hegemonic designs.
The effect was felt immediately in numerous ways. There were soon bitter and
angry exchanges at CCI meetings, whose membership included persons serving on the governing organs of ESO. It did not take long for them to ensure
that ENO should end up dissolving through inanition. In the absence of
divine intervention in this battle between David and Goliath, it was David
who stood to lose everything.
But there was more to come. A technical working group was set up with
European funding to examine which of the two technical proposals, EURO-50
or OWL, would be the more suitable for the European extremely large telescope. Needless to say, ESO managed to stifle the EURO-50 in favour of its
OWL, however much the Spanish and Swedish members of the group demonstrated in tough technical meetings the clear advantages offered by the
EURO-50. What happened next? First, ESO, in the face of the multiple construction problems with OWL that rendered it unviable with a 100-m mirror,
were forced to reduce its diameter to 60 metres. But the project still remained
impracticable, so they made a further reduction to forty-odd metres. That was
still not doable, with the result that today the diameter has shrunken to a
‘mere’ 39 metres. This version is now the E-ELT, whose construction has
begun in Chile.
After the EURO-50 had been wiped from the slate, we focused all our
efforts on getting the E-ELT sent to the ORM, knowing all the while that
ESO wanted it in Chile. As is usual in the IAC, when we face a major challenge we set up a think tank. We have always believed in brainstorming. The
group consisted of our best researchers and was set the task of analysing the
subject in depth, devising a workable strategy, monitoring the evolution of
events, and proposing practicable solutions to be tried at all times. We knew
we were up against a giant, so we had to have courage and determination. We
were encouraged by knowing that this would not be the first time we had
achieved impossible goals. We were also sure in our knowledge that we wanted
the best for the Canaries, for Spain, and for Europe—and for astrophysics
too. All or nothing! You cannot enter the arena with the spirit of a loser.
We were quite aware that the final emplacement of the E-ELT was going to
be decided on political and economic grounds, and also on personal
F. Sánchez