their vision of how to move towards a lower carbon model of development, Perez
(2002) shows that finance capital is crucial to the Schumpetarian ‘waves of creative
destruction’ that challenge and dislodge the power of incumbents. Here it is
suggested that this will be vital to disinvesting in fossil fuels, such that the twist in
the story could yet be about the rise of a finance-led regime of accumulation and
its role in accelerating decarbonization.
Historically, finance capital has been vital to unsettling existing technologies,
industries and bases of political power. Carlota Perez’s (2013) work reminds us of
the key role of finance in supporting previous historical transitions – the ‘grand
experiments’ she refers to ‘when unrestrained finance can override the power of
the old production giants and fund the new entrepreneurs in testing the vast new
potential’. Examples include the technological revolutions produced in the
Industrial Revolution, what she refers to as the ‘age of steam and railways’, and
around ‘oil, automobile and mass production’ in the Fordist era described above,
for example (2002, p11). Indeed, as Arrighi notes: ‘Throughout the capitalist era
financial expansions have signalled the transition from one regime of accumulation
on a world scale to another. They are integral aspects of the recurrent destruction
of ‘old’ regimes and the simultaneous creation of new ones’ (2010, ppxi–xii).
This raises the question of whether the interests of different fractions of capital
– finance or money capital on the one hand, and productive capital concentrated
in fossil fuels on the other – can be played off against one another for the purposes
of producing a shift in the energy regime. While certain ‘base technologies’
(Storper and Walker, 1989) may characterize eras of capitalism, as Buck notes, it
is important not to ‘confuse particular manifestations of capitalism – that is,
particular historical social formations – with capitalism itself, thus under-estimating
the flexibility of the beast’ (2006, p60). If there is ‘one essential feature of the general
history of capitalism’, Braudel claims, it is ‘its unlimited flexibility, its capacity for
change and adaptation’ (1982, p433). Might it be possible, then, that climate change
can be reworked as an opportunity for growth where fossil fuels can be replaced
by, for example, a ‘solar revolution’ (Altvater, 2006, p53)? As Marx and Engels
famously stated, the bourgeoisie ‘cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing
the means of production’ (1998 [1848], p28). Technological dynamism is at the
heart of capitalism and, as a consequence, its technological trajectories are not
necessarily set in stone. ‘Capital, as value in motion, does not care about what it
makes, the machinery used or the motive source. It cares only about its own selfexpansion and valorization’ (Buck, 2006, p63). These are the incessant waves of
creative destruction that need to be harnessed towards the goal of a low-carbon
economy.
Recognizing the heightened power of finance in this phase of capitalist
development means asking questions about the dilemmas and opportunities of trying
to harness that power to the project of decarbonization, which include some of
the following. First, the pressure to disclose: from the US Securities and Exchange
Commission rulings, for example, forcing companies to disclose information about
78 Peter Newell
(2002) shows that finance capital is crucial to the Schumpetarian ‘waves of creative
destruction’ that challenge and dislodge the power of incumbents. Here it is
suggested that this will be vital to disinvesting in fossil fuels, such that the twist in
the story could yet be about the rise of a finance-led regime of accumulation and
its role in accelerating decarbonization.
Historically, finance capital has been vital to unsettling existing technologies,
industries and bases of political power. Carlota Perez’s (2013) work reminds us of
the key role of finance in supporting previous historical transitions – the ‘grand
experiments’ she refers to ‘when unrestrained finance can override the power of
the old production giants and fund the new entrepreneurs in testing the vast new
potential’. Examples include the technological revolutions produced in the
Industrial Revolution, what she refers to as the ‘age of steam and railways’, and
around ‘oil, automobile and mass production’ in the Fordist era described above,
for example (2002, p11). Indeed, as Arrighi notes: ‘Throughout the capitalist era
financial expansions have signalled the transition from one regime of accumulation
on a world scale to another. They are integral aspects of the recurrent destruction
of ‘old’ regimes and the simultaneous creation of new ones’ (2010, ppxi–xii).
This raises the question of whether the interests of different fractions of capital
– finance or money capital on the one hand, and productive capital concentrated
in fossil fuels on the other – can be played off against one another for the purposes
of producing a shift in the energy regime. While certain ‘base technologies’
(Storper and Walker, 1989) may characterize eras of capitalism, as Buck notes, it
is important not to ‘confuse particular manifestations of capitalism – that is,
particular historical social formations – with capitalism itself, thus under-estimating
the flexibility of the beast’ (2006, p60). If there is ‘one essential feature of the general
history of capitalism’, Braudel claims, it is ‘its unlimited flexibility, its capacity for
change and adaptation’ (1982, p433). Might it be possible, then, that climate change
can be reworked as an opportunity for growth where fossil fuels can be replaced
by, for example, a ‘solar revolution’ (Altvater, 2006, p53)? As Marx and Engels
famously stated, the bourgeoisie ‘cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing
the means of production’ (1998 [1848], p28). Technological dynamism is at the
heart of capitalism and, as a consequence, its technological trajectories are not
necessarily set in stone. ‘Capital, as value in motion, does not care about what it
makes, the machinery used or the motive source. It cares only about its own selfexpansion and valorization’ (Buck, 2006, p63). These are the incessant waves of
creative destruction that need to be harnessed towards the goal of a low-carbon
economy.
Recognizing the heightened power of finance in this phase of capitalist
development means asking questions about the dilemmas and opportunities of trying
to harness that power to the project of decarbonization, which include some of
the following. First, the pressure to disclose: from the US Securities and Exchange
Commission rulings, for example, forcing companies to disclose information about
78 Peter Newell